Saturday, March 14, 2015

Kelley Lynch's Email To Michelle Blaine Re. Phil Spector & The Coordinated Campaign Of Cyber-Terrorism That Involves Stalker Stephen Gianelli

From: Kelley Lynch <>
Date: Sat, Mar 14, 2015 at 8:01 PM
To: Michelle Blaine <>, "*irs. commissioner" <*>, Washington Field <>, ASKDOJ <>, ": Division, Criminal" <>, "Doug.Davis" <>, Dennis <>, rbyucaipa <>, khuvane <>, blourd <>, Robert MacMillan <>, a <>, wennermedia <>, Mick Brown <>, "glenn.greenwald" <>, lrohter <>, Harriet Ryan <>, "hailey.branson" <>, Feedback <>, "" <>,

Michelle Blaine,

It's quite obvious that Stephen Gianelli, you, and others (Escobar) are engaged in a highly coordinated campaign of terrorism re Phil Spector.  So let's be clear.  Paulette Brandt and I think you targeted Phil Spector and set him up.  Leonard Cohen's tax fraud is outrageous.  Do you think a Canadian can move here and defraud the taxpayers.  Good luck.  I have evidence going back to 1977.  I don't care what LA Confidential does.  Cooley and Jackson joined forces publicly with Cohen.  I've asked Oliver Stone to weigh in.  

People need to go to prison over this situation.  It's a game right, Michelle.  Think long and hard about your game.

Kelley Lynch

February 6, 2007 10:56

Phil Spector to receive $900,000 settlement

Legendary producer’s former assistant has to pay up

Read more at 

mControl Blogs

Something kinda interesting... Henry Lee does NOT list the Spector case in his 'Famous Cases' listing.

Updated! Kelley Lynch Blog Is GONE! Blogger finally listened and has pulled the flagged blog. Thanks to all who flagged and especially to Blogonaut for initiating the pull.

Blog has been removed
Sorry, the blog at has been removed. This address is not available for new blogs.
June 21, 2009 3:16 PM


We have confirmed that the spam/hate blog of the person currently living in Boulder, Colorado, has been removed by Google.

We consider this the end of the matter, and unless and until there are actual additional criminal or civil court filings related to this matter, we will not be reporting further on this sadly demented person.
June 22, 2009 3:05 PM

mControl said...
Well I am pleased that this saga is finally put to bed. Now we can all get a bit of rest from her constant diatribes and rants.

Peace be with her...
June 22, 2009 5:29 PM

New comments have been disabled for this post by a blog administrator.

About mControl
Some days, I fall off the face of the planet and forget to brush my teeth and, more importantly, even forget to tell my kids to brush their teeth, because holy shit there are people inside my computer that are calling for me day and night, longing for me to write, thinking, sometimes mistakenly, that I am witty and funny! I can’t let them down!So here I am, neglecting my real life, one blog at a time.

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This is a personal weblog. The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of any other people, unless otherwise noted. This is a blog. That fact means nothing. It is not a peer-reviewed journal, a final archive of my writing, a sponsored publication, or the product of gatekeeping and editing. That does mean something…it means that while the ideas and thoughts are often vital and the product of a long gestational period, the writing itself is not. It is essentially as it came from the keyboard: spontaneous, unproofed, unrevised, and corrected afterward only when necessary to address mistakes that grossly effect the intent.
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Posted by at 10:05 PM M

Li'l Red by PhillyBoyWonder (print image)

Kelley Lynch's Email To Leonard Cohen's Lawyer Re. The Proxy Stalker's Ongoing Harassment

From: Kelley Lynch <>
Date: Sat, Mar 14, 2015 at 12:15 PM
Subject: Fwd: FYI re: Kelley Lynch emails dated Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 5:45 AM and Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 5:24 AM
To: Jeffrey Korn <>, "irs.commissioner" <>, Washington Field <>, ASKDOJ <>, "Division, Criminal" <>, "Doug.Davis" <>, Dennis <>, MollyHale <>, nsapao <>, fsb <>, rbyucaipa <>, khuvane <>, blourd <>, Robert MacMillan <>, a <>, wennermedia <>, Mick Brown <>, woodwardb <>, "glenn.greenwald" <>, lrohter <>, Harriet Ryan <>, "hailey.branson" <>, "stan.garnett" <>,, Feedback <>, "" <>

Jeffrey Korn,

As you and I personally discussed, I will be filing a motion.  In fact, I spent the day copying the exhibits yesterday.  The document is voluminous as I want to present evidence showing what has actually unfolded.  I was not served Leonard Cohen's lawsuit.  

