The Los Angeles
City Attorney is now retaliating against me. There was and is no
domestic violence. The Opposition was filed together with Paulette
Brandt and my declarations. My mother's will be next. The order I
requested is a civil harassment order and I am now filing a federal
lawsuit over this situation.
Kelley Lynch
In Propria Persona
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY
OF LOS ANGELES
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA Case No. 2CA04539
Plaintiff OPPOSITION TO NOTICED
PROBATION VIOLATION; WITNESS
Vs. LIST; PROPOSED EVIDENCE
KELLEY LYNCH Date
of Hearing: 11.13.2013
Time
of Hearing: 8:30 AM
Department : 47
Defendant
TO THE CLERK OF THE
COURT AN THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA:
PLEASE
TAKE NOTICE that Defendant, Kelley Lynch, in propria persona, hereby gives
written notice of her Opposition to Noticed Probation Violation matter, having
been vaguely apprised of the alleged violation on September 25, 2013, in
Department 31. Said matter is set for
hearing on November 13, 2013 in Department 47 although the City Attorney’s
Notice of Probation Violation (received by Defendant on October 23, 2013) lists
the date of the hearing as November 14, 2013.
This
Opposition is in response to the allegations and the ongoing outrageous conduct
on the part of the City Attorney of Los Angeles, and others, with respect to Defendant
Kelley Lynch – throughout her trial, appellate process, and with respect to her
probation requirements. Defendant has
engaged in entirely lawful behavior prior to, during formal custody, and
following her “official” release from custody through and including today’s
date. She views the prosecution’s
ongoing false accusations as highly slanderous, defamatory, retaliatory,
defensive in nature, and indicative of official misconduct.
Apart from the allegations raised by the City
Attorney, all of which are vehemently denied, Defendant is contesting the domestic
violence and effective assistance of counsel fines that are a direct result of
false statements, perjured testimony, and egregious prosecutorial misconduct. She has filed an appeal and initial writ of habeas
corpus, both denied, and intends to file a petition with the Court of Appeals
when she is in receipt of her complete file from the Public Defender’s Office
and in a position to properly address the issues raised at trial. Since her release from jail, in September
2012, Lynch has continuously attempted to obtain her entire file from the
Public Defender’s Office. She has been
unable to do so.
As the City Attorney understands, Lynch also
plans to file complaints with the Criminal Grand Jury of Los Angeles,
Department of Justice, Attorney General of California, Justice Integrity
Division of the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office, California State Bar
and others. She has attempted to file
complaints with respect to the prosecutorial misconduct and retaliation with
the City Attorney’s Office. The City
Attorney’s Office does not appear to have any type of complaint process in
place and has responded to legitimate complaints and grievances with threats of
prosecution and allegations of probation violations. Lynch has filed a complaint with the Ethics
Commission about the ongoing conduct of the City Attorney’s Office with respect
to her and the misuse and abuse of authority she has been victimized by. Defendant also plans to file a federal
lawsuit in response to her 2012 trial, verdict, sentencing, probation, and the
ongoing outrageous conduct on the part of the Los Angeles City Attorney, and
others.
After
a trial, replete with false statements and perjured testimony, Defendant was
placed on five years summary probation on April 17, 2012 in Department 47. Her trial, sentence, and terms of probation
involve false and fraudulent allegations related to, among other things,
ineffective assistance of counsel, domestic violence, an intimate dating
relationship, an unconstitutionally vague statute, and issues related to VAWA
and the modification and registration of the 2008 Boulder, Colorado civil
harassment order.
At the probation hearing, held on or about September
12, 2012, the City Attorney of Los Angeles signed off on all of Lynch’s
probation requirements excluding the fines the Court refused to waive. Lynch believes the Public Defender’s Office
should have contested the Court’s position with respect to these fines and
other matters as she is indigent and does not have the ability to pay these
fines which are entirely unconstitutional given the fact that 1) there is no
domestic violence and no evidence of domestic violence or a dating relationship;
2) the original Boulder order was a civil harassment order that was invalidly
modified when it was registered in California; 3) and, the fact that Lynch was
not, even in one’s wildest imagination, represented by effective assistance of
counsel. Furthermore, Lynch has no
mental health issues and the fact that false accusations and perjured testimony
were used against her, by an individual with bias and motive, does not change
that fact. Leonard Cohen, regardless of
his perjured testimony that Lynch “assailed” his reputation, is the individual
with a well-documented history of psychiatric problems, drug and alcohol abuse,
and a history of fraud, false accusations, highly embellished stories, and a
pattern of tax/resident problems and theft.
Lynch never “assailed” the reputation of a man once known as “Captain
Mandrax.” The trial court appeared to
have an idea of what a business arrangement or conversation should look like. Of course, the trial court was not in the
music industry, does not know either party, and may also believe Leonard Cohen
– during business hours – had a legal right to look at people defecating on one
another in front of Defendant. Since
Lynch was a professional personal manager, and not in the porn industry, she
believes this type of activity must also be viewed as extraneous and lacking a
legitimate purpose. Leonard Cohen’s drug
usage, which is publicly documented, was not part of Kelley Lynch’s common plan
and scheme. She had no common plan and scheme
apart from attempting to request tax information, address legitimate business
and legal issues, and advise Cohen to cease and desist with respect to his
malicious lies and slander. In any
event, Cohen’s performance must have been tailored specifically for the jury as
he was nearly simultaneously providing Sylvie Simmons (his approved biographer
who felt very comfortable using the word “pussy”) with interviews addressing
his use of meth, LSD, and other drugs. Leonard
Cohen’s personal conduct annoys him.
Sylvie Simmons sold her book, containing Cohen’s quotes about his drug
usage, to many people who don’t know him.
Cohen is the individual who assailed his reputation and the following
testimony is perjured:
Prosecutor
Sandra Jo Streeter: … How did it feel to
be accused of being a drug user by Ms. Lynch?
