Kelley
Lynch
In
Propria Persona
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Leonard
Norman Cohen, an Case
No. BC338322
Individual,
Leonard Cohen Related
Case No. BC341120
Investments,
LLC, a Delaware
Limited
Liability Company Honorable
Robert L. Hess
Department
24
Plaintiff
vs. Hearing
Date: May 29, 2015
Time: 8:30 AM
Kelley
Lynch, an individual, et al. Complaint
Filed: August 15, 2005
Defendants
DEFENDANT
KELLEY LYNCH’S REPLY
TO
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SEAL PORTIONS
OF THE
COURT RECORD, SHORTEN NOTICE
OF
HEARING, DECLARATION OF KELLEY LYNCH
TO PLAINTIFFS, LEONARD
COHEN & LC INVESTMENTS, LLC AND THEIR
ATTORNEYS:
INTRODUCTION
The
law requires that a party that seeks to keep court records from public view
must demonstrate a compelling reason for doing so. However, instead of a compelling argument
supported by articulable facts, Plaintiffs have offered only sweeping
conclusory assertions, supported by blatantly misleading and/or false
statements. Lynch does agree that there
may be one or two documents subject to legitimate dispute but contends that
this issue will be resolved when the Court issues its final judgment. These documents are not sufficient to
overcome the longstanding presumption of public access to court records. Nor is Lynch’s decision to present this
evidence to the court for invalid or harassing purposes. Lynch has spent approximately 10 years
attempting to resolve these issues and it ultimately led to two false arrests
and imprisonments. The motion and
documents filed in connection with the Defendant’s Motion for Terminating
Sanctions in this case should therefore remain unsealed.
Plaintiffs’ motion is based upon the grounds that defendant
has been found to have no interest in Plaintiff’s [sic] entities and has
otherwise been ordered to return all Plaintiff’s personal property that she
wrongfully retained after being terminated for cause as Plaintiff’s personal
manager in or around October, 2004.
Despite such court orders, Defendant has retained privileged and
confidential documents of Plaintiff’s, including attorney-client privileged
communications and tax documentation, and Defendant has now disclosed such
privileged and confidential information in her Motion for Terminating Sanctions
and has published same on the internet and her blog. See riverdeepbook.blogspot.com.
ARGUMENT
Defendant, Kelley Lynch, objects to the scheduling of
Plaintiffs’ ex parte application to seal portions of the court record, or in
the alternative, for an order shortening time on the hearing of Plaintiffs’
motion to seal. On Thursday, May 28,
2015, Kelley Lynch advised Bergman Law Group and Kory Rice Law Firm that we
should continue to abide by the Court’s November 18, 2013 Order that
states: “Plaintiff hereby consents to
service by Plaintiff by Plaintiff [Defendant?] of further Motion documents, if
any, by email to jeffkorn@live.com” and
“Plaintiff will serve all Motion related documents via email and overnight
delivery to the email and physical addresses provided on Defendant’s currently
filed Motion documents.” That email
address is: kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com. Plaintiffs advised Lynch that the email
address on the Motion for Terminating Sanctions (which may have been
inadvertent as that email address is alternate and created due to the ongoing
harassing emails) was: REDACTED. Due to the ongoing issues re. proper service
and lack of jurisdiction, Defendant Kelley Lynch refused to accept service
until the Court personally clarified this situation. She has been falsely accused of willfully
violating a Boulder, Colorado Order that the Boulder Combined Court informed
her had expired on February 15, 2009.
Therefore, Lynch will leave nothing to chance. This matter could have been avoided if, when
the substitution of attorney was filed (substituting one attorney of record for
another while not filing a withdrawal of counsel), a revised Order was prepared
for the Court to sign. Kelley Lynch will
not and does not consent to email service with either law firm currently on
record with the Court. Daniel Bergman
served as Kelley Lynch’s ex-husband’s custody lawyer and the outcome of that
situation was thoroughly and utterly unconscionable. Kelley Lynch would like the Court personally
to resolve this situation in a manner that is fair, reasonable, and does not
cause her further emotional and mental distress.
Additionally,
over the past several days, Kelley Lynch has received numerous emails to the
following email accounts:
kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com and REDACTED.