The Proxy Stalker continues to harass me and Paulette Brandt over this motion and Leonard Cohen.  He writes legal opinions and is now providing Paulette and me with legal documents related to void judgments.

I will be quite clear with Agent Tejeda that what he is looking at is a 10 year conspiracy to cover up criminal tax fraud and obstruct justice.  Judge Hess is now going to prove precisely how much fraud and perjury Los Angeles Superior Court believes is acceptable.  I will then file a federal lawsuit against Cohen.

You are the attorney of record regardless of your inane comments to me the other day and you will be served the motion and exhibits.  

Kelley Lynch

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sat, Mar 14, 2015 at 11:26 AM
Subject: FYI re: Kelley Lynch emails dated Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 5:45 AM and Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 5:24 AM

Dear Ms. Brandt (assisting in the attempted relitigation of issues long ago decided) and Ms. Lynch:

There comes a time when the litigation is over. Respectfully, that time came when the $7M judgment (attached) was entered following a hearing that Ms. Lynch was invited to, but declined to attend, based on supporting evidence attached to that email (to which Ms. Lynch replied). The law simply does not contemplate the “never-ending lawsuit”. Absent extraordinary circumstances not present here, the law requires that judgments that have not been timely appealed to be final. See the below illustrative case.

Ms. Brandt, you would save Ms. Lynch and yourself a great deal of hardship and turmoil by loaning Ms. Lynch $3,000 to sit down with an experienced Californian litigation attorney, after he has been provided copies of the prior judgment and Judge Hess’ minute order dated January 17, 2013, as well as a copy of the Memorandum in support of the motion that Ms. Lynch has been claiming daily and weekly that she is poised to file, most recently when “Paulette” is available to drive her to the courthouse (Ms. Lynch apparently lacking transportation of her own).

61 F.3d 916
James E. STEWART, Plaintiff-Appellant, and
Twashakarris, Inc., d/b/a English Language Center, an
Oklahoma corporation, Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES of America; Department of Justice;
Immigration & Naturalization Service; Internal
Revenue Service, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-6086.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
July 25, 1995.
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further order.
Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
1. After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

2. James E. Stewart, a pro se litigant, and a corporation, Twashakarris, Incorporated, which is represented by the pro se litigant, appeal an adverse summary judgment.

3. We first dismiss the corporate defendant's appeal. The corporation is represented by Mr. Stewart who is not an attorney. A corporation may appear in court only through an attorney. The corporation thus failed to perfect its appeal and failed to prosecute its appeal.

4. Mr. Stewart commenced this action based upon events which occurred in 1982 and which were previously litigated. The underlying facts were raised through Defendants' motion for summary judgment and the trial court concluded the earlier judgments were a bar to this suit. It is this decision which Mr. Stewart now appeals.

5. Mr. Stewart seeks to avoid the bar of the previous judgments by asserting the previous judgments are void. In short he argues the previous litigations were meaningless as the judgments rendered therein are void and he asserts he is now entitled to relitigate the matters previously raised. He argues the previous judgments are void and unenforceable because they resulted from a gross violation of due process, extrinsic fraud and inaccurate and incomplete factual bases. In fact, this is the second time Mr. Stewart has filed an action seeking to relitigate the issues which were previously decided against him. Mr. Stewart fails to realize this civil action is not the appropriate forum to raise these challenges. There comes a time when litigation ceases. That time has long since passed.

6. Mr. Stewart has failed to convince this court that he may relitigate the issues decided in the prior adjudications.

7. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed for substantially the same reasons set forth in the trial court's order of December 27, 1994, a copy thereof being attached hereto.