Leonard Cohen: It’s not
agreeable. Q: How did it feel to not only be accused of
being a drug user but have her send out such accusations to people that you
don’t know? Leonard Cohen: It’s not a pleasant sensation. Q:
Now, Mr. Cohen, when you say not a pleasant sensation, your definition
of what’s not a pleasant sensation, two different things. So is there any way that you could
elaborate? A: Well, I mean Ms. Lynch would routinely accuse
me of being a drug addict and many other things so it made me feel – how can I
say it? I – Of course I didn’t like it,
and I felt my reputation was being assailed and the reputation of my
family. RT 142 Sidebar - Kelly: I’ve done some research on Mr. Cohen and he’s
in the past made interviews about having used legal and illegal drugs. Court:
No we’re not going to get into the issue of his drug use. Kelly:
I will say the evidence that was presented points to, perhaps,
defamatory in nature. And I do think
that if that’s the case that the people be precluded from saying that because
drug use was mentioned, therefore, it was harassing and threatening. RT 433
Streeter: Perhaps if the court
recalls I never specifically asked Mr. Cohen – Court: You did not.
Streeter: There was a reason why
I never did because I had a feeling when he wrote and what he wrote – RT
433 Court: Then we don’t need to get into that. Streeter:
And just so I’m clear. The people
mentioned the drug usage not to use as defamatory, that was more as a common
scheme and plan and I did it for the emails and the voice mail messages. That was the reason the people did that. Kelly:
I will say they spent a big portion of the emails highlighting the drug
use and in fact a lot of those messages referred to prior drug use and not
necessarily current drug use. Court:
Whether he used or not used drugs is not the issue and to the extent
they refer they do go the issue – I mean, to the extent that you bring up that
subject, it goes to the issue of whether the calls were during the course of
business, etc., etc. Kelly: I do think it goes to the 653. Whether they were meant to annoy or harass,
if he has himself proclaimed to be a drug user, then I think it mitigates the
level of harassment if she knows and he knows.
Court: You know we could have 500
mini trials in this case about lots of subjects but we’re not going to do
it. RT 434
These issues were willfully concealed from the
jury during Lynch’s trial while jurors were regaled with a deeply disturbing
and entirely fictional theory about Lynch.
At the September 12, 2012 hearing, Lynch was
advised that she did not have to attend the hearing at all but could, in the
alternative, mail her payment for the fines and fees in. When Lynch appeared for her probation hearing
on September 25, 2012, she was blind-sided with allegations of an absurd and
outrageous probation violation.
The
fines imposed by the trial court with respect to Lynch’s sentence are as
follows: A restitution fine of $120;
probation revocation restitution fine that is only imposed if probation is
revoked; conviction fee of $30; court security fee of $40; $400 domestic
violence payment; and $1,800 in attorneys’ fees. These fines and fees are in dispute.
OPPOSITION
TO NOTICE OF PROBATION VIOLATIONS
The
prosecution has falsely accused Lynch of engaging in “unlawful behavior”
commencing with her release from custody through and including September 26,
2013. The People assert that Lynch
violated the terms of her probation in the following manner: 1)
Failure to present a completion of a psychological evaluation to the
court for review; 2) Failure to obey all laws by her continuing behavior that
falls within the purview of California Penal Code Section 653(m)(copies of the
emails are attached hereto). Lynch
asserts that this matter is nothing other than prosecutorial retaliation, an
affirmative defense, unconscionable government conduct and an absolute abuse of
power. Lynch vehemently denies these
allegations which she views as false, fraudulent, and entirely slanderous. On
September 25, 2013, Judge Robert Vanderet advised the City Attorney’s anonymous
legal representative that he did not require Lynch to have a psychological
evaluation. She has no mental health
issues but has been viciously and maliciously slandered over the ongoing legal,
business, and tax matters involving Leonard Cohen.
This case essentially arose from and relates to
Leonard Cohen’s legal defense with respect to the allegations of criminal tax
fraud that Lynch brought to the attention of the Internal Revenue Service,
State of Kentucky Revenue Cabinet and Fraud Unit, Franchise Tax Board, and
others. Lynch is essentially a whistle
blower and Leonard Cohen has relentlessly retaliated against her. She reported the allegations of his criminal
tax fraud to the Internal Revenue Service on April 15, 2005, met with agents
from the U.S. Treasury about this matter, and was advised to present these
allegations and evidence to IRS Agent Luis Tejeda, Head of Tax Fraud for the
Western Division of the United States.
Many federal tax issues were raised throughout Lynch’s trial; she was
deprived her constitutional right to call compulsory witnesses, including Agent
Tejeda; and, in debriefing, the jurors advise the Public Defenders that they
wanted to hear from the Internal Revenue Service. All of this is rather alarming given the fact
that LA Superior Court has no jurisdiction over the IRS and/or federal tax
matters and the City Attorney of Los Angeles does not represent the IRS or
speak for them. The prosecutor did,
however, present many false statements and elicted perjured testimony with respect
to federal tax matters and many other issues.
Ann Diamond’s article for Rolling Stone gives a solid and factual
overview of what unfolded between Lynch and Cohen after he heard, in the fall
of 2004, that she intended to report his tax fraud, and unconscionable use and
abuse of her, to the Internal Revenue Service and other authorities.
Leonard Cohen has misused, abused, manipulated,
and exploited the restraining order process and justice system, as a means of
revenge, and retaliation. The City
Attorney’s Office has done the same with respect to Lynch. Furthermore, the City Attorney’s Domestic
Violence Unit should not have been involved in this matter at all – which would
have reduced Lynch’s possibility of crossing paths with prosecutor Sandra Jo
Streeter which resulted in countless lies, false statements, and perjured
testimony. The 2008 Boulder, Colorado
order was and remains a civil harassment order.
Since 2004, Lynch has been subjected to a
plethora of false allegations by Leonard Cohen (and several others, including
his paid witness lawyers) that have resulted in numerous restraining orders,
manufactured criminal actions, frivolous and malicious legal actions, an utter
waste of taxpayer dollars, wrongful arrests and incarceration, the loss of
Defendant’s home, a coordinated custody matter, irreversible financial
devastation, the destruction of two businesses, and inconceivable damage to
her, members of her family, and others. Lynch
has seen no documents related to the 2005 restraining order and is, as of this
moment in time, and is unsure of the type of order that was issued: civil harassment or domestic violence. That is a highly material and relevant
issue. Lynch also appears to be the
victim of corrupt and/or compromised public officials. Reports of corruption and collusion by public
officials have been documented for the IRS, FBI, DOJ, Treasury, FTB, and
others.
Due
to this egregious and vile manipulation and exploitation of the restraining
order system (which is frequently and blatantly abused to obtain an upper hand
in litigation and business matters), and specifically with respect to “domestic
violence” orders, Lynch has contacted the Department of Justice and Federal
Bureau of Investigation and asked them to investigate. Proof and evidence has
been provided with respect to public official misconduct, as this case most
definitely indicates that crimes were committed by public officials who were
operating under a variety of state and federal grant funds under the auspices
of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).