Additionally,
while Defendant did receive Plaintiffs’ initial Ex Parte document package by
email in a timely manner the morning of May 28, 2015, she received the
following documents (two of which were corrected) at 4:51 PM: 1) Plaintiff’s ex parte application
to grant Plaintiff’s Motion to seal portions of the court record, or in
the alternative for an order shortening time on the hearing of
Plaintiff’s Motion to seal; Declaration of Pourya Keshavarzi re ex
parte notice, 2) Proposed order on Plaintiff’s ex parte application
for Motion to seal portions of the court record or in the alternative,
for an order shortening time for hearing on said Motion, 3) Corrected Plaintiff’s notice of
Motion and Motion to seal portions of the court record, and 4) Corrected
proposed order on Plaintiff’s Motion to seal Portions of the court record. This is completely inappropriate and
Defendant believes the Court should reschedule the ex parte hearing after
addressing the new manner that the parties will serve one another. As there is presently a hearing scheduled for
June 23, 2015, and Plaintiffs waited approximately 3 months (with approximately
four lawyers working on this matter), Defendant objects to any shorter notice
with respect to a hearing on this matter.
This lengthy delay in filing the ex parte application disproves
Plaintiffs position that the need to seal documents is a matter of urgency. See Exhibit A.
California
Rules of Court, Rule 3.1203 states that “[a] party seeking an ex parte order
must notify all parties no later than 10:00 A.M. the court day before the ex
parte appearance, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances that justify a
shorter time for notice.” (Emphasis added). The rule also states that “[a]
party seeking an ex parte order in an unlawful detainer proceeding may provide
shorter notice (than the 10:00 A.M. requirement) provided that the notice given
is reasonable.”
THE
EVIDENCE SHOULD REMAIN UNSEALED
Motions must remain unsealed unless Plaintiffs
demonstrate compelling reasons for sealing. To overcome the strong presumption
of public access to court records, a proponent of sealing typically must
demonstrate “compelling reasons” for secrecy.
Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178
(9th Cir. 2006). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs and their lawyers insist that to
justify sealing the records in this case, it need only argue irreparable harm
and immediate damage. This defies logic
given the fact that Leonard Cohen now appears to have two law firms representing
him while Defendant’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions was filed on March 17,
2015. Nearly three months have gone by
and Leonard Cohen, LC Investments, LLC, and Cohen’s lawyers, have suddenly
decided to apply for an ex parte hearing due to urgent irreparable harm and
immediate damage. Plaintiffs do not
explain what the irreparable harm and immediate damage actually is other than
insinuating that it is the dissemination of sensitive documents. All documents are the property of Kelley
Lynch. It is important for this Court to
understand that, in the related case (which Judge Freeman’s Court Reporter
brought to her attention), Leonard Cohen had Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department
wrongfully seize Lynch’s personal business property, books, files, corporate and
partnership tax returns, Phil Spector’s master tape, Adam Cohen tapes, Elton
John master tape, and other property that belongs to her. Leonard Cohen and/or his daughter, Lorca
Cohen, also went into Lynch’s office (when her mother was present) and seized all
of Lynch’s business files apart from those related to her greeting card
company. Lynch has repeatedly advised
Cohen to return her property without receiving so much as the courtesy of a
response. Lynch has addressed the fact
that on October 27, 2004, her lawyers (after asking Cohen and his personal tax
and corporate lawyer, Richard Westin, to explain numerous corporate entities
and any “liability” they exposed Lynch to) advised Westin to have his client
make arrangements to pick up his property.
Cohen failed to make any such arrangements, abandoned the property for
nearly one year, and then had the audacity to have his lawyer demand that Lynch
hire a moving van to return property that she stored as a courtesy for this
individual for years – since 1996 when his home garage was converted to a guest
suite for his sister and studio for himself.
The abandoned property, per Internal Revenue Service guidelines, was
worth the paper and ink it was written on and with. There were no original manuscripts or other
documents of that nature and none appear on the Sheriff’s Inventory. There was a photocopy of what Lynch believed
was “Beautiful Losers” in a Machat & Machat file due to the fact that Marty
Machat was involved in the production of a play related to that piece. Leonard Cohen also seized property belonging
to Machat & Machat. Lynch received
authorization from Steven Machat to maintain copies of the Machat & Machat
documents (including the “1977 Tax Memorandum” at issue) submitted to this
Court.
At this time, the issue the Court should consider is
whether the documents Cohen would personally like under seal are relevant to
the merits of the dispute. They
absolutely are. Kelley Lynch has
becoming tired of Leonard Cohen’s argument that any defense, response, or
utterance on her part is “harassment.”
