Blogger kellygreen said...
Apparently today is judgement day for Spector. Yep, Tuesday, February 21, 2012 is the day the Supremes will decide wether or not they will hear Spector's case. So, what do your guys think: will the Supremes hear his case or will they tell Spector that he's going to die alone in a dank prison cell?
February 21, 2012 1:40 AM
http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=4410281564721246856&postID=2880935757215465539
kellygreen said...
Honestly, does anyone care about the trial bridezilla? The second she realizes he's only going to leave prison in a body bag, she'll be gone as will ALL his money! They deserve one another.
February 21, 2012 1:48 AM
Sprocket said...
What was "really gone" was that music career she pursued. Maybe she really thought she was the next Whitney Houston....
February 21, 2012 4:53 AM
http://sprocket-trials.blogspot.com/2012/02/phil-spectors-us-supreme-court-appeal.html
Showing posts with label Charles Sevilla. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Charles Sevilla. Show all posts
Tuesday, February 21, 2012
U.S. Supreme Court Shamelessly - & With Great Cowardice - Hands Down Phil Spector's Death Sentence
Phil Spector listens to the judge during sentencing in Los Angeles Criminal Courts.
Jae C. Hong-Pool/Getty Images
February 21, 2012 11:10 AM ET
The United States Supreme Court has declined to review the murder conviction of Phil Spector. The producer's attorneys argued that his constitutional due process rights were violated when prosecutors used the trial judge's comments about an expert's testimony, effectively making the judge a witness for the prosecution.
The court upheld Spector's second-degree murder conviction for the killing of actress Lana Clarkson, who was shot dead in Spector's suburban Los Angeles home in 2003. The justices did not offer any comment on the ruling by a California appeals court.
Spector's attorneys have been working to strike down his conviction with little success over the past two years. Most recently, the California Supreme Court denied a request to review the case over the same claim of due process rights violations.
Read more: http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/phil-spector-appeal-rejected-by-supreme-court-20120221#ixzz1n2yAMQwt
Saturday, May 21, 2011
Phil Spector's lawyers seek rehearing of appeal
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
(05-18) 16:15 PDT LOS ANGELES, (AP) --
Lawyers for music producer Phil Spector have asked an appeals court to take a second look at his arguments for a new trial.
In a petition to the California 2nd District Court of Appeal, the attorneys said the court's rejection of Spector's murder conviction appeal has left the legal community incredulous.
They suggested the court failed to consider the defense claim that the trial judge violated his neutrality in the case by allowing the prosecution to show a videotape of himself in closing arguments.
Spector was convicted two years ago of shooting actress Lana Clarkson to death at his Alhambra mansion in 2003. He's serving 19 years to life in prison on a second-degree murder conviction.
His first trial ended in a hung jury; the second ended in a conviction.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2011/05/18/national/a161535D99.DTL
Saturday, May 14, 2011
Preserving the Value of Unanimous Criminal Jury Verdicts in Anti-Deadlock Instructions by Emil J. Bove III
C. CALIFORNIA’S APPROACH: THE PHIL SPECTOR TRIAL
California rejected the Allen charge in 1977,201 and, perhaps relatedly, trials
in its state courts appear to end in deadlock-related mistrials more frequently
than the national average.202 Like Arizona’s court rules, California’s court rules
also permit flexible action by the trial court when the jury reaches an “impasse”:
(a) Determination
After a jury reports that it has reached an impasse in its deliberations, the
trial judge may, in the presence of counsel, advise the jury of its duty to
decide the case based on the evidence while keeping an open mind and
talking about the evidence with each other. The judge should ask the jury if it
has specific concerns which, if resolved, might assist the jury in reaching a
verdict.
(b) Possible further action
If the trial judge determines that further action might assist the jury in
reaching a verdict, the judge may:
(1) Give additional instructions;
(2) Clarify previous instructions;
(3) Permit attorneys to make additional closing arguments; or
(4) Employ any combination of these measures.203
The most notable distinction from Arizona’s rule is that California does not
suggest that the evidence may be reopened upon a question from the jury.