Additional factors include the presence of entertainment figures and a
political component which may have facilitated or fueled much of this
debacle. Lynch believes sufficient
evidence and facts exist for the DOJ to conduct an audit of all state taxpayer
funds that have been distributed to the County and City of Los Angeles and to
halt all such distributions in the interim.
Lynch is aware of other individuals who have similar complaints.
Lynch
has raised, on appeal and in her initial writ, and will continue to pursue
these legal issues, violations of her constitutional rights with respect to her
2012 trial. Those include the right to confront adverse witnesses (Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 1988); right to effective assistance of counsel (Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 1984); prosecution must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt (In re. Winship, 397 U.S. 358 1970); prosecution must
disclose exculpatory evidence (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 145 1986);
right to fair trial in a fair tribunal (In re. Murchison, 394 U.S. 133,
136 1955); and right to assistance of counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 1963). And, while the U.S.
Supreme Court has observed that “due process does not require that every
conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of
convicting an innocent person” [Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208
(1977), so as not to paralyze our alleged system of justice, only once a
defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which
he or she was changed does the presumption of innocence disappear. See Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
610 (1974). Lynch disputes that the
State met its burden of proof at trial that defendant was guilty. Lynch further claims that there is newly
discovered evidence that proves actual innocence. There has been a fundamental miscarriage of
justice with respect to Lynch and she is challenging the validity of her
conviction, sentence, and terms of probation.
Her criminal process “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to ranked as fundamental.” Patterson
v. New York.
Lynch
has attached a declaration that incorporates numerous letters that could
ultimately form the basis of affidavits with probative value. These affidavits, had they been obtained by
Lynch’s trial lawyers, could have been weighed by the jury, along with other
evidence, in deliberating upon its verdict.
Since the statements in the affidavits contradict the evidence received
at trial, the jury would have had to decide important issues of credibility. Credibility issues, with respect to Leonard
Cohen, also arose with respect to his acknowledgment that his testimony re. the
“dating relationship” was perjured. Unfortunately,
the jury was denied this opportunity.
These affidavits are a showing of innocence. Exhibit
- Declaration of Kelley Lynch (letters attached)
At
the heart of the probation violation matter are communications with government
officials. This issue was raised during
Lynch’s trial as well. Lynch contends
that her communications with government officials were legitimate. They addressed, among other things, valid
complaints and grievances; issues related to her self-representation re. the
writ of habeas corpus; refuted slanderous and malicious accusations being made
directly to Lynch’s prosecutor and others in the City Attorney’s office; and
the ongoing dangerously unstable individuals she, her family, and others
continue to be exposed to. Lynch has
most certainly not engaged in a campaign of harassment with respect to DCA
Streeter, or anyone at the City Attorney’s office, but views the probation
violation matter as an ongoing pattern of harassment and retaliation on the
part of the government. Lynch clearly
had legitimate purposes for contacting the City Attorney’s Office.
Sentencing Hearing -
Court: I’m not going to include any
government officials because I don’t believe it’s proper to enjoin people from
communicating with government officials.
RT 641
CONSTITUTONAL
RIGHT OF
SELF-REPRESENTATION
Is That The Extent of It? I Merely Have The Right To Defend
Myself?
The Sixth Amendment as made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth guarantees that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an
independent constitutional right of self-representation and that he may proceed
to defend himself without counsel. In Faretta
v. California, 422, U.S. 806 (1975), the Court confirmed: “In the federal courts, the right of
self-representation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of our
Nation. Section 35 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92, enacted by the First Congress and signed by President
Washington one day before the Sixth Amendment [422, U.S. 806, 813] was
proposed, provided that ‘in all courts of the United States, the parties may
plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel
…’ The right is currently codified in 28
U.S.C. 1654. With few exceptions, each
of the several states also accords a defendant the right to represent himself
in any criminal case. The Constitutions
of 36 States explicitly confer that right.
Moreover, many state courts have [422 U.S. 806, 814] expressed the view
that the right is also supported by the Constitution of the United
States.”
In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S.
269, 279, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to
the assistance of counsel implicitly embodies a “correlative right to dispense
with a lawyer’s help.” The Sixth
Amendment includes a statement of the rights necessary to a full defense: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right … to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.”
These
rights are basic to our system of justice and are part of the “due process of
law” that is guaranteed to defendants by the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to defend oneself essentially means
that one is acting as their own legal counsel and has therefore been afforded
all the rights a lawyer would have. Faretta
v. California sets forth the historical background to the right to
self-representation: “In the American
colonies the insistence upon a right of self-representation was, if anything,
more fervent than in England. The
colonists brought with them an appreciation of the virtues of self-reliance and
a traditional distrust of lawyers. When
the Colonies were first settled, ‘the lawyer was synonymous with the cringing
Attorneys-General of the Crown and the arbitrary Justices of the Kings Court,
all bent on the conviction of those who opposed the King’s prerogatives, and
twisting the law to secure convictions.’
This prejudice gained strength in the Colonies where ‘distrust of
lawyers became an institution.’ Several
colonies prohibited pleading for hire in the 17th century. The prejudice persisted into the 18th
century as ‘the lower classes came to identify lawyers with the upper class.’ The years of Revolution and Confederation saw
an upsurge of anti-lawyer sentiment, a ‘sudden revival, after the War of the
Revolution, of the old dislike and distrust of lawyers as a class.’ In the heat of these sentiments the
Constitution was forged.”
Those
identical sentiments exist today and the City Attorney can now be viewed as the
King’s Court – hell bent on the conviction of those who oppose and criticize
them and twisting the law to secure convictions. The City Attorney can also be viewed as the
“upper class” who, complete with secretaries, assistants, messengers, and
LAPD’s TMU at its beckon call, can trample on the rights of citizens, retaliate
using extraordinary resources, and attempt to intimidate the citizenry using
malicious and unconscionable tactics, frivolous accusations, and – now –
domestic violence law, whether or not that individual is in an alleged “dating
relationship.”
All a
prosecutor needs to say to mount an affirmative defense is “I fear for my life”
and hire a psychologist to support that position. That is precisely what Defendant believes has
occurred in the instant matter. And yet,
the City Attorney of Los Angeles and its prosecutors appear to have no idea
what the rights conferred upon a self-represented individual entail. They also do not seem to understand basic and
fundamental laws and rules. For
instance, prosecutor Sandra Jo Streeter appeared to argue that an employer does
not have an obligation to provide an employee with a year-end tax document that
the IRS, and other taxing authorities, require.