She finds that argument dubious and suspect at best. See Kamakana,
447 F.3d at 1179-80; Melaleuca Inc. v. Bartholomew, No.
4:12-CV-00216-BLW, 2012 WL 5931690, at *2 (D. Idaho Nov. 27, 2012); Selling
Source, 2011 WL 1630338 at *5; Dish Network, 2009 WL 2224596, at *6. The
“resolution of a dispute on the merits . . . is at the heart of the interest in
ensuring the public’s understanding of the judicial process and of significant
public events.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at
1179. Documents that are tangential, or
entirely unrelated to the merits of a case are less integral to protecting than
those that are directly relevant to the cause of action. See id. at
1179-80. The documents Plaintiffs are
attempting to seal, including corporate federal and state tax returns including
one where Lynch was designated a partner and the Tax Matters Partner
(Traditional Holdings, LLC 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax returns). All documents are material and relevant to
the grounds upon which Lynch brought her motion: fraud upon the court, abusive litigation
tactics (including an attempt to obstruct justice), and the extensive use of
perjury and fraudulent misrepresentations to convince this Court to deny
Lynch’s motion to vacate. The documents
Lynch provided are crucial evidence supporting the argument that Plaintiffs
have committed egregious fraud upon the court, concealed a tremendous amount of
evidence, fabricated a financial ledger (which is not an accounting – let alone
a corporate accounting), perjured themselves in declarations, and undermined
the integrity of this Court and the public’s confidence in the Court’s ability
to properly assess the facts, evidence, witness demeanor, Plaintiff’s credibility,
or testimonial statements. The documents
that Plaintiffs have asked this Court to seal are not remotely tangential or
unrelated to the underlying cause of action.
Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014)see
also Navarro v. Eskanos & Adler, No. C-06-02231 (WHA) (EDL), 2007 WL
902550, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007).
The documents at issue are relevant to the merits of the
case. Courts, including the Ninth
Circuit, have applied the compelling reasons standard. See Oliner v. Kontrabecki, applying
the compelling reasons standard to a request to seal district court records
because “the rationale underlying the good cause standard, namely that the
public has less of a need for access to court records attached because those
documents are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying
cause of action, does not apply to this case,” Melaleuca, 2012 WL 5931690, at
*2; Selling Source, 2011 WL 1630338 at *5; Dish Network, 2009 WL 2224596, at
*6. Plaintiffs have not presented an
argument disputing the fact that the documents at issue are directly relevant
to the merits of the underlying lawsuit.
See Opposition Motion. Because
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated compelling reasons to keep them confidential,
they must therefore remain unsealed.
The
compelling reasons standard applies to briefs and declarations. Because the parties’ briefing and
declarations on the motion for terminating sanctions are not even arguably
Leonard Cohen attorney/client privileged documents, they cannot possibly fall
under the exception to the presumption of public access for sealed documents
attached to Defendant’s motion. Therefore, regardless of whether the Court
decides the plaintiffs’ ex parte motion is dispositive for purposes of the
public right of access, the compelling reasons standard indisputably applies to
these records.
Even
if the good cause standard were to apply here, which it does not, the standard
is not met by an ex parte order granting an application to seal without
analysis. First, under binding Ninth
Circuit precedent, even under the good cause standard, the documents at issue
may only remain sealed if Plaintiffs makes a “particularized showing” with
respect to each document that “specific prejudice or harm will result” from
disclosure. Phillips ex rel.
Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir.
2002); See also In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products
Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 45 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (“The good cause
requirement is met by a showing that disclosure will work a clearly defined,
specific and serious injury.”).
Therefore, “the burden of proof remains with Plaintiffs.
To
order documents sealed, Plaintiffs must, “for each particular document it seeks
to [seal] . . . show … that specific prejudice or harm will result if” the
documents are unsealed, and the Court must “identify and discuss the” reasons
sealing is warranted. See also E.E.O.C.
v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168, 169 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing and remanding to
district court to “articulate its reasoning and findings” where court denied a
motion to unseal without explaining the basis for sealing).
Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs have used this ex
parte motion as an opportunity to conceal information prejudicial to their
case, Leonard Cohen personally, and in bad faith with no legitimate or good
faith purpose.