Kelley Lynch's Motion for Terminating Sanctions & Memorandum Re. Leonard Cohen's Abusive Litigation Misconduct


 This Motion seeks to put an end to Leonard Cohen’s intentional and unrelenting pattern of misconduct and litigation abuse.  The misconduct in this case includes the excessive and knowing use of perjured statements, fabricated financial data, concealed evidence, and fraudulent misrepresentations.  Plaintiffs, together with their legal counsel (specifically officers of the court Robert Kory and Michelle Rice), have severely undermined the integrity of this Court and caused substantial prejudice and harm to Kelley Lynch. 
Dismissal is warranted where perjury and fraud upon the court is systemic and designed to sabotage and enhance a case.  Terminating sanctions, and other relief, would restore order and dignity to the judicial process.  No sanction short of dismissal is appropriate.

On August 15, 2005, Leonard Cohen filed the Summons and Complaint in this matter.  See Complaint on file.  Defendant denies all allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint; contends that she was not served the Summons & Complaint; continues to maintain that this Court lacks jurisdiction over her (including with respect to the denial of Defendant’s Motion to Vacate; and, has prepared a Proposed Answer to the exceedingly disturbing Complaint.  Exhibit 1:  Proposed Answer to Complaint, attached hereto and made a part hereof.
Plaintiffs’ use of litigation tactics and egregious misconduct, throughout these proceedings, are addressed more fully in the declarations and exhibits attached hereto and made a part hereof.  See also Lynch’s Case History attached to her Motion to Vacate.  Some of the tactics used against Lynch were also memorialized in Natural Wealth’s June 2005 lawsuit against Leonard Cohen and his lawyer, Robert Kory, in the District Court in Denver, Colorado.  A copy of that lawsuit was attached as Exhibit A to Tactical Allocation Services, LLC’s Ex Parte Application in Intervention for Order Protecting & Preserving Documentary Evidence filed in Related Case No. BC341120 on November 14, 2005, made a part hereof, and addressed further in Lynch’s Summary of Factual Allegations & Statements attached hereto and made a part hereof.  Exhibit 2: Kelley Lynch’s Summary of Factual Allegations & Statements Re: Natural Wealth Real Estate, Inc., et al. v. Leonard Cohen, et al., Case No. Case 1:05-cv-01233-LTB.
Cohen’s ultimate goal was to crush and destroy Lynch; bring her to her knees by rendering her financially incapable of defending against his lurid allegations; seal her fate through the use of salacious, inflammatory slander; and, undermine her credibility as a witness in this and other matters.  Exhibit 3:  Summary of Fraudulent Misrepresentations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint attached hereto and made a part hereof.
            On May 15, 2006, the Court entered a default judgment against Defendant. 
On August 9, 2013, Lynch filed a Motion to Vacate and set aside the default judgment due to lack of service of the Summons & Complaint.  
             On January 17, 2014, without obtaining jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court denied Lynch’s request to vacate the default judgment.
Plaintiffs have acted in bad faith and with improper purpose in a manner that degrades, offends, and jeopardizes the integrity of the judicial system.  Manufactured evidence, fraudulent misrepresentations, and perjured testimony have continuously been introduced into this case.  When a litigant's conduct abuses the judicial process, the United States Supreme Court has recognized dismissal of a lawsuit as the remedy within the inherent power of the court.  Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. (1991) 501 U.S. 32.  Exhibit 4:  Declaration of Kelley Lynch; Exhibit 5:  Declaration of Joan Lynch; Exhibit 6:  Declaration of John Rutger Penick; Exhibit 7:  Declaration of Paulette Brandt; Exhibit 8:  Declaration of Clea Surkhang; Exhibit 9:  Declaration of Palden Ronge; Exhibit 10:  Declaration of Dan Meade, all attached hereto and made a part hereof.

This Motion argues that Plaintiffs’ fraud on the court forms the basis for dismissal with prejudice.  Dismissal with prejudice has long been available as a sanction against litigation misconduct. 