One can assume that she, however, receives one. Neither the Lynch nor the IRS are in receipt
of Leonard Cohen’s IRS required form 1099 to Kelley Lynch for the year
2004. Lynch legitimately “wants” this
form and is legitimately entitled to receive it.
Indeed
the most important thing she mentions every so often the tax statement is
merely a ruse. RT 42 Let’s talk a little bit about Ms. Lynch’s
need for the tax form or tax return – RT 42
The evidence will show that Ms. Lynch was Mr. Cohen’s business
manager. The evidence will show that Mr.
Lynch – Mr. Cohen has no clue as to what a W-2 form is, a 1099 is, a K-1
form. The evidence will show that Ms.
Lynch is the one that had all of that information, knew all that information. Mr. Cohen did not have it, does not have it
and does not understand what it means.
Okay. RT 43 So what you have here, what this is proof of
is not a woman who legitimately wants her IRS records or documents. It is the unraveling of a con. RT 578
Equal
justice under law is one of the most fundamental maxims of our legal
system. One of the key issues involved
in the instant matter is the manner in which the City Attorney of Los Angeles,
and others, relate with an unrepresented opponent. Fair treatment can and does contribute
directly to equal justice. In broad
terms, fair treatment of unrepresented opponents would mean not taking unfair
advantage of the absence of counsel.
This is not a matter of vigorous advocacy on the part of an opponent. It is a matter of the most basic
communication skills, ethics, and an equal playing field. Lynch has never asked the City Attorney’s
Office for legal advice and the assertion is absurd. She was represented, on appeal, by Francisco
Suarez, but – at the same time – was self-represented with respect to her writ
of habeas corpus. The City Attorney had
a wide range of appropriate responses at hand. Some examples are: 1) Communicate with Lynch regarding their
potential conflict or whatever issue they felt was detrimental to them
personally; 2) Hit “Reply All” and advise Stephen Gianelli, who was maliciously
slandering Lynch while harassing her and others, to cease and desist. He is clearly engaged in a proxy war that
relates to Leonard Cohen and possibly matters involving Phil Spector. 3)
Contact Lynch’s Public Defenders (in the Probation matter) or her
appellate attorney, Francisco Suarez. 4)
Acknowledge or respond to Lynch’s complaints and grievances rather than
threatening her with prosecution or further probation violations. 5)
Advise Lynch that they had no post-conviction Brady violation
obligations. 6) Advise Lynch that they have no duty of candor
and no ethics.
In
absence of legal representation, by an effective attorney, the layperson must
either proceed in ignorance or seek answers to questions from others, including
clerks, judges and opposing counsel/prosecutors. Lynch maintains that the City Attorney’s
Office had and an obligation to clarify their role(s). That would have permitted Lynch to avoid any
risk of probation violation allegations, regardless of whether or not the City
Attorney or any individual prosecutors, felt compelled to retaliate against her
or raise affirmative defenses using domestic violence and/or workplace violence
defenses which is their area of expertise and permits them to entrap
people. Furthermore, Stephen Gianelli
has taken positions against Lynch that mirror those of the prosecutor’s so his
communications with respect to Lynch (particularly given the fact that he is
most definitely engaged in a proxy war that involves Leonard Cohen, Lynch’s
motion to vacate Cohen’s civil suit, and matters involving Phil Spector) are
suspect, at best. The fact that the City
Attorney permitted this to go on for over a year is unconscionable. Lynch’s sons were previously targeted, during
her trial, by prosecutor Sandra Jo Streeter, Leonard Cohen, and his paid
witness lawyers.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES
&
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The City Attorney of
Los Angeles, in the person of Sandra Jo Streeter, concluded that Lynch has
undiagnosed mental health issues based on letters she sent Bruce Cutler while
incarcerated at Lynwood Jail. Lynch
maintains that she had every legal and ethical right and obligation to reach
out to Phil Spector once she became aware that Leonard Cohen, the District
Attorney of Los Angeles (and in particular DA Steve Cooley and DDA Alan
Jackson) joined forces against Lynch.
Lynch became alarmed when she was briefly permitted to review an email
thread between Leonard Cohen and prosecutor Sandra Jo Streeter that addressed
an alleged incident whereby Phil Spector was accused of holding a gun on
Leonard Cohen. Cohen had, after all,
advised Lynch for approximately 20 years that Phil Spector never held a gun on
him and informed her that his stories to the news media were highly embellished
good rock and roll stories. Lynch has no
mental health issues. She recently
learned that “Dr. Baca” is a domestic violence counselor who frequently works
with the City Attorney’s Office. Lynch
did not have access to her address book in jail, came across the IRS
Commissioner’s Staff and Bruce Cutler’s addresses in paperwork her lawyers had,
and wrote to them detailing many matters. Ultimately, her public defender (Nikhil
Ramnaney) went online and provided Lynch with Phil Spector and Dennis Riordan’s
address. She immediately contacted both
of them and heard back from Phil Spector personally while at Lynwood. Lynch does not believe she has a
long-standing relationship with Bruce Cutler.
She knows for a fact that she has a very close long-standing
relationship with Phil Spector and remains convinced that he had a legal right
to confront Leonard Cohen over his testimony that Phil Spector held an
automatic gun to his head. That
testimony was impeached by Cohen’s email to prosecutor Sandra Jo Streeter. Neither Streeter nor Lynch’s trial lawyers
brought this to the attention of the jury.
Nor did they advise the jury that Cohen’s testimony was completely
contrary to statements the Los Angeles District Attorney used against Phil
Spector during his trials. Those
statements involve an automatic gun pointed at Cohen’s chest. There are now three versions of Leonard
Cohen’s highly embellished good rock and stories about Phil Spector before LA
Superior Court. Lynch has no idea which
version the Government believes but knows for a fact that she had the right to
confront Steve Cooley and Alan Jackson over this highly material and relevant
issue. Lynch poses no danger to anyone
or society.
Streeter: The
second thing the people want to emphasize in particular in the letter from Dr.