Music producer Phil Spector’s recent murder trial presents an example in
which the trial court risked stretching this rule so far that the proceedings would
damage the legitimacy of the jury process. Spector was accused of killing
actress Lana Clarkson in 2003.204 The much-publicized trial lasted four
months.205 After deliberating for seven days, the jury indicated that it was
deadlocked, noting that the split was seven votes to five but following the
judge’s instructions not to reveal which side had the majority.206 Three jurors
suggested that additional instructions would be helpful, including more guid-
The judge then “elicited a back-and-forth with several jurors as he sought to
pinpoint what issues they were stuck on.”208 The jurors indicated disagreement
about the meaning of “reasonable doubt” and that they were confused about
how to weigh the evidence and interpret an instruction regarding the elements
of second-degree murder.209 Following this exchange, the judge rejected the
option of additional instructions on lesser-included offenses, agreeing with the
defense that such instructions might coerce the jury into believing that a verdict
was necessary at all costs.210 In the end, the judge simply re-read most of the
instructions, removing language he said misstated the law and adding additional
instructions about “reasonable doubt.”211 After about another week of additional
deliberation, the judge declared a mistrial due to the deadlock.212 Upon being
discharged, jurors indicated that two “holdouts” in favor of Spector had prevented
the conviction.213
The biggest problem with the judge’s actions in this case is that there is a
great risk in conducting the type of back-and-forth that took place in this trial; it
injects too many unknowns into the process. Jurors are likely to put great
emphasis on everything that the judge says or asks. Even subtle facial expressions
from the judge risk the type of influence that the anti-coercion principle
seeks to avoid—the judge should not inappropriately affect the deliberations
taking place in the jury room while they are in progress. Juries frequently ask to
review evidence or to have testimony read to them, and some interaction with
the court during deliberations is probably unavoidable in many cases. Nonetheless,
these interactions should be circumscribed as much as possible. That is
why both the Arizona and California rules permit the judge to solicit indications
via notes from the jury about questions or other things that might help it reach a
verdict, but the rules suggest that conducting this inquiry through in-court
conversation is not appropriate. The judge in the Spector case seems to have run
afoul of the rule and risked tainting the process.
Second, the judge’s alterations to the jury instructions were probably a
mistake. He was correct not to instruct the jury on the lesser-included charge of
manslaughter after it had reached an impasse.214 Substituting a lesser-included
charge after deliberations had begun would suggest to the jury that the court
preferred some type of conviction in the case, even if on a different charge,
rather than a mistrial.
By removing part of the initial murder instruction, however, the judge
conveyed a “not-so-subtle message to the jury that there may be more ways to
find Spector guilty than they have been thinking of . . . .”215 The jury could infer
from the new instruction that, because the initial instruction was so incorrect
that it had to be removed, they should look more carefully at the charge in the
first place. If the latter instruction seemed more permissive, it would suggest to
the jury that it should look more carefully at convicting Spector. Essentially, by
making this change, the judge “alter[ed] the rules by which a jury makes a
decision.”216 Even if a curative measure was available for the erroneous instruction
in the first place, the judge impermissibly invaded the province of the jury.
The close, public scrutiny of his actions meant that, even if the jury had reached
a verdict, society would certainly not have accepted it as a legitimate stamp of
disapproval of Spector’s actions.
The interaction illustrates the fragility of the symbolism associated with the
jury system. The rules in both Arizona and California offer judges wide latitude
in dealing with and “assisting” split juries, but most trial courts are hesitant to
go beyond re-reading instructions before declaring a mistrial. Their actions
demonstrate appropriate regard for the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations and
the symbolic legitimacy that attaches to verdicts resulting from a process
requiring unanimous verdicts. Departing too far from contemporary antideadlock
instructions to “assist” the jury through the procedures available in
these states might reduce the incidence of mistrials, but these actions also risk
damaging the perceived legitimacy of the criminal process. Most judges do not
go too far with the more radical methods of dealing with divided juries. Nor
should they.
CONCLUSION
This Note articulated some instrumental principles to guide the debate regarding
anti-deadlock instructions. Properly defined, the primary concern in handling
a divided jury is that the judge may coerce jurors in a way that taints the
ultimate verdict, prevents it from being the product of the jury’s deliberations,
and limits the extent to which the community accepts the products of the
criminal justice system as legitimate. The sanctity of the deliberation room and
the concept that the verdict is solely the jury’s should be paramount concerns.