Courts have inherent equitable powers to dismiss actions or enter default judgments for failure to prosecute, contempt of court, or abusive litigation practices. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 632, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); United States v. Moss-American, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 214, 216 (E.D.Wis.1978). 
It is well-established that these equitable powers include the authority to dismiss the claims or defenses against a litigant who engages in dishonest conduct, obstructs the discovery process, abuses the judicial process, or otherwise seeks to perpetrate a fraud on the court. See Link v. Wabash Railroad Co. See also Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp, 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989); McDowell v. Seaboard Farms of Athens, Inc., 1996 WL 684140, 2-3 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (cases cited therein); Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 389 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that, when a litigant commits a fraud upon the court, “the inherent powers of the court support the sanction of dismissal and entry of default judgment”); Pope v. Federal Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 984 (8 Cir. 1992) (dishonest conduct that “threatens the integrity of the judicial process” is grounds for dismissal with prejudice); Amway Corp. v. Shapiro Express Co., 102 F.R.D. 564, 569–70 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Figgie Int’l, Inc. v. Alderman, 698 So. 2d 563, 567–68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); O’Vahey v. Miller, 644 So. 2d 550, 551 (holding that “the ultimate sanctions of dismissal or default are justified by the repeated presentation of false testimony under oath”).
The United States Supreme Court held that a court need not endure the indignity of a fraud being perpetrated upon it and concluded that a court possesses the “inherent power” to manage its affairs in such a way as to ensure that cases are not resolved by vexatious or oppressive tactics, or through conduct that skirts the legal obligations that bind all litigants and their attorneys to use the courts in a fair, honest, and open manner.  The equitable power also allows a court to vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the court.  “Courts have inherent power to fashion and impose appropriate sanctions for conduct that abuses the judicial process.”  Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.
This “historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments,” is necessary to the integrity of the courts, for “tampering with the administration of justice in [this] manner ... involves far more than an injury to a single litigant.  It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.”  Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944).  See also Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580, 66 S.Ct. 1176, 1179, 90 L.Ed. 1447 (1946).
The integrity of the litigation process depends on truthful disclosure of facts.  Dismissal with prejudice has long been available as the ultimate civil sanction against litigation misconduct.  “A system that depends on an adversary’s endless ability to uncover falsehoods is doomed to failure, which is why this kind of conduct must be discouraged in the strongest possible way.”  Cox v. Burke.  The need for the orderly administration of justice does not permit violations of due process.  Phoceene Sous Marine, S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802, 805-06 (9th Cir.1982).
The California Supreme Court has recognized that California courts have inherent powers, independent of statute, derived from two distinct sources: the courts’ “equitable power derived from the historic power of equity courts” and “supervisory or administrative powers which all courts possess to enable them to carry out their duties.”  Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 626, 635 [150 Cal.Rptr. 461, 586 P.2d 942].  “Such power is part of the inherent power of the superior court (and of courts generally) to control litigation before it, to prevent abuse of its process, and to create a remedy for a wrong even in the absence of specific statutory remedies.”  Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v. RMI, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1116-1117 [222 Cal.Rptr. 556].
The Peat, Marwick Court, in a highly relevant California decision on the inherent authority of courts, affirmed that judges are empowered to act when a party seeks to take unfair advantage of “the integrity of the judicial system.”  This decision directly addressed the fact that a court’s inherent powers include the authority to terminate a case for litigation misconduct.  It is the responsibility of courts to preserve the integrity of the adversary process and the fair and efficient administration of justice.  Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 272, 287 (1988). 
Plaintiffs’ serial misconduct cannot be remedied by any sanction other than a terminating sanction.  The misconduct, involves a deliberate and elaborate scheme of perjury, fraudulent misrepresentations, and abusive tactics, and, clearly qualifies as a willful deceit that has irreparably harmed Lynch and the integrity of the Court itself.  Sanctions should be imposed to redress the misconduct that severely undermines the integrity of the judicial system.
Fraud upon the Court, an equitable remedy, deals with the integrity of courts and justice.  The concept of fraud upon the court correctly challenges a preferential judicial legal principle:  the finality of a judgment.  A “fraud on the court” as that term has been defined by the 9th Circuit is “an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.”  England v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309 (9th Cir. 1960).
A party who is guilty of fraud or misconduct, in the prosecution or defense of a civil proceeding, should not be permitted to continue to employ the very institution it has subverted to achieve his or her ends.  Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1956). Thus, egregious and irreparable misconduct should result in the case being dismissed with prejudice.  The power of a court to grant such relief not only deters improper actions by a party, but offers the defendant an opportunity to remedy the fraud through appropriate and available sanctions. 
