Monday, November 17, 2014

Kelley Lynch Email To City Attorney Mike Feuer Re. Preservation Of Evidence, Why A Local/State Order Cannot Subvert IRS Reporting Requirements; & Vague Terms

From: Kelley Lynch <>
Date: Mon, Nov 17, 2014 at 8:24 PM
Subject: Kelley Lynch: LAPD Report - Alleged Emails General Requests For Tax Information
To: City Attorney Mike Feuer cc:  IRS, FBI, DOJ, FTB & Multiple Recipients


I'm sorry to bother you again.  Unfortunately, the motions and lawsuits I am preparing and researching are time consuming and, unlike your team of professionals, I do not have a State Bar degree.

First, let me begin by stating that I have finally had the opportunity to research the specific reasons why a local county or state restraining order cannot subvert IRS reporting and corporate requirements related to a variety of entities in jurisdictions throughout the United States.  Those jurisdictions would include New York, Kentucky, Delaware, and California.  That is where the corporations were formed, exist, and for which federal and state tax returns were filed.  Of course, these all relate to very serious, outstanding legal, tax, and corporate matters between me and Leonard Cohen.  While I was his personal manager, I also have an ownership interest in numerous entities.  Furthermore, Cohen continues to refuse to provide me with IRS required form 1099 for the year 2004; refuses to rescind K-1s transmitted to State of Kentucky and IRS indicating that I am a partner on an entity that I am not; evidently believes he does not have to address other K-1s transmitted to IRS and FTB indicating income on other entities and phantom income shifted to me but not distributed; etc.  Furthermore, Leonard Cohen refuses to address his nearly $6.7 million in loans/expenditures from TH.  That is the entity Streeter told the jurors had only $100,000-$150,000 in assets although Cohen's loans (with interest due) are assets and now total approximately $10 million.  Unfortunately, one juror relied on her false statements.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States addresses why a local county or state order (including a fraudulently registered domestic violence order) cannot be used to subvert IRS requirements and/or federal tax and corporate matters.  I find it rather shocking that your office was unaware of that fact particularly in light of the fact that LAPD's report that formed the basis of my arrest and prosecution clearly states that the unauthenticated emails I allegedly sent were generally requests for tax information.  Additionally, a great deal of evidence was concealed from the jurors and, at times, Streeter would skip over emails about tax information and/or to IRS and address one of Leonard Cohen's three gun stories now before LA Superior Court about Phil Spector.  I am interested to know if Steve Cooley and Alan Jackson's role in my alleged trial proves a "quid pro quo" re. the prosecution Streeter noted they failed to bring following my 2006 Complaint to their Major Fraud Unit re. Cohen's theft, fraud, etc.  That information would be considered Brady material.

What I am requesting now, Mike is that you preserve and maintain all evidence that explains why LAPD, prosecutors, and LA Superior Court feel that a local county or state court order subverts IRS reporting requirements related to federal tax and corporate matters.

On another note, your office prepared and transmitted via U.S. mail domestic violence related orders to Robert Kory, Michelle Rice, and Bruce Cutler (who did not request one).  It's unclear, as are so many things with respect to my alleged matters, if these orders expired when probation was terminated or whether they were extended.  I have been forced to guess about so many matters and feel I am entitled to know.  

For the record, there was and is no "domestic violence" order in Boulder, Colorado and California DOJ has recently advised me that DV-600 does not change a foreign order into a domestic violence order.  This all seems rather unconstitutionally vague.

Kelley Lynch

The Supremacy Clause, found in Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, establishes the Constitution, Federal Statutes, and U.S. treaties as "the supreme law of the land."  Therefore, if a state law conflicts with a federal law, the federal law must be followed.
The Supremacy Clause states:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be Supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
According to U.S. law treaties are those international agreements that receive the advice and consent of the Senate. (Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution). A treaty to which United States is a party is given status equal to that of a federal legislation and therefore forms a part of the Supreme law of the land.
This concept of federal supremacy was first developed by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 406 (U.S. 1819), where the court held that the State of Maryland could not tax the Second Bank of United States, a branch of the National Bank. It was concluded that "the government of the Union, though limited in its power, is supreme and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, "any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
In Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (U.S. 1982) it was held that “a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute” and that a conflict will be found either where compliance with both federal and state law is impossible or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Similarly in Stone v. San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 862 (9th Cir. Cal. 1992) the court held on the issue of injunction and remediation, that "otherwise valid state laws or court orders cannot stand in the way of a federal court's remedial scheme if the action is essential to enforce the scheme. State policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees."
In effect, this means that a State law will be found to violate the Supremacy Clause when either of the following two conditions (or both) exist:[2]
1.    Compliance with both the Federal and State laws is impossible
2.    "State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"

The Supremacy Clause is the provision in Article SixClause 2 of the United States Constitution that establishes the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties as "the supreme law of the land." It provides that these are the highest form of law in the United States legal system, and mandates that all state judges must follow federal law when a conflict arises between federal law and either a state constitution or state law of any state.
The supremacy of federal law over state law only applies if Congress is acting in pursuance of its constitutionally authorized powers.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
Similarities exist between the Supremacy Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
The difference between the two is that while the Supremacy Clause deals with the relationship between the Federal Government and the states, the Fourteenth Amendment deals with the relationships among the Federal Government, the States, and the citizens of the United States.

In the case of California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989), the Supreme Court held that if Congress expressly intended to act in an area, this would trigger the enforcement of the Supremacy Clause, and hence nullify the state action. The Supreme Court further found in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363(2000), that even when a state law is not in direct conflict with a federal law, the state law could still be found unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause if the "state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress's full purposes and objectives".[4] Congress need not expressly assert any preemption over state laws either, because Congress may implicitly assume this preemption under the Constitution.

The Internal Revenue Code (IRC), formally the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, is the domestic portion of federal statutory tax law in the United States, published in various volumes of the United States Statutes at Large, and separately as Title 26 of theUnited States Code (USC).[1] It is organized topically, into subtitles and sections, covering income tax (see Income tax in the United States), payroll taxesestate taxesgift taxes, and excise taxes; as well as procedure and administration. Its implementing agency is the Internal Revenue Service.

The Internal Revenue Code includes most but not all federal tax statutes. Some tax statutes are found in other provisions of the United States Code including title 11 (related to bankruptcy) and title 28 (related to the judiciary). Further, some tax statutes are not codified at all (for example, the provisions of tax statutes that list the effective dates of Internal Revenue Code amendments).

In its role in administering the tax laws enacted by the Congress, the IRS must take the specifics of these laws and translate them into detailed regulations, rules and procedures.