“The mere fact that [a
pleading] may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to
further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its
records.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179
(9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331
F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003)). “A litigant who might be embarrassed,
incriminated, or exposed to litigation through dissemination of materials is
not, without more, entitled to the court’s protection.” Foltz, 331 F.3d at
1136; see also Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Kamakana on this point); S.E.C. v. Shanahan, No. 4:06-MC-546 CAS, 2006
WL 3330972, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2006).
The public has a right of
access to court documents that “is grounded in the First Amendment and in
common law.” CBS, Inc. v. United States District Court, 765 F.2d 823,
835 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Webster Groves Sch. Dist. v. Pulitzer Pub. Co.,
898 F.2d 1371, 1376 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications,
435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (“There is a ‘common-law right of access to judicial
records.’”). In a democracy such as ours, the public has both a right and a
need to know what is occurring in their federal courts. Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) ; see also Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1243,
1244 (D. Idaho 2013) (“To start with the necessary, if obvious, initial
premise, court proceedings and records are generally open to the public.”); Skinner
v. Uphoff, No. 02–CV–033–B, 2005 WL 4089333, at *3 (D. Wyo. Sept. 27, 2005)
(citing Allsop v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 39 P.3d 1092, 1095, 1096
(Wyo. 2002) (rejecting a public official’s attempt to seal information related
to the operation of a prison, reasoning that “the public has a right, and even
a responsibility . . . to monitor the activities and performance of their own
government and use this information to implement change if needed[]”).
Furthermore, maintaining an open judiciary “serves as a check upon the judicial
process—an essential component in our structure of self-government.” Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982); see also IDT
Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1222 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) (“This right of access bolsters public confidence
in the judicial system by allowing citizens to evaluate the reasonableness and
fairness of judicial proceedings . . . [and] to keep a watchful eye on the
workings of public agencies.”). Therefore, “only the most compelling reasons
can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.” In re Neal, 461 F.3d
1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Gitto Global Corp., 422 F.3d
1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)). Although a court must be alert for deliberate efforts to
embarrass and scandalize a party as a litigation tactic, see Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, the mere fact
that a party may be embarrassed or scandalized by a pleading will not justify
sealing that pleading based on that fact alone. See In re Neal, 461 F.3d
at 1054 (noting that although a pleading has the capacity to embarrass and
scandalize outside parties, the pleading should not be sealed absent proof that
it “was filed for an improper purpose, such as to gratify public spite or
promote public scandal”).
A court must identify “a
compelling governmental interest” that necessitates the sealing of a record,
and it must “make specific findings regarding the necessity” of sealing that
record. Goff v. Graves, 362 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79 (holding that the party seeking to seal a
matter “bears the burden of meeting a ‘compelling reasons’ standard, under
which the party must ‘articulate compelling reasons supported by factual
findings’” that outweigh the “presumed right of access”). Thus,
a court may seal a document only after it has articulated particularized and
specific findings of a compelling need for secrecy, and the scope of the order
must be narrowly tailored to protect that interest. Press
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510-12 (1984). Plaintiffs cannot meet this heavy burden for
justifying the sealing Defendant’s exhibits and declarations as well as
excerpts of those documents.
Permitting the documents to
remain unsealed, until the Court renders its final judgment, would ensure that
the public is fully informed of all developments in this case and Lynch
receives a fair hearing. Any embarrassment that these documents cause on the
part of Plaintiffs is ancillary to its probative value in this important case
of public concern.
Oliner shows
that the final word on whether documents can be filed under seal or remain
under seal rests with the courts, not the parties.
Courts are bound to recognize the public’s First
Amendment and common law right of access to public documents, including
judicial records. See, e.g., Oliner, 745 F.3d at 1025-26; Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1273, 1280 (2003).
Notably, even non-parties may intervene to challenge the propriety of a sealing
order, provided they satisfy constitutional standing requirements. Company
Doe v. Public Citizen, 2014 WL 1465728, at *14 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 2014).
Given the strong presumption of public access, even parties’ agreements to file
documents under seal do not guarantee that a court will grant a request to
seal. See Oliner, 745 F.3d 1024.
A careful evaluation therefore must be made
concerning the relevant statutory or substantive law dealing with sealed documents
before a decision is made to file confidential or sensitive information with a
court. In the 9th Circuit, parties must
demonstrate “good cause” or “compelling reasons” by making a particularized
showing of harm. Parties seeking a
sealing order must do more than make conclusory assertions of harm. Broad,
conclusory allegations of harm, without specific concrete examples, do not meet
either standard. AmerGen Energy, 115 Fed. Cl. at 143. Instead,
parties must “articulate the specific prejudice or harm that will flow from
disclosure.” Id. at 147. Certain types of harm, like harm to company reputation, may not be sufficient to rebut the
public right of access. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983).