The inherent power allows a court to vacate its own judgment upon proof that fraud has been perpetrated upon the court. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co; Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co.  It is a well-recognized principle that a court of general jurisdiction has the inherent power to set aside a judgment obtained through fraud practiced upon the court.  McKeever v. Superior Court, 85 Cal.App. 381 [259 P. 373]; McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 222 [237 P. 42, 45, 40 A.L.R. 1110].  “There can be no question as to the inherent power of the court to set aside the final decree if obtained by fraud.”  Miller v. Miller, 26 Cal. 2d 119, 121 [156 P.2d 931].
To constitute fraud on the court, the alleged misconduct must “harm the integrity of the judicial process.”  Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir.1989).  Fraud upon the court should embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.  Gumport v. China International Trust and Inv. Corp. (In re Intermagnetics America, Inc.), 926 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting 7 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶60.33, at 515 (2d ed. 1978))Fraud upon the court includes both attempts to subvert the integrity of the court and fraud by an officer of the court.
7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 60.33, at 515 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter Moore], quoted in Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir.1989).
There are evidently no maxims of the law more firmly established, or of more value in the administration of justice, than those which were designed to prevent repeated “litigation” between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy.  However, according to United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878), there is an admitted exception to this general rule in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side,—these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and a fair hearing.  See U.S. v. Throckmorton.  Relief has also been granted, on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court.
There is no statute of limitations for bringing a fraud on the court claim.  As the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals explained:  “a decision produced by fraud on the court is not in essence a decision at all and never becomes final.”  Kenner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 387 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1968).
Due to the irreparable prejudice accruing to Defendant by reason of the misconduct, interference with the Court's adjudicatory function, the public interest in the integrity of the judicial system, dismissal is warranted. 
Defendant seeks sanctions for litigation abuses and misconduct.  Plaintiffs’ conduct warrants dismissal sanctions under the Court’s inherent equitable power.  California courts retain flexibility to exercise historic inherent authority in modern circumstances, fashioning procedures and remedies as necessary to protect litigants’ rights.  See Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 830, 848, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 560; Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377-1378, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882.
Dismissal is an available sanction in extraordinary circumstances. Valley Engineers, Inc. v. Electric Engineering Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998). Dismissal is appropriate where a “pattern of deception and discovery abuse made it impossible” for the district court to conduct a trial “with any reasonable assurance that the truth would be available.”  Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 69 F.3d 337, 352 (9th Cir.1995)
According to the 9th Circuit, “extraordinary circumstances exist where there is a pattern of disregard for Court orders and deceptive litigation tactics that threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of a case.”   Valley Engineers, Inc. v. Electric Engineering Co.
Terminating sanctions are appropriate when a party seeks to take unfair advantage; the integrity of the judicial system is at risk; and as punishment or redress for grossly improper litigation behavior.  Federal courts, and their state counterparts, have a “well-acknowledged inherent power to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices.”   DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 1998).  When the offending party has engaged in truly willful or bad faith egregious litigation practices, the Supreme Court has affirmed that “outright dismissal of a lawsuit . . . is within the court's discretion.”  Chambers v. Nasco, Inc
The court in Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736, held that a trial court has inherent power to impose a terminating sanction where a plaintiff's litigation abuse and misconduct was deliberate and egregious.  It is well settled that dismissal is warranted where a party has engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings: “courts have inherent power to dismiss an action when a party has willfully deceived the court and engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice.” Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 709 F.2d (9th Cir. 1983). 
In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., the U.S. Supreme Court granted relief based on the introduction of fraudulent evidence.  The Court explained that the inquiry as to whether a judgment should be set aside for fraud upon the court focused on whether the alleged fraud harmed the integrity of the judicial process:  “Tampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society. Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always wait upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.”  The policy of finality is not absolute.
When the plaintiff has engaged in misconduct during the course of the litigation that is deliberate, that is egregious, and that renders any remedy short of dismissal inadequate to preserve the fairness of the trial, the trial court has the inherent power to dismiss the action.  Such an exercise of inherent authority is essential for every court to remain “a place where justice is judicially administered.”  Von Schmidt v. Widber (1893) 99 Cal. 511, 512, 34 p. 109, quoting 3 Blackstone Commentary 23. 
Plaintiffs willfully deceived the court and engaged in misconduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice, requirements of due process, and severe sanctions are the appropriate remedy. 