Baca. The people, you know, given
this situation, the people are faced with we can’t force Ms. Lynch to submit to
a mental health evaluation. That’s
something her attorneys would have to do or the court would have to do. But the people have been incredibly concerned
by some of the actions by Ms. Lynch. I
just want to emphasize some of the things Mr. Cohen said, giving him a respite
… The District Attorney’s office contacted the people themselves out of concern
at what Ms. Lynch is doing… One would have no idea that there is no idea that
there is a no relationship, no – what one would view as a relationship between
Ms. Lynch and Mr. Cutler. But she writes
as if the two of them are long-lost friends.
This is a concern the people have, particularly in light of showing
those to Dr. Baca, is the fact that it appears part of what is driving this is
that Ms. Lynch has some undiagnosed mental health issue, and the danger that
she poses to Mr. Cohen, Mr. Cutler, and Mr. Cohen, and society in
particular. RT 632 So the people would truly like to urge that
what is – is done is that the defendant is ordered to go to a locked mental health
facility. RT 632-633
Lynch has recently discovered that Dr. Baca is a domestic
violence counselor who does not diagnose people without seeing them. www.aboutfacedivp.com. She was advised to contact Baca’s lawyer and
the City Attorney’s Office over the lack of a “domestic violence” order, dating
relationship with Cohen, and due to the fact that she is now contacting the
Medical Board and believes Baca should lose her license over this
unconscionable situation. Lynch believes
her literal writing style and personal opinions were on trial and Judge Robert
Vanderet’s own statements bolster her argument:
The Defendant has also
throughout this trial, continuing up to the past month, as I read from the
letters, displayed an utter contempt for the judicial process and for judicial
orders. RT 636
Lynch
disagrees with the Court’s assessment of her letters and opinions and
absolutely believes that a “criminal enterprise” is an element of the judicial
process. It’s an aspect of the RICO
statute. Lynch didn’t write any letters
to the judge and completely disagrees with his conclusions. She is, however, astounded at what the
government is willing to read into just about anything Lynch has to say.
She’s also shown no
remorse nor glimmer of acknowledgment of wrongdoing for her behavior, even up
to this moment. RT 636 And in light of those factors, the court has
very few tools at its disposal in this case.
In other cases, I would often grant probation for a first-time
misdemeanor, with the expectation that a protective order would be abided
with. I have no confidence whatsoever
that protective order would be effective in this case because past protective
orders have done nothing. RT 636-637
Lynch
continues to show no remorse and not a glimmer of acknowledgement of
wrongdoing. The reason for this is
because Lynch is innocent and finds the notion of an innocent person feigning
“remorse” nauseating. Lynch has not seen
any remorse or a glimmer of acknowledgment of wrongdoing on the part of the
Government. That is evidently irrelevant
and highly immaterial.
The statute requires
that she undergo domestic violence counseling.
Streeter: Or psychiatric
counseling. RT 638
There
is no domestic violence. The Colorado
order Lynch requested was and remains a civil harassment order that can only be
modified by the original court. Lynch
would assume that when California statutes apply to her, the court would
require personal jurisdiction over her.
That is an ongoing legal issue in this matter.
Judge
Robert Vanderet, at Lynch’s Sentencing Hearing, clearly stated that he does not
believe it’s proper to enjoin people from communicating with government
officials. Lynch believes that statement
is relevant to her probation requirements.
She challenges the Government’s use of Penal Code 653(m) because it does
not appear constitutional to apply this statute to Government officials and/or
actors. This would ultimately prevent
citizens from complaining to their Government, addressing grievances with their
Government, representing themselves in criminal matters with their Government, and
so forth and so on.
Defendant, Kelley Lynch, has attempted in a
variety of ways, to address the corrupting impact of false statements and false
and perjured testimony in her trial with various individuals at the City
Attorney’s Office. They evidently find
that conveniently harassing. The U.S.
Supreme Court has long held that the Due Process Clause protects against
convictions based on testimony that the prosecutor knew or should have known
was false. This fundamental
constitutional protection, which is nothing other than the right to a fair
trial, has been undermined by imposing requirements of prosecution knowledge,
narrowing the definition of false testimony, and holding defendants to an
inappropriate standard materiality.
The
City Attorney of Los Angeles appears to have a problem with, among other
things, the word “lying” and the notion that a prosecutor should face criminal
sanctions as a result of their conduct and actions. According to dictionary.com, “lying” is
defined as “the telling of lies, or false statements; untruthfulness.” Lynch’s 2012 trial was replete with lies,
slander, false statements, perjured testimony, fraud, concealment, and appears
to be nothing other than a blatant attempt to obstruct justice while
discrediting Lynch. The crime of
obstruction of justice is committed with the knowledge that such act reasonably
may or will affect an actual or potential present, past, or future criminal
proceeding. Obstruction of justice
includes tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the
results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove
relevant to a criminal or proceeding and attempting to influence the testimony
of any person in any criminal proceeding.
It also includes causing or inducing the withholding of testimony or
withholding of records, documents, or other objects from any criminal
proceeding. It also addresses
retaliation against any witness or informant.
All of these elements apply to Lynch’s 2012 trial proceedings.
At issue in this probation matter is the
government’s attempt to limit Lynch’s speech while, from her perspective,
retaliating and raising an affirmative defense.
The government’s conduct in this matter is wholly and entirely
unconstitutional. “As a general matter,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002), The
Constitution “demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed
invalid … and that the Government bear the burden of showing their
constitutionality.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union. “Content-based restrictions on speech have
been permitted only for a few historic categories of speech, including
incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct,
so-called ‘fighting words,’ child pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech
presenting some grave and imminent threat the Government has the power to
prevent … As for perjury statutes, perjured statements lack First Amendment
protection not simply because they are false but because perjury undermines the
function and province of the law and threatens the integrity of judgments.” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S.
_____ (2012).
The
government’s allegations with respect to Lynch are, at best, invalid. At the heart of Kelley Lynch’s trial, and among
her grievances/complaints to the City Attorney of Los Angeles, are perjured
testimony and false statements. In fact,
Leonard Cohen essentially confessed to perjuring himself and suffered no
consequences whatsoever. He should have
been referred for a perjury prosecution.
“The remedy for speech that is false is
speech is true. This is the ordinary
course in a free society. The response to
the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the
straight-out lie, the simple truth. See Whitney
v. California, 247 U.S. 357, 377 (1928) (Brandeis, J., concurring)(“If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence”). The
theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’ Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The
First Amendment itself ensures the right to respond to speech we do not like,
and for good reason. Freedom of speech and thought flows not from the
beneficence of the state but from the inalienable rights of the person. And suppression of speech by the government
can make exposure of falsity more difficult, not less so. Society has the right and civic duty to
engage in open, dynamic, rational discourse.