In
California state court, unless “confidentiality is required by law, court
records are presumed to be open.” California Rules of Court (“CRC”), Rule
2.550(c). Under California law, only certain narrow categories of information,
like certain family law or juvenile records, or medical information, are
automatically excluded from the public record. See, e.g., Cal. Fam.
Code § 7643(a); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 827(a)(1); Cal. Civ. Code §
56.10.
In
deciding whether to file documents under seal, trial courts must make express findings
of fact that establish that (1) there is an overriding interest supporting
sealing the record that (2) overcomes the public’s First Amendment right to
access the record; (3) there is a substantial probability of prejudice if the
record is not sealed; (4) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) no
less restrictive means to protect a party’s rights exist. CRC, Rules 2.550 and
2.551.
KELLEY LYNCH WAS A SELF-EMPLOYED
INDIVIDUAL
WHO DID NOT HAVE ATTORNEY/CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
WITH LEONARD COHEN OR THE
CORPORATE ENTITIES
Although federal courts recognize that the
attorney-client privilege can protect communications between corporations and
independent contractors who are the "functional equivalent" of
employees, they disagree about the evidence required to meet the functional
equivalent test. Communications may fall within the privilege as long as the
independent consultant is the functional equivalent of an employee. The court
found that the real estate consultant was intimately involved on a daily basis
in the client's business and "was in all relevant respects the functional
equivalent of an employee."
According to Internal Revenue Service, “People such as doctors,
dentists, veterinarians, lawyers, accountants, contractors, subcontractors, public
stenographers, or auctioneers who are in an independent trade, business, or
profession in which they offer their services to the general public are
generally independent contractors. However, whether these people are
independent contractors or employees depends on the facts in each case. The
general rule is that an individual is an independent contractor if the payer
has the right to control or direct only the result of the work and not what
will be done and how it will be done. The earnings of a person who is working
as an independent contractor are subject to Self-Employment Tax. If you are an independent contractor, you are
self-employed.” Kelley Lynch was an
independent contractor who paid self-employment tax. She and Leonard Cohen did not share
attorney/client privilege.
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
In California as in every state,
the judicial system’s integrity hinges on honest actions by participants,
without fear of reprisals; when a participant does not act honestly, he or she
may be charged with obstruction of justice. Basically, obstruction of
justice is the interfering with proper or legitimate operations of either a
court or officers of the court through either actions or words. A few
examples of this criminal offense include threatening a judge, encouraging
someone to destroy evidence, or attempting to bribe a witness.
Obstructing justice is a crime under both state and federal laws. On May 26, 2015, Michelle Rice served Kelley
Lynch with Notice of Intent to Move for Sanctions under CCP Sections 1008(d)
and 128.7 that contained the following ultimatum: “Please be advised that if, after reviewing
the Sanctions Motion and Proposed Order, you refuse or fail to withdraw the
2015 Motion and Proposed Order, you refuse or fail to withdraw the 2015 Motion
on or before the end of the Court’s business day on Friday, June 19, 2015, we
will file the enclosed Sanctions Motion with the Court on Monday June 22,
2015.” One of the sanctions Plaintiffs
would like is a termination of Lynch’s “fee waiver.” Lynch would like to suggest that this Court
immediately terminate her fee waiver, prohibit her from filing any additional
documents in Case No. BC338322, and require Plaintiffs to immediately file the
Sanctions Motion and Proposed Order rather than issuing a threat to Lynch that
could very well be construed as an attempt to obstruct justice.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs
should not be permitted to prevail in their attempts to manipulate the judicial
system to do its bidding particularly based on an illogical and questionable argument
unsupported in the law. Defendant,
therefore, respectfully request that this Court order that her documents remain
unsealed.
The court should reject Plaintiffs’ completely unfounded
attempt to seal any documents and, instead, sanction Plaintiffs for bringing an
entirely meritless, frivolous motion for the sole purpose of harassing
Defendant. The hearing on this Motion
should be combined with the hearing presently scheduled on the Motion for
Terminating Sanctions for June 23, 2015 for the sake of the economy of the
Court’s time as well as Defendant’s.
