DATING RELATIONSHIP
Dating Relationship
Leonard Cohen Cross: Kelly: Okay. Now, you also mentioned earlier that there was a brief intimate relationship between you and Ms. Lynch, correct? Cohen: That’s correct. Kelly: Now, being that she was your business manager, you wouldn’t say that was probably the best idea, to have a romantic relationship with your business partner, correct? Cohen: I don’t think it goes the the description of romantic. Kelly: Okay, but it was a sexual relationship, correct? Cohen: It was an intimate relationship, yes. Kelly: Was it a sexual relationship? Cohen: It involved a sexual - yes. Kelly: Not, it was -- it was actually spanning years, correct? Cohen: I’m sorry? Kelly: It actually spanned years, correct? Cohen: I don’t know how long it lasted, sir. ... Kelly: But you would agree with me that it was on and off for a period of time? Cohen: Yes, sir. (RT 275) Kelly: When did it end? Cohen: I don’t remember exactly when it ended. Like many relationships, it - it just dissolved. (RT 276) Kelly? Okay. Do you remember testifying on March 23rd at another hearing? March 23rd, yes. Of this year. You were in this courthouse testifying, correct? Cohen: That is correct. Kelly: Now, you were asked if this was -- if your relationship with Ms. Lynch was purely a business relationship. Do you remember that? Cohen: I did. Kelly: And you actually said that it was, yes, purely a business relationship. (RT 276) Cohen: I have said repeatedly that there was an intimate relationship, but the lady denies it. So I did not want to insist. Kelly: I’m not asking you about what Ms. Lynch said. I’m asking about what you said. You said that yes, that it was purely a business relationship, correct? Cohen: May I explain? Kelly: I’m just asking for if that’s what you said on March 23rd. Cohen: Yes. Kelly: In fact, you were asked a follow up question that -- asking you if that was the extent of it, and again you said yes, that was the extent of it. Cohen: Correct. (RT 277)
Leonard Cohen Testimony - March 23, 2012 Hearing
And finally, there was a question about a previous testimony that you’ve given, the description of your relationship with Ms. Lynch. Why at that hearing did you say that you only had a business relationship with Ms. Lynch? And not just once or twice. Why did you say that? Because, as it turns out, the friendship Ms. Lynch displayed was false and deceptive, so it was not really a friendship. Kelly: Objection. The intimate relationship we had, she denies. So I’m not going to insist. So, therefore, it was not -- from that point of view, there was not an intimate relationship
and there was not a friendship; it was all business. It was all business from the point of view of Ms. Lynch. Kelly: Objection; speculation as to what Ms. Lynch thought. Court: Overruled. The question was why he did it, and he’s testifying to his subjective reason. (RT 319-320)
Leonard Cohen Cross: Kelly: When you testified on March 23rd, you said that -- you didn’t give the same answer that you gave now, correct, regarding your relationship with Ms. Lynch? Cohen: That’s correct. Kelly: Okay. But you -- when you did testify, you stood in front of the counsel table, you raí sed your right hand, correct? Cohen: Correct. Kelly: You swore to tell the truth, the whole truth? Cohen: Correct. Kelly: And then the same oath that you just took
right now, correct? Before testifying, correct? Cohen: Correct. Kelly: Okay. And you understand that you were under the penalty of perjury on March 23rd? Streeter: Objection; argumentative. Court: Sustained. Kelly: Nothing further. (RT 321-322)
Kelley Lynch appeals from a California restraining order Leonard Cohen registered on May 25, 2011 for lack of jurisdiction under the [84 Cal. App. 4th 400] Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA or the Act) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.). The Act extends protection to individuals who are or have been in certain relationships with the perpetrator of defined types of abuse, including "a dating or engagement relationship." (Fam. Code, § 6211, subd. (c).) Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding there was a "dating relationship" between her and Cohen.
The legal question this issue presents - considerably more difficult than it may first appear - is not only with respect to the meaning of the phrase "dating relationship" as used in the DVPA but also what jurisdiction the trial court held over Ms. Lynch with respect to the alleged restraining order violation.
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Personal jurisdiction, or in personam jurisdiction, refers to the power of a court to enter a binding judgment against a person or other legal entity. A court must be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party in order for that party to be bound by an order of the court.
The Fourteenth Amendment grants the right to not be compelled to defend a lawsuit in a remote jurisdiction unless a party’s actions have made it fair to hale that party into court. A court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a party must “not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Issue: Is service of process valid where a party induces another party by false representation to come within a jurisdiction in order to serve process on that person?
Holding and Rule: If a person is resident outside a jurisdiction, that person may not be induced by false representation to come within the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of service of process. The law will not lend its sanction or support to an act, otherwise lawful, which is accomplished by unlawful means.