These ends are not well served when the government seeks to orchestrate
public discussion through content-based mandates.” United
States v. Alvarez.
FIRST
AMENDMENT
GOVERNMENT
RETALIATION
The First Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress
shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1. This prohibition was made applicable to the
States and their political subdivisions by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.
As a general rule, the First
Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting individuals to
retaliatory action for speaking out.
The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, secures from state action an individual’s rights to
“freedom of speech” and to “petition the government for a redress of
grievances.”
Defendant is convinced that she is being punished and
retaliated against, in this probation matter, for exercising her right of
appeal and engaging in constitutionally protected activity which would include
freedom of speech, attempting to address grievances with one’s government, and
due to the unconscionable manner in which the government and lawyers treat
self-represented individuals. The
concept of a vindictive prosecution applies not only to vindictiveness by a
bench officer (North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711 [23 L.Ed. 2d
656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (Pearce)), but also to conduct of a prosecutor (Blackledge
v. Perry (1974) 417 U.S. 21 [40 L.E. 2d 628, 94 S.Ct. 2098] (Perry)). “Pearce and Perry dealt with postconviction
action by the state in response to the defendant’s exercise of statutory
rights. The central notion underlying
the rule of those cases is that a person who has suffered a conviction should
be free to exercise his right to appeal, or seek a trial de novo, without
apprehension that the state will retaliate by “upping the ante” with more
serious charges or a potentially greater sentence.” (People v. Bracey (1994) 21 Ca.App.4th
1532, 1543 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 7301].) “To
punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a
due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’" See UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Learley Reed
GOODWIN. 457 U.S. 368 (102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d
74).
FALSE STATEMENTS &
PERJURED TESTIMONY
A criminal prosecutor is simultaneously an
adversary of the defense and an agent of the sovereign. As an agent of the sovereign, a prosecutor’s
interest must be steadfast in both convicting the guilty an acquitting the
innocent. In the United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111, the United States Supreme Court held that “though
the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and
vigor, he must always be faith to his client’s overriding interest that just
shall be done.”
The perjured testimony at issue also relates to
the new “domestic violence” order created on May 25, 2011 when Leonard Cohen
filed the 2008 Boulder, Colorado civil harassment order in Los Angeles,
California and is therefore highly relevant and material. Months after Lynch was released from Lynwood,
and investigating matters related to her appeal and writ of habeas corpus, she
discovered that the civil harassment order was invalidly and unlawfully
registered as a domestic violence order.
Lying, embellishing stories and narratives, and perjuring himself is
Leonard Cohen’s habit. Leonard Cohen has
motive and bias which should have been clearly and concisely addressed with the
jury. It also appears to be a habit of
prosecutor Sandra Jo Streeter’s, individuals at the City Attorney of Los
Angeles’ Office, and others. Leonard
Cohen’s perjury confession was merely one example of the lengths he will go to
obstruct justice. The City Attorney
evidently felt that perjury was an acceptable form of testimony. In fact, at times, the prosecutor would make
statements that undermined the testimony of her own witnesses. Lynch can assure the court that Cohen was not
defending her honor by perjuring himself over their non-existent intimate
sexual “dating relationship.” His excuse
for his allegedly perjured testimony was Lynch.
Evidently when Lynch says something, Cohen will swear to it. That does not explain why he was the witness
stand attempting to assist the prosecution with her conviction. Perjury is indeed at war with justice but not
when it is condoned and sanctioned by individuals integral to the justice
system itself. The trial lawyer’s
question to Cohen “And you understand that you were under the penalty of
perjury on March 23rd?” was not argumentative. Found in Penal Code Section 118, California
law defines “perjury” as deliberately giving false information while under
oath. Perjury is a felony in California
law. Leonard Cohen knew that his
testimony was false. It was not merely a
mistake. He did not misunderstand the
question on March 23, 2012 and was asked two follow up questions to confirm
that understanding. The false statement
related to a material and significant issue.
Cohen was under oath and acknowledged that he swore to tell the truth,
the whole truth. And yet he did
not. He knowingly and unequivocally made
a false statement under oath. This
situation alone makes a mockery of the justice system. Evidently Cohen wasn’t properly rehearsed for
the March 23, 2012 bail hearing. Not
only did he truthfully testify that he and Lynch were in a purely “business
relationship,” he confirmed that she never stole from him, just his “peace of
mind.” This testimony was concealed, by both the prosecution and Lynch’s trial
lawyers, from the jury and is highly material and exceedingly relevant.
Public
Defender: When you testified on March 23rd,
you said that – you didn’t give the same answer that you gave now, correct,
regarding your relationship with Ms. Lynch.
Leonard Cohen: That’s correct. Q:
Okay. But you – when you did
testify, you stood in front of the counsel table, you raised your right hand, correct? A:
Correct. Q: You swore to tell the truth, the whole truth? A:
Correct. Q: And then the same oath that you just took
right now, correct? Before testifying,
correct? A: Correct.
Q: And yet you gave two different
answers, yes or no? A: Correct.
Q: Okay. And you understand that you were under the
penalty of perjury on March 23rd?
Streeter: Objection;
argumentative. Court: Sustained.
Kelly: Nothing further. RT 321-322
“[T]he
‘unquestioned constitutionality of perjury statutes,’ both the federal statute
Section 1623 and its state law equivalents.
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.,
336 U.S. 36, n. 1 (1961). It is not
simply because perjured statements are false that they lack First Amendment
protection. Perjured testimony ‘is at
war with justice’ because it can cause a court to render a ‘judgment not
resting on truth.’ In re. Michael,
326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945). Perjury
undermines the function and province of the law and threatens the integrity of
judgments that are the basis of the legal system. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507
U.S. 87, 97 (1993)(‘To uphold the integrity of our trial system … the
constitutionality of perjury statutes is unquestioned.’). Unlike speech in other contexts, testimony
under oath has the formality and gravity necessary to remind the witness that
his or her statements will be the basis for official governmental action,
action that often affects the rights and liberties of others. Sworn testimony is quite distinct from lies
not spoken under oath and simply intended to puff up oneself … Were the Court
to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to sustain
a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech was used to gain a
material advantage, it would give government a broad censorial power
unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition. The mere potential for the exercise of that
power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech,
thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom … But to
recite the Government’s compelling interests is not to end the matter. The First Amendment requires that the
Government’s chosen restriction on the speech at issue be ‘actually necessary’
to achieve its interest. Entertainment
Merchants Assn., 564 U.S. at ___ (slip op. at 12). There must be a direct
causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be
prevented.” See United States v.