Dated: May 29, 2015 Signed: Kelley Lynch
DECLARATION
OF KELLEY LYNCH
I, Kelley Lynch, do state and declare as
follows:
1. I am a
citizen of the United States and a resident of the Los Angeles,
California. I am over
the age of 18.
Except as to those matters stated on information and belief, I have
personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and could and would testify
competently if asked to do so.
2. Due to
the fact that I received the corrected documents late yesterday, I have not had
time to
properly review and/or proof read this
response. Nor have I had an opportunity
to prepare a schedule related to the statements Leonard Cohen would like
redacted from the legal documents I’ve filed with this Court. I submit this Declaration in support of my
Response to Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application.
3. While
I did receive a variety of emails from Plaintiffs, I did not receive a message
from
Plaintiffs’ representative. It is possible that the line was otherwise
engaged.
4. I
would like to advise the Court that I continue to receive criminally harassing
emails from
Stephen Gianelli, a stranger and ostensibly a
lawyer from the Bay Area who presently resides in Greece. I do not know this man. He finds this conduct amusing and works in
tandem, at times, with Leonard Cohen’s fan, Susanne Walsh. Both Robert Kory and Michelle Rice have been
copied in on these emails in the past month.
Furthermore, I have received nearly 2,000 pages worth of harassing
emails from these individuals since filing my Motion for Terminating Sanctions
in mid-March. I am now receiving rather
absurd harassing emails from Lana Clarkson’s publicist, Ed Lozzi, who posed a
question about Michelle Rice. I would
like the Court to review that document.
This is the individual who shot herself at Phil Spector’s house on
February 3, 2007 and I am not a party to that case. Exhibit A:
Emails from Ed Lozzi dated May 28, 2015 at 8:33 AM;
5. Should
this Court decide to instruct Plaintiffs to file their Motion for Sanctions,
which
contains a reference to the Phil Spector “gun”
incident, they should be instructed to formally notify Phil Spector’s attorney
of record or appellate attorney as he has a right to confront his accuser. In the alternative, they should be instructed
to remove the statements. I referred to
the three versions of that statement to address a pattern of perjury on the
part of Leonard Cohen and not to prove which version was correct. That is none of my business. I have however taken the following position
about this situation vis a vis Leonard Cohen:
1) For approximately 20 years,
Leonard Cohen personally told me that Phil Spector never held a gun on him; 2)
Mick Brown, UK Telegraph, advised me that he personally reviewed the Spector
Grand Jury transcripts and Leonard Cohen’s statements/testimony was presented
to the jury; 3) the Spector prosecution’s Motion in Limine (February 2005) is
readily available online at LA Superior Court and that document contains one
version of Leonard Cohen’s highly embellished alleged “gun” story related to
Phil Spector; and, 4) there are now three versions of Leonard Cohen’s good rock
‘n roll “gun” story before LA Superior Court at this time. Cohen’s Motion for Sanctions takes the
position, if I recall correctly, that I said he perjured himself before Phil
Spector’s Grand Jury. The Grand Jury
Legal Adviser herself was unable to determine what witness presented these
statements and/or testimony.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the
laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Signed May 29, 2015. Kelley Lynch.
Filed May 29, 2015: Hearing.
Leonard
Cohen is now represented by two law firms in this matter (Kory/Rice &
Bergman Law Group who represented her younger son’s father in the coordinated
custody matter)
Rice
advised Judge Hess that Bergman would handle questions with the Court. Rice confirmed that Jeffrey Korn
withdrew. Email service – Judge Hess
said a new order would have to be proposed.
He confirmed that there is no agreement with respect to email with
Kory/Rice or Bergman on file.
Communications between the parties via email is acceptable.
Hearing
Held – Judge Hess temporarily sealed records; confirmed that corporate tax returns
(partnership) hold mutual attorney client privileges; etc. The primary discussion involved Kelley Lynch’s
declaration & certain exhibits – including Machat & Machat’s property
used with authorization. Some documents
temporarily sealed; Cohen’s lawyers heavely redacted Kelley Lynch’s
declaration.
Judge
Hess would not, as Lynch requested, order Cohen’s lawyres to file the Motion
for Sanctions they have threatened her with.
Judge
Hess annoyed that Kelley Lynch interrupted him.
Perhaps he would like to go up against the man who destroyed his family
at some point in the future.
Hearing
on Motion for Terminating Sanctions (discussed) scheduled for June 23, 2015.