The court in Televideo Systems, Inc. vs. Heidenthal (9th Cir. 1987) 826 F.2d 915, 917) concluded that the appellant’s “elaborate scheme involving perjury clearly qualifies as a willful deceit of the court” and noted that “it infected all of the pretrial procedures and interfered egregiously with the court’s administration of justice.”  The Court sanctioned Heidenthal not merely to punish him, but to enable the court to proceed to hear and decide the case untainted by further interference and possible further perjury on the part of Heidenthal.
Dismissal is an appropriate sanction for perjury because committing perjury is tantamount to acting in bad faith.  Arnold v. County of El Dorado, No. 2:10-CV-3119 KJM-GGH, 2012 WL 3276979, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:10-CV-3119 KJM-GGH (E.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2012). 
California Penal Code Section 118 defines “perjury” as deliberately giving false information while under oath.  The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “a witness testifying under oath or affirmation violates this statute if she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.”  United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993).  All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth.  In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 228 (1945).   
Plaintiffs, together with officers of the court Robert Kory and Michelle Rice, have obstructed the judicial process by repeatedly providing false statements and testimony under oath, through fraudulent misrepresentations, by concealing evidence, providing misleading and deceptive statements to the Court, and submitting fraudulent financial and accounting data to the Court (which was referred to, with respect to Lynch’s Motion to Vacate, in Robert Kory’s declaration that attached Kevin Prins’ declaration in support of the default and “expense ledger.” 
“In order to lawfully hold a person to answer on the charge of perjury under California Penal Code section 118, evidence must exist of a “willful statement, under oath, of any material matter which the witness knows to be false.”   Cabe v. Superior Court, (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 732.  The statements were material and used to affect the outcome of the proceedings and most certainly had the probability of influencing the outcome.  In Ex Parte Davis, (1921) 52 Cal.App. 631 the Court held that:  “The matter sworn to need not be directly and immediately material. It is sufficient if it be so connected with the fact directly in issue as to have a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove such fact by giving weight or probability to the testimony of a witness testifying thereto, or otherwise.” 
Perjury is a criminal offense and an affront to the judicial system.  Sanctions should be imposed to redress the misconduct that severely undermines the integrity of the judicial system.  In the instant matter, Plaintiffs have engaged in a deliberate deception of this Court by the continuous presentation of statements known to be perjured and through other means.
Defendant additionally argues that Plaintiffs should be precluded from seeking relief due to its own unclean hands.  The underlying aim of the unclean hands doctrine is to promote justice by making a plaintiff answer for his own misconduct.  Kendall-lackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 4th 970, 978-79 (1999).  This doctrine arises from long-standing legal principles rooted in fairness. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted regarding the unclean hands doctrine, “This maxim is far more than a mere banality. It is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief. That doctrine is rooted in the historical concept of a court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith.”  Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co. 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945).
The clean hands doctrine allows courts to refuse relief to any plaintiff who has acted inequitably.  Judicial integrity, justice, and the public interest form the basis for the doctrine.  The defense of unclean hands arises from the maxim, “‘He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.’”  Blain v. Doctor’s Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1059.  The doctrine demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he seeks a remedy.  He must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim.  Precision Co. v. Automotive Co. (1945) 324 U.S. 806, 814-815; Hall v. Wright (9th Cir. 1957) 240 F.2d 787, 794-795. 
California has long recognized the maxim that “No one can take advantage of his own wrong.” (Civ. Code. § 3517.) “He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.” See Wilson v. S.L. Rey, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal. App.4th 234, 244; Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd v. Superior Court.  The doctrine promotes justice and prevents “a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression.”  Precision Co. v. Automotive Co.; Keystone Co. v. Excavator Co. (1933) 290 U.S. 240, 245.  See also London v. Marco, 229 P.2d 401, 402 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951)(misleading statements made to the court constitutes unclean hands); Lazaro v. Lazaro (In re Marriage of Lazaro), No. A107473, 2005 WL 1332102, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 6, 2005) (finding that presenting false testimony in a court proceeding goes to the core of the unclean hands doctrine).
Under the “unclean hands” doctrine, a party is barred from relief if he has engaged in any unconscientious conduct directly related to the transaction or matter before the court.  Burton v. Sosinsky (1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 562, 573 [250 Cal.Rptr. 33]; California Satellite Systems, Inc. v. Nichols (1985) 170 Cal. App. 3d 56, 70 [216 Cal.Rptr. 180]. 
The authority to dismiss a lawsuit for litigant misconduct is a creature of the “clean hands doctrine” and is applicable to both equitable and legal damages claims. Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 544 F.Supp. 242, 244-245 (D SC, 1981). See also Mas v Coca-Cola Co., 163 F.2d 505, 507 (CA 4, 1947).  
Plaintiffs have come before this Court with unclean hands.  They have engaged in extreme and abusive litigation misconduct.  They have taken advantage of Dependent due to the fact that she has been self-represented since the Complaint in this matter was filed.  The Court should not aid or reward Plaintiffs for their egregious misconduct.  Cohen’s very presence before this Court is the result of his own wrongful conduct, retaliation, fraud, and inequity.