Alvarez.
When
a prosecutor uses false statements and perjured testimony to convict a criminal
defendant, that criminal defendant’s right to due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment have been violated.
See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) stating that a
“deliberate deception of the court” by the presentation of perjured testimony
is a deprivation of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States.
The
U.S. Supreme Court has established the standard of materiality for a
prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony in Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154: “A new trial is
required if the false testimony could … in any likelihood have affected the
judgment of the jury.” The Ninth Circuit
has held that the finding of materiality under Giglio necessarily compels reversal. See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987
(9th Cir. 2002).
The
U.S. Supreme Court first addressed a prosecutor’s use of false testimony in Mooney v. Holohan. The Supreme Court asserted that a prosecutor
violates due process if he presents false testimony or deliberately suppresses
evidence favorable to the accused. The
Court addressed the fact that a restrained individual has the right to obtain
immediate relief from unlawful confinement by challenging the constitutionality
of his or her conviction or sentence.
The writ of habeas corpus is merely one avenue that would permit an
individual to challenge the constitutionality of one’s conviction, sentence,
and probation requirements. The Court
stated: “[Due process] is a requirement
that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has
contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but
used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be
perjured. Such a contrivance by a State
to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by
intimidation.” These two sentences lay
the foundation for the argument that a prosecutor’s use of false testimony is a
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore
unconstitutional. An unconstitutional
verdict results in an unconstitutional sentence and unconstitutional probation
requirements.
In
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) the Supreme Court advanced the
jurisprudence regarding a prosecutor’s presentation of false testimony in two
important ways. First, the Court found
that the prosecutor’s failure to correct false testimony was tantamount to the
knowing presentation of false testimony.
Second, the Court, for the first time, did what can accurately be
described as a materiality analysis. In Alcorta, the Supreme Court, relying on Mooney and Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213, 216 (1942), held that a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false
testimony violated due process. The
prosecutor in that case asked questions of the key witness to avoid revealing
facts that would support the defense’s theory.
The Court held that the prosecutor’s behavior at trial obscured the
truth and was therefore equivalent to presenting false testimony. This holding reinforced the importance of
protecting the criminal defendant from a prosecutor’s use of false
testimony. The Court held that the
“petitioner was not accorded due process of law,” and then went on to explore
the prosecutor’s withholding of information known to him, and the likely
outcome if the truth had been revealed to the jury. Lynch was not accorded due process of
law. It cannot seriously be disputed
that the prosecutor’s statements and Cohen’s testimony, taken as a whole, gave
the jury the false impression that he and Lynch were in an intimate sexual
dating relationship and she did not legitimately require tax documents. This obviously led the jury to conclude that
Lynch had no legitimate business purpose for contacting Cohen including with
respect to monies owed her, corporate business matters, legal issues, and other
legitimate reasons.
The
prosecutor acted with an apparent bias against Lynch, calling her a con artist
and advising the jurors that Lynch agreed with an absolutely deranged theory
which was and remains a bald-faced lie, and Cohen had clearly accused Lynch for
reasons related to self-preservation. Lynch
vehemently disagrees with the people’s theory of everything. She does not agree with the people and
Streeter’s closing statements are absurd and outrageous. She did not admit that any of the events that
unfolded between her and Cohen were her “handiwork” and she did not admit that
the wholly incoherent transcripts were her voice or accurate. Defendant also did not admit that she sent
Cohen emails asking him “how big is your penis,” “Fuck the DA,” or “I fucked
Oliver Stone.” Lynch never said she “did it.”
Oliver Stone was used to stir up a custody matter between Lynch and her
younger son’s father, Steven Clark Lindsey, who is a highly volatile,
aggressive, and jealous individual. For
unknown reasons, Lindsey, Cohen, and Kory were meeting about Lynch and Cohen’s
business and legal disputes. Steve
Lindsey and Lynch separated in the fall of 1997 and he was never involved in
any business or legal matters between her and Cohen. He was, however, very clear with Lynch that
both Cohen and Kory were encouraging him to take custody of Ray from her. In any event, Lynch maintains that she had
every legal right to refute fraudulent, false, and slanderous accusations
related to her and Oliver Stone.
Closing
- Streeter: Did you guys hear it? Did you hear it yesterday from the testimony
of Ms. Lynch? Cone on. You heard it.
She said as much. She agrees with
the people’s theories of the case … RT 560
She agrees with the people. She
admits that all of this was her handiwork.
She admits that the first transcript, that was her voice. The second transcript, that was her
voice. She admits that she sent Mr.
Cohen emails where there are comments like “how big is your penis” or “Fuck the
DA” or “Fuck You.” She admits that she
sent voice mail messages saying “I fucked Oliver Stone.” Come on.
You heard it. She said she did
it. All right. We all heard she said she did it. RT 56
According to Standard 3 – 1.2 of the American Bar
Association Standards, that are intended to be used as a guide to professional
conduct and performance, the function of the prosecution is: (a) The office of a prosecutor is charged
with responsibility for prosecutions in its district; (b) The prosecutor is an
administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court, the
prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her
functions; (c) The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to
convict; (d) It is an important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform
and improve the administration of criminal justice. When inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or procedural law
come to the prosecutor’s attention, he or she should stimulate efforts for
remedial action; and (e) It is the duty of the prosecutor to know and be
guide by the standards of professional conduct as defined by applicable
professional traditions, ethical codes, and law in the prosecutor’s
jurisdiction. The prosecutor should make
use of the guidance afforded by an advisory council of the kind described in
standard 4 – 1.5.
Lynch’s probation violation is evidently the City
Attorney’s notion of “remedial action.” Lynch has brought grave injustices to
the attention of Sandra Jo Streeter, Vivienne Swanigan, Susan Schmitter, Carmen
Trutanich, Mike Fueur, and others in the Los Angeles City Attorney’s
office. These communications, and
others, form the basis of Lynch’s communications with these individuals. Lynch has also been representing herself with
respect to her writ of habeas corpus, continues to represent herself, has valid
grievances, was advised by LA Superior Court and the DA’s Justice Integrity
Division to address her complaints with the City Attorney’s office, and had the
audacity to follow up with respect to service of the Notice of Probation
Violation. Lynch was ultimately advised
that these communications were further violations of probation. Lynch vigorously disagrees and also contends
that she has every legal right to defend herself against slanderous and
malicious lies and accusations that were also sent to her sons, sister, and
many others.