Federal
RICO suit against Leonard Cohen will be filed thereafter.
EXHIBIT
A
From: Pourya Keshavarzi <PKeshavarzi@bergman-law.com>
Date: Thu, May 28, 2015 at 4:51 PM
Subject: COHEN v. LYNCH, et al.
To: "Kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com"
<Kelley.lynch.2013@gmail.com>, "Kelley.Lynch.2010@gmail.com"
<Kelley.Lynch.2010@gmail.com>
Cc: Michelle Rice <mrice@koryrice.com>,
Dan Bergman <DBergman@bergman-law.com>, Bryan Bergman
<BBergman@bergman-law.com>
Good afternoon Ms. Lynch:
Attached, please find:
1) Plaintiff’s ex parte application to grant Plaintiff’s
Motion to seal portions of the court record, or in the alternative for an order shortening time on the
hearing of Plaintiff’s Motion to seal; Declaration of Pourya Keshavarzi re ex parte notice, 2) Proposed order on Plaintiff’s ex parte application for Motion to seal
portions of the court record or in
the alternative, for an order shortening time for hearing on said Motion,
3) Corrected Plaintiff’s notice of Motion and Motion to seal portions of the
court record, and 4) Corrected proposed order on Plaintiff’s Motion to seal
Portions of the court record.
Very truly yours,
********* INTERNET
EMAIL CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE********
Privileged/Confidential Information may be contained in this message. If
you are not the addressee indicated in this message (or responsible for
delivery of the message to such person) you may not copy or deliver this
message to anyone. In such case, you should destroy this message (and
attachments) and kindly notify the sender by reply mail. Please advise
immediately if you or your employer do not consent to Internet email for
messages of this kind. Opinions, conclusions and other information in
this message that do not relate to official business of this firm shall be
understood as neither given nor endorsed by it.
EXHIBIT
B
Insane letter from Gianelli to Ed Lozzi (Clarkson
Publicist, Copying in KelleyLynch)
From: STEPHEN R. GIANELLI <stephengianelli@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, May 24, 2015 at 10:26 PM
Subject: Phillip Spector - pending petition for habeas
corpus in the federal district court
To: epl@lozzipr.com
Dear Ed,
You latest blog post about the pending Spector
“appeal” being mere grandstanding evinces a lack of understanding of the
process that is now playing out in federal court.
Now that the state court appeals (California
Court of appeal, petition for review to the California Supreme Court) have been
exhausted, Spector may now ask (and has asked) the federal district court to
review the FEDERAL issues implicated by the conviction, of which there are
several – including the so called “structural error” consisting of the
prosecutor playing a Court TV video tape of the trial judge from a prior
hearing held outside the presence of the jury in trial #1 indicating where an
evidence technician (whose hands could only be seen by the court at the
hearing) was testifying that she observed blood on the victim’s hands. (This
was a key issue, because blood on the front of the hand would indicate a
defensive position of the hand, blood on the back of the hand would suggest a
suicide.)
This is a meritorious issue, and if Riordan is
correct that structural error was committed, it will result in an automatic
reversal and retrial with no weighing of prejudice.
It should also be noted that only one appellate
court has looked at the case “on the merits” of the issues: The California
Court of appeal. The petitions to the California Supreme Court [FN - below] and
to the United States Supreme Court [FN] were
discretionary (and
decided on considerations OTHER THAN the merits of Spector’s arguments on
appeal) Therefore,
the fact that the California and United States Supreme Court denied the
respective petitions for review is no reflection at all on the merit of
Spector’s issues on appeal, including those now pending in the district court.
This issue is now being evaluated by a federal
magistrate on the briefs submitted by each side under federal court case law
decided under the United States Constitution. By September of this year
the magistrate judge will submit his report and recommended disposition of
Spector’s petition (grant or deny) and then the assigned district court judge
will sign off. The losing side in that decision may then appeal to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. That forum
is where Spector appellate counsel Dennis Riordan is best known and respected
by the justices, and has also had his highest rate of success – including Mr.
Riordan’s recent successful appeal on behalf of Barry Bonds of his obstruction
of justice conviction. (Bonds’ conviction was reversed on technical legal
grounds, and he may not be retried.)
To write this process off as mere
“grandstanding” or to infer from the prior decisions affirming the conviction
during the state court appeal process (or from the US Supreme Court’s refusal
to exercise discretionary review, which decision was not “on the merits” and
was a one and a million shot to begin with) – that Spector has no chance of
succeeding in the district court or in the 9th circuit would be a mistake.