The judgment is void to the extent it provides relief “which a court under no circumstances has any authority to grant.”  Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 20 [84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715]; Selma Auto Mall II v. Appellate Department (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1683 [52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599].  “No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party.”  Scott v. McNeal,154 U. S. 34,154 U. S. 46
            For the past 10 years, Leonard Cohen and his representatives have steadfastly refused to provide Lynch with IRS required form 1099 for the year 2004, corporate tax documents for the years 2004 and 2005, rescind K-1s issued to Lynch by Leonard Cohen’s wholly owned LC Investments, LLC, provide intellectual property valuations and information (including royalty statements, evidence of royalty payments, all contracts and agreements, federal and state tax returns), she requires to have a complete and proper accounting prepared.  This information is required for Lynch’s 2004 and 2005 federal and state tax returns.  At Lynch’s March 12, 2012 bail hearing, Cohen testified that Lynch “failed” to file her tax returns.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Leonard Cohen, and his legal representatives, have knowingly and willfully refused to provide me with the required information and are obstructing justice with respect to Lynch’s ability to file these returns.  In fact, rather than providing this information to Lynch, Cohen testified that he reported these requests for tax information to the police.  Cohen’s lawyer, Michelle Rice, testified that a fraudulent restraining order prevents her from transmitting this information to Lynch and informed Lynch that she should have obtained this information during the discovery process in the instant case.  The May 2006 judgment does not appear to be retroactive and Lynch would like clarification of the issues raised in Exhibit 11, Clarification of Ambiguities in Default Judgment, attached hereto and made a part hereof.
State and local government agencies may not encumber the exercise of federal authority. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl.2, “a state is without power ... to provide conditions on which the federal government will effectuate its policies.”  United States v. Georgia Public SefVice Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285, 293 (1963).  Leonard Cohen’s argument, with respect to Lynch’s request for IRS filing and reporting requirements, essentially concludes that a state judgment negates his (and “Cohen” related corporate entities which is not an IRS classification) tax obligations, and those of the corporate entities addressed in Exhibit 11, vis a vis Internal Revenue Service rules and requirements and those of the federal government and other tax authorities such as the Franchise Tax Board and equivalent State of Kentucky authorities.  There are matters of local concern within the scope of federal power which, in the silence of Congress, may be regulated in such manner as does not impair national uniformity.  There are federal activities which, in the absence of specific Congressional consent, may be affected by state regulation. 
“Since the United States is a government of delegated powers, none of which may be exercised throughout the Nation by any one state, it is necessary for uniformity that the laws of the United States be dominant over those of any state. Such dominancy is required also to avoid a breakdown of administration through possible conflicts arising from inconsistent requirements. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states this essential principle. Article VI. A corollary to this principle is that the activities of the federal government are free from regulation by any state.  No other adjustment of competing enactments or legal principles is possible.  Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943).
As the activities of the federal government are presumptively free from state regulation, unless Congress has clearly authorized state regulation in a specific area (See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1976)), it would seem self-evident that a state or local municipal court’s judgment does not subvert IRS reporting and filing requirements. 
After the entry of a state judgment, federal law dictates the consequences for federal tax purposes.  Thus, under the doctrine of preemption, which is based upon the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal law must control
            The trial court has continuing jurisdiction to effectuate its prior judgments, either by summarily ordering compliance with a clear judgment or by interpreting an ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate the judgment as interpreted.  This authority is grounded in its inherent powers.
Based on the foregoing, Kelley Lynch respectfully requests that the Court sustain the Motion, impose terminating and other sanctions upon Plaintiffs and their counsel (Robert Kory and Michelle Rice), and grant such other or further relief as the Court may deem just and appropriate.  That would include, but is not limited to, in the alternative, permitting Lynch to be heard on the actual merits of the case, referring this matter to the local prosecutor for perjury charges and the state disciplinary board.  Additionally, Lynch asks this Court to clarify the ambiguous judgment entered against Lynch.  Finally, Defendant Lynch asks the Court to overturn and invalidate the settlement agreement entered into by Cohen and former co-defendant, Richard Westin, and order Plaintiffs to provide Lynch with transcripts of all mediation proceedings and a copy of the settlement agreement itself.  According to Leonard Cohen’s testimony, during the mediation, Richard Westin rectified a “mistake” with respect to Traditional Holdings, LLC (and possibly other matters) and this issue raises federal tax implications that remain unresolved.  That would include, but is not limited to, the inclusion of Lynch as a partner on Traditional Holdings, LLC 2001, 2002, and 2003 federal tax returns. 
Dated:  13 March 2015