Although unanimity does not necessarily provide major benefits in terms of
instruction would look. . . . The defense will easily argue that if the jury then comes back with a guilty verdict on manslaughter, it was ‘a tainted compromise verdict . . . .’”) ...
http://www.georgetownlawjournal.org/issues/pdf/97-1/Bove.PDF
California rejected the Allen charge in 1977,201 and, perhaps relatedly, trials
in its state courts appear to end in deadlock-related mistrials more frequently
than the national average.202 Like Arizona’s court rules, California’s court rules
also permit flexible action by the trial court when the jury reaches an “impasse”:
(a) Determination
After a jury reports that it has reached an impasse in its deliberations, the
trial judge may, in the presence of counsel, advise the jury of its duty to
decide the case based on the evidence while keeping an open mind and
talking about the evidence with each other. The judge should ask the jury if it
has specific concerns which, if resolved, might assist the jury in reaching a
verdict.
(b) Possible further action
If the trial judge determines that further action might assist the jury in
reaching a verdict, the judge may:
(1) Give additional instructions;
(2) Clarify previous instructions;
(3) Permit attorneys to make additional closing arguments; or
(4) Employ any combination of these measures.203
The most notable distinction from Arizona’s rule is that California does not
suggest that the evidence may be reopened upon a question from the jury.
Music producer Phil Spector’s recent murder trial presents an example in
which the trial court risked stretching this rule so far that the proceedings would
damage the legitimacy of the jury process. Spector was accused of killing
actress Lana Clarkson in 2003.204 The much-publicized trial lasted four
months.205 After deliberating for seven days, the jury indicated that it was
deadlocked, noting that the split was seven votes to five but following the
judge’s instructions not to reveal which side had the majority.206 Three jurors
suggested that additional instructions would be helpful, including more guid-
The judge then “elicited a back-and-forth with several jurors as he sought to
pinpoint what issues they were stuck on.”208 The jurors indicated disagreement
about the meaning of “reasonable doubt” and that they were confused about
how to weigh the evidence and interpret an instruction regarding the elements
of second-degree murder.209 Following this exchange, the judge rejected the
option of additional instructions on lesser-included offenses, agreeing with the
defense that such instructions might coerce the jury into believing that a verdict
was necessary at all costs.210 In the end, the judge simply re-read most of the
instructions, removing language he said misstated the law and adding additional
instructions about “reasonable doubt.”211 After about another week of additional
deliberation, the judge declared a mistrial due to the deadlock.212 Upon being
discharged, jurors indicated that two “holdouts” in favor of Spector had prevented
the conviction.213
The biggest problem with the judge’s actions in this case is that there is a
great risk in conducting the type of back-and-forth that took place in this trial; it
injects too many unknowns into the process. Jurors are likely to put great
emphasis on everything that the judge says or asks. Even subtle facial expressions
from the judge risk the type of influence that the anti-coercion principle
seeks to avoid—the judge should not inappropriately affect the deliberations
taking place in the jury room while they are in progress. Juries frequently ask to
review evidence or to have testimony read to them, and some interaction with
the court during deliberations is probably unavoidable in many cases. Nonetheless,
these interactions should be circumscribed as much as possible. That is
why both the Arizona and California rules permit the judge to solicit indications
via notes from the jury about questions or other things that might help it reach a
verdict, but the rules suggest that conducting this inquiry through in-court
conversation is not appropriate. The judge in the Spector case seems to have run
afoul of the rule and risked tainting the process.
Second, the judge’s alterations to the jury instructions were probably a
mistake. He was correct not to instruct the jury on the lesser-included charge of
manslaughter after it had reached an impasse.214 Substituting a lesser-included
charge after deliberations had begun would suggest to the jury that the court
preferred some type of conviction in the case, even if on a different charge,
rather than a mistrial.
By removing part of the initial murder instruction, however, the judge
conveyed a “not-so-subtle message to the jury that there may be more ways to
find Spector guilty than they have been thinking of . . . .”215 The jury could infer
from the new instruction that, because the initial instruction was so incorrect
that it had to be removed, they should look more carefully at the charge in the
first place. If the latter instruction seemed more permissive, it would suggest to
the jury that it should look more carefully at convicting Spector. Essentially, by
making this change, the judge “alter[ed] the rules by which a jury makes a
decision.”216 Even if a curative measure was available for the erroneous instruction
in the first place, the judge impermissibly invaded the province of the jury.
The close, public scrutiny of his actions meant that, even if the jury had reached
a verdict, society would certainly not have accepted it as a legitimate stamp of
disapproval of Spector’s actions.