Note also that Barry Bonds initially LOST in
the 9th Circuit, but that Dennis Riordan convinced the
either 9th Circuit
to hear the case “en banc”, and it was during this process that Dennis
Riordan won the case for his client. (The oral argument is on line, and you can
see from the video the tremendous respect the justices of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals have for Mr.
Riordan and you can also see how posed and skilled he is arguing before the
court.)
This video vividly illustrates that with a
lawyer of Dennis Riordan’s caliber representing the defendant, the case truly
“ain’t over till its over”.
I am no apologist for Phil Spector, nor do I
have an opinion as to his guilt or innocence.
I simply believe that we cannot decide the case
until he has had a fair trial, and that he has not had. The trial should have
been about one thing only” Who was holding the gun when Lana Clarkson died.
Instead, too much of the trial consisted of airing ancient history, 30, 20, and
10 years before Spector even met Clarkson.
Very truly yours,
Stephen R. Gianelli
Attorney-at-Law (ret.)
Crete, Greece
-----
FN- The California Supreme Court’s function is to preside over the
orderly and consistent development of California case law. Therefore, the
primary ground for granting a petition in a particular case is if review is
necessary to secure uniformity of decision among the appellate courts or to settle
an important question of law, as stated in California Rules of
Court, rule
8.500(b). The U.S. Supreme Court gives full consideration to but a
small fraction of the cases it has authority to review. With many important
categories of cases, the party seeking Supreme Court review does so by
"petitioning" the Court to issue a "writ of certiorari."
(See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257, 2350.) While a decision to
deny cert. lets the lower court's ruling stand, it does not constitute a decision
by the Supreme Court on any of the legal issues raised by the case. Rule 10 of the Supreme Court
Rules lists some of the considerations that may lead the Court to grant
certiorari. But the decision to grant or deny cert. is discretionary.
EXHIBIT C
Insane Publicist for Lana Clarkson
The Woman Who Shot Herself At Phil Spector's
From: Edward Lozzi <friendsoflanaclarkson@yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, May 28, 2015 at 8:33 AM
Subject: Press Release
To: "kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com"
<kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com>
Ms. Lynch,
Interesting blog.
My question is: When you acknowledge Michelle
Rice's dominance over you by kneeling before her and notifying the Court that
you are WITHDRAWING your Motion for Terminating Sanctions as Ms. Rice's
letter of May 26, 2015 demands (and as we all know you will) are you also going
to send out a press release informing everyone on your original distribution
list (including Web Heights/Marie Mazur) that after all of the hoopla on your
blog you have decided to run and hide like a scared little puppy with your tale
between your legs?
You see, I have always known the despite your
tough talk you are a coward at heart - ever since you started publicly
attacking a woman whose daughter was a murder victim.
Cyber bullies always are.
That is one press release that I cannot wait to
read and would be pleased to help you write.
EXHIBIT
D
Stephen Gianelli Impersonating A Woman
Or Someone From Daniel Bergman's Law Group?
From: Marianne I. <Marianne1957@gmx.com>
Date: Fri, May 29, 2015 at 12:58 AM
Subject: Rotten tatics?
To: kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com
My, my, what an angry little blog you have.
Tell me, Kelley Lynch, why you talk so tough on
your blog - "warning" Judge Hess about this or that, threatening to
bring the court's attention to this or that person and their emails - but when
you are notified of a hearing you stay home!
One would think, my dear, that with all of your
talk, talk, talk you would jump at the chance to appear at ever court
appearance you could, to bring all of the "criminal harassment" you
emagine suffering to the judge's attention. But instead you stay home.
"I was never served" and "I never
agreed to email service" seems to be your mantra, doesent it dear?
You stole Leoanrd's money and now you are afraid to face the court.
I don't blame you dear. I would be hiding my face
from the world too if I was in your shoes....
EXHIBIT D
BLOODY STUMP EMAIL
REDACTED
Horrifying false and slanderous allegations made
About Kelley Lynch, her sons, Oliver Stone,
and with respect to the horrifying Whole
Foods incident.
Stephen Gianelli no doubt authored and sent this email,
threatened Kelley Lynch over it, and stated that she should be
murdered, raped, or commit suicide. He has made similar statements
to and about Kelley Lynch and Paulette Brandt.