                                                                                    Kelley Lynch
                                                                                    In Propria Persona

Case No. BC338322

Exhibit 1:  Defendant’s Proposed Answer to Complaint.

Exhibit 2: Kelley Lynch’s Summary of Factual Allegations & Statements Re: Natural Wealth Real Estate, Inc., et al. v. Leonard Cohen, et al., Case No. Case 1:05-cv-01233-LTB.

Exhibit 3:  Summary of Fraudulent Misrepresentations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Exhibit 4:  Declaration of Kelley Lynch.

Exhibit 5:  Declaration of Joan Marie Lynch.

Exhibit 6:  Declaration of John Rutger Penick.

Exhibit 7:  Declaration of Paulette Brandt.

Exhibit 8:  Declaration of Clea Surkhang.

Exhibit 9:  Declaration of Palden Ronge.

Exhibit 10:  Declaration of Dan Meade.

Exhibit 11: Clarification of Ambiguities in Default Judgment.




CASE NO. 1:05-cv-01233-LTB



















I, Paulette Brandt, certify as follows:

1.      At the time of service I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action.

2.      My residence address is:  1754 N. Van Ness Avenue, Los Angeles, California  90028.

3.      The electronic service address from which I served the documents is

4.      On March 13, 2015, I served the following documents:


5.      I served the documents on the person below, as follows: 

a.       Name of person served:  JEFFREY KORN, ESQUIRE
(Attorney of record for Leonard Cohen and LC Investments, LLC)

b.      Residential address where person was served:

714 W. Olympic Blvd.
Suite 450
Los Angeles, California  90015

c.        Electronic service address where person was served:

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 16, 2015.

                                                                        Paulette Brandt