The interaction illustrates the fragility of the symbolism associated with the
jury system. The rules in both Arizona and California offer judges wide latitude
in dealing with and “assisting” split juries, but most trial courts are hesitant to
go beyond re-reading instructions before declaring a mistrial. Their actions
demonstrate appropriate regard for the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations and
the symbolic legitimacy that attaches to verdicts resulting from a process
requiring unanimous verdicts. Departing too far from contemporary antideadlock
instructions to “assist” the jury through the procedures available in
these states might reduce the incidence of mistrials, but these actions also risk
damaging the perceived legitimacy of the criminal process. Most judges do not
go too far with the more radical methods of dealing with divided juries. Nor
should they.
CONCLUSION
This Note articulated some instrumental principles to guide the debate regarding
anti-deadlock instructions. Properly defined, the primary concern in handling
a divided jury is that the judge may coerce jurors in a way that taints the
ultimate verdict, prevents it from being the product of the jury’s deliberations,
and limits the extent to which the community accepts the products of the
criminal justice system as legitimate. The sanctity of the deliberation room and
the concept that the verdict is solely the jury’s should be paramount concerns.
Although unanimity does not necessarily provide major benefits in terms of
instruction would look. . . . The defense will easily argue that if the jury then comes back with a guilty verdict on manslaughter, it was ‘a tainted compromise verdict . . . .’”) ...
http://www.georgetownlawjournal.org/issues/pdf/97-1/Bove.PDF
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Some Background On Lana Clarkson's Life
The Dead, Carlos Santana, the wild flamenco dancers from another commune down the road, and scores of day-trippers would stop by and ignite spontaneous parties. The area was then the world capital of LSD, and there was a lot of acid tripping going on. Hidden at the back of a kitchen shelf was a black jar holding a hockey-puck-size mass of the now-mythical concoction of LSD known as “Orange Sunshine”—all of which was eventually consumed.
Lana was raised by Donna Clarkson, a single mother and registered nurse. Together with Lana’s younger sister, Fawn, they lived in a rented house and took part in the commune’s social life. Donna had dark hair and eyes and the long legs Lana had inherited. “She was kind of a flaky hippie, like the rest of us,” says one of the commune’s mainstays, Julie Beardsley. “But she took being a mother very seriously. She came to a lot of our parties but didn’t get wild and pick up men—especially in front of Lana.”
Family and friends describe Lana as a happy child who was reciting nursery rhymes when she was just a year old and loved telling stories and dressing up. On Lana’s tenth birthday Donna gave her a roan mare, and over the next four years she learned to ride both western and English style. W hen she turned 14, they mated her horse, Breeze, with one of the commune’s horses—a large, papered white Arabian stallion named Kief. Lana and the other local girls hung around the corral, looking on with fascination as the horses coupled. Not long after its birth the foal stepped into a posthole, snapped its leg, and had to be put down. Some of the commune members decided to freeze the meat and serve it at a party at a nearby ranch, where Lana accidentally ate her own horse.
“Lana,” says Beardsley, “was a sweet girl
http://www.domanickjusticetalk.com/files/Spector_la_mag_.pdf
Lana was raised by Donna Clarkson, a single mother and registered nurse. Together with Lana’s younger sister, Fawn, they lived in a rented house and took part in the commune’s social life. Donna had dark hair and eyes and the long legs Lana had inherited. “She was kind of a flaky hippie, like the rest of us,” says one of the commune’s mainstays, Julie Beardsley. “But she took being a mother very seriously. She came to a lot of our parties but didn’t get wild and pick up men—especially in front of Lana.”
Family and friends describe Lana as a happy child who was reciting nursery rhymes when she was just a year old and loved telling stories and dressing up. On Lana’s tenth birthday Donna gave her a roan mare, and over the next four years she learned to ride both western and English style. W hen she turned 14, they mated her horse, Breeze, with one of the commune’s horses—a large, papered white Arabian stallion named Kief. Lana and the other local girls hung around the corral, looking on with fascination as the horses coupled. Not long after its birth the foal stepped into a posthole, snapped its leg, and had to be put down. Some of the commune members decided to freeze the meat and serve it at a party at a nearby ranch, where Lana accidentally ate her own horse.
“Lana,” says Beardsley, “was a sweet girl
http://www.domanickjusticetalk.com/files/Spector_la_mag_.pdf
Tuesday, April 19, 2011
Phil Spector Appellate Co-Counsel Charles Sevilla
Charles Sevilla
After receiving his law degree from the University of
Chuck has argued cases at all appellate levels, including several times before the U.S. Supreme Court. He is a frequent speaker and presenter at legal conferences. Chuck has published books on legal humor and two novels about a fictional New York City defense lawyer, John Wilkes. He has authored numerous law review articles and is the co-author of a legal text, California Criminal Defense Practice, used by lawyers and in law schools throughout the country.