The essence of procedural due process, another requirement that must be satisfied for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, is that the defendant must receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The initial police report reflecting Cohen's various complaints described appellant and Cohen as having a “sexual relationship.” In a subsequent contacts with LAPD, appellant sought to correct errors in their original report, including the fact that she and Cohen had a “sexual relationship.” Lynch was never Cohen’s girlfriend, never dated him, and was not in a sexual relationship with him and finds the very concept of that accusation deeply offensive. The California domestic violence order should be dismissed because Lynch and Cohen did not have a “dating or engagement relationship” within the meaning of the DVPA; that the Boulder civil harassment order was unlawfully modified when registered in California; and because appellant was not served the new California order depriving her of … constitutional rights.
The DVPA provides for issuance of orders "to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved, if an affidavit shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse." (Fam. Code, § 6300.) "Domestic violence" is defined in section 6211 of the DVPA as "abuse perpetrated against any of the following persons: (a) A spouse or former spouse; (b) A cohabitant or former cohabitant, as defined in Section 6209; (c) A person with whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship;
(d) A person with whom the respondent has had a child, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the father of the child of the female parent under the Uniform Parentage Act; (e) A child of a party or a child who is the subject of an action under the Uniform Parentage Act, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the father of the child to be protected; and, (f) Any other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree."
When registering the Colorado civil protection order, Leonard Cohen sought the protection of the DVPA under subdivision (c) of Family Code section 6211.
Appellant contends the Family Court erred in registering the Boulder civil harassment order - that can only be modified by the original court - as a domestic violence order because it failed to take into consideration the fact that Lynch and Cohen were not in a “dating relationship” of any type whatsoever. Lynch and Cohen’s business relationship, that also included a friendship, is insufficient to meet the definition of the DVPA. Appellant furrier contends that the absolute lack of a definition of “dating relationship” renders the statute itself unconstitutionally vague and overly broad.
Excerpts from Oriola v. Thaler (2000) 84 Cal. App. 4th 397:
“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. T. M. Cobb Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 273, 277. An equally basic rule of statutory construction is that courts are bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual [84 Cal. App. 4th 405] and ordinary meaning of the language employed in framing them. Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973)10 Cal. 3d 222. Where the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 692, 698.” O'Kane v. Irvine (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 207, 211.”
“The DVPA was originally enacted in 1979. (Stats. 1979, ch. 795 § 10, pp. 2710-2711.) Originally, the DVPA did not protect persons in a "dating relationship." As first enacted, the DVPA applied only to family members and persons who regularly resided in the household and had sexual relations with another family or household member, or had so resided within the last six months. (Former Code Civ. Proc., § 542, subds. (b), (c); Stats. 1979, ch. 795, § 10, p. 2711.) The DVPA was soon amended to delete the requirement of a sexual relationship for persons regularly residing in the household (former Code Civ. Proc., § 542, subd. (c); Stats. 1980, ch. 1158, § 6, p. 3880), and subsequently amended to extend to abuse between parents of a minor child. (Former Code Civ. Proc., § 542, subd. (c); Stats. 1984, ch. 1163, § 3, pp. 3995-3996.) Finally, as previously noted, the statute was amended to include the present "dating or engagement relationship" language. (Former Code Civ. Proc., § 542, subd. (b)(1); Stats. 1990, ch. 752, § 2, p. 3409.)”
“The DVPA does not define the phrase "dating or engagement relationship," and the meaning of a "dating relationship" is not clear enough to delineate the particular meaning the Legislature had in mind when it used these words.”
“The failure of the Legislature to define the nature of the "dating relationship" it had in mind creates a daunting judicial problem.”
“Therefore, as no judicial attempt to compass the human mind can fully succeed, we can devise no completely satisfactory definition of the "dating relationship" the Legislature contémplate … we conclude that, for purposes of the Act, a "dating relationship" refers to serious courtship. It is a social relationship between two individuals who have or have had a reciprocally amorous and increasingly exclusive interest in one another, and shared expectation of the growth of that mutual interest, that has endured for such a length of time and stimulated such frequent interactions that the relationship cannot be deemed to have been casual.”
No such continuing and mutually committed emotional relationship ever existed between Kelley Lynch and Leonard Cohen. Leonard Cohen was not without potential relief with respect to registering the Colorado civil harassment order in California. He and his lawyers cold have properly registered the order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.
This court should also specifically dismiss the restraining order violation charges and attendant verdict for lack of jurisdiction. Leonard Cohen and his attorneys have improperly used legal procedures to harass, inflict, and impose undue distress and expense upon appellant.