Chuck's complete resume (PDF 23K) including Bar activities and selected published opinions is available here.
http://www.charlessevilla.com/publications.htm
“Under California law, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct if he or she makes use of ‘deceptive or reprehensible methods' when attempting to persuade either the trial court or the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without such misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would have resulted.”
“A “reasonable probability” means “ ‘merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Racy (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1335, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 455.)”
“A prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel.” ( Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 832, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) “If there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would understand the prosecutor's statements as an assertion that defense counsel sought to deceive the jury, misconduct would be established.” ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1302, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.”
“Further, accusations that counsel fabricated a defense or misstated facts in order to deceive the jury are forbidden. (E.g., People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 30–31, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 211 P.3d 520.) The prosecutor's statement in closing argument that Dr. Kalish “got paid seven grand to meet for two hours with the defendant and come up with an excuse,” was not an argument based on the evidence. Rather, it was an unfair suggestion to the jurors that they should disregard Dr. Kalish's testimony because his testimony had been bought and paid for by defense counsel.”
People v. Higgins (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1075
Wednesday, April 13, 2011
Phil Spector murder conviction in appeals court
Apr. 12, 2011 5:40 PM ET
LINDA DEUTSCH, AP Special Correspondent
LINDA DEUTSCH, AP Special Correspondent
LOS ANGELES (AP) — A panel of three appellate judges gave lawyers on both sides a hostile reception Tuesday as they argued for and against motions to overturn the second-degree murder conviction of legendary music producer Phil Spector.
With his family and that of slain actress Lana Clarkson in the courtroom, Spector's appellate attorney, Dennis Riordan, insisted that a judge erred when he allowed prosecutors to show jurors a videotape from a hearing held outside the presence of Spector and the jury.
On the tape, Superior Court Judge Larry Paul Fidler was seen interpreting the testimony of a key forensic witness about the position of blood spatter on Clarkson's body, Riordan argued.
Riordan said the judge had taken on the role of a witness.
Associate Justice Richard D. Aldrich and Presiding Justice Joan Dempsey Klein of the California 2nd District Court of Appeal seemed unimpressed with the argument.
Klein said when she was a trial judge, she sometimes interceded to clarify testimony for jurors. "Something that's a mere clarification of evidence — judges do it all the time," said Klein. "...I've done it. It doesn't mean we're testifying."
But Riordan noted that the prosecution used the videotape and a picture of Fidler in their closing argument to validate their position.
The panel, which also included Associate Justice Patti S. Kitching, questioned points made by the state attorney general's office about admissibility of evidence in the case. They quizzed Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Daniels about Fidler's decision to allow the testimony of five women who claimed to have been threatened by Spector in the past.
"If that evidence hadn't come in, do you think you would have gotten a guilty verdict?" asked Klein, who suggested the evidence could be viewed as "highly prejudicial."
Daniels argued it was admissible and not prejudicial, and that coupled with other testimony, it showed that Spector killed the "Barbaraian Queen" star.
The judges have 90 days to issue a written ruling.
Spector was convicted two years ago of shooting to the actress to death at his Alhambra mansion in 2003. He's serving 19 years to life and didn't attend the hearing.
If the appellate court grants Spector a new trial, it would be his third. Spector's first jury deadlocked in the case in 2007; a second jury convicted him in 2009.
Spector's lawyers in both trials contended he did not kill Clarkson and suggested that forensic evidence showed was depressed and shot herself in the mouth. The 71-year-old rock music producer known for his "Wall of Sound" recording technique never testified.
Clarkson's mother, Donna, and another daughter attended the hearing with their attorney. Also in the audience were Spector's wife, Rachelle, and his grown children, Louis and Nicole.
Outside court, Riordan said it was impossible to predict what the court might do and noted that "the tenor of questions shifted" depending on the issues being addressed.
Rachelle Spector said she visits her husband in prison every weekend and that he has been waiting anxiously for the result of his appeal.
"I sincerely hope they take into consideration the evidence and do the right thing," she said.
The justices received some 360 pages of legal briefs and 10,000 pages of transcripts over the past year. They said they had studied the facts of the case closely.
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