Lynch
does not have the extraordinary resources the City Attorney has and personally
asked Judge Robert Vanderet to grant her an additional two weeks to prepare for
the November 13, 2013 hearing. However,
she did not receive the Notice of Probation Violation until October 23, 2013,
nearly one month following the September 25, 2013 hearing. This incident has prevented Lynch from
preparing her defense in a timely manner.
When she followed up, with the City Attorney’s Office, she was told that
the judge was “wrong” because the City Attorney did not have to serve Lynch;
the Court evidently has that responsibility.
She has been treated rudely by this office, given the run-around, and
ultimately advised that her follow up calls and additional grievances are
further probation violations. Lynch has
discussed these issues with a representative of the Ethics Commission.
Lynch has also attempted to find out what the Los Angeles
City Attorney’s office policies and procedures are with respect to complaints,
per state law, and/or with respect to prosecutorial misconduct and
retaliation. This situation demands a
remedy and one remedy would involve the Los Angeles City Attorney’s office
legally addressing the misconduct, false statements and perjury, and other
matters that arose throughout Lynch’s trial.
That would include, but is not limited to, the fact that the jurors were
advised by the prosecutor that Lynch has the tax information she requires when
in fact she does not have the IRS required form 1099 from Cohen for the year
2004 and this continues to prevent her from filing her tax returns.
The prosecutor advised the court that the People view all
of Lynch’s allegations as unsubstantiated.
The prosecutors failed to investigate their witnesses and had an
obligation to present accurate and candid information. The prosecutor may not use false
testimony. That would include
half-truths and vague statements that give a false impression to the jury. The prosecutor had an obligation to advise
the jurors that the original 2008 Boulder, Colorado order was a civil
harassment order that involved no domestic violence but was registered in Los
Angeles, California as a domestic violence order on May 25, 2011. The prosecutor has a duty to investigate
plausible allegations that a government’s witnesses’ testimony was false. Lynch has communicated a tremendous amount of
evidence that Cohen and his paid witness lawyers perjured themselves throughout
the trial. It is obvious that when the
government received this information they should have understood that there
were serious problems with testimony.
However, Lynch believes that these problems should have been cleared up
before the trial. When the government
learns that part of its case is inaccurate, it must investigate and cannot
simply ignore evidence that its witnesses have lied. The government abdicated its responsibility
by failing to investigate and continues to do so. Defendant maintains that the government must
not present false or misleading testimony but has a duty to investigate
allegations that its cooperating witnesses testified falsely and had the bias
and motive to do so. United States v.
Freeman, 09-cr-4043, 2011 WL 2417091 (7th Cir., June 17, 2011)
addresses the prosecutor’s duty to investigate his own witness.
The public defenders, appointed by Los Angeles Superior
Court, also failed to investigate.
Criminal defense lawyers must diligently investigate facts supporting
possible defenses and witnesses. The
public defenders failed to meet with Lynch and many of the statements they
made, and facts they argued, were false, misleading, and blatantly
inaccurate. They did not contact anyone
who could have refuted and/or impeached prosecution witness testimony regarding
many subjects. That would include, but
is not limited to, Lynch’s mother, father, sister, brother-in-law, younger son,
mother-in-law, ex-husbands, friends, former business associates, and so forth
and so on. The Scientist, a world-renown
record producer lives in Los Angeles and has confirmed that he will review the
17 CDs of evidence Lynch recently received from the Public Defender’s
Office. The voice mail recordings, which
are out of sequence and cannot be date/time stamped, were clearly altered and
tampered with. That might explain why,
after a cursory review, Lynch detected Cohen’s voice mingled with her own. The Scientist was available to testify during
Lynch’s trial but her trial lawyers refused to address extremely important
issues related to authentication of emails, voice mail messages, etc.
BRADY
VIOLATIONS
Lynch
contends that the prosecution withheld exculpatory and impeachment evidence
from the defense and/or concealed this information and evidence from the
jury. The Brady obligation clearly
applies post-conviction due to the fact that there was not a fair trial and the
verdict is tainted. Courts have held
that Brady applies post-conviction. See Duckett
v. State, 918 So.2d 224 (Fla. 2005)(Brady creates a “continuing duty
throughout all proceedings” including post conviction proceedings.); Monroe
v. Butler, 690 F.Supp. 521 (E.D.La. 1988)(“Nothing in Brady or its progeny limits its doctrine of fact characterization
to pre-conviction context. Brady doctrinally stands for the notion
that it is fundamentally unfair for the prosecution to withhold material,
exculpatory evidence from the defendant and that the proceedings in which the
unfairness occurred should be overturned so that the merits of the Brady facts can be considered. Clearly, such nondisclosure is as unfair
where it prevents a defendant from taking full advantage of post-conviction
relief as it is when it results in the forfeiture of the defendant’s right to a
fair trial. The prosecutor’s duty to
disclose material, exculpatory evidence continues through the period allowed by
the State for post-conviction relief.”)
See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The
Role of the Prosecutors in Serving Justice after Convictions, 58 Vand.
L.Rev. 171 (2005).
The
prosecutor is also bound by the requirements of legal ethics to disclose
exculpatory evidence after conviction. Rule 3.8(g) of the ABA’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct provides that when a prosecutor “knows of new, credible
and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted
defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted,” he
or she must disclose the information to a court, and normally to the defendant
as well. And the issue extends well
beyond providing the evidence to the defense.
It clearly applies to the court and jury.
The
Supreme Court’s opinion in Brady v.
Maryland exemplifies this foundational principle of the American justice
system. The constitutional right to
exculpatory evidence is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and would clearly extend itself to the jury. Brady also applies to sentencing mitigation
evidence and probation matters, not just trial evidence. The Brady obligation applies not just to
evidence that’s exculpatory to guilt but also evidence that’s mitigating for
sentencing and probation matters. “Brady v. Maryland is two-pronged. Its declaration of a constitutional right to
disclosure of exculpatory material says there is mandatory disclosure of
anything which bears on guilt or on punishment, and prosecutors all too
frequently forget about the second requirement for disclosure. … It is
deserving of comment that Brady v.
Maryland dealt only with punishment.” United States v. Feeney, 501
F.Supp. 1324, 1334 (D. Colo. 1980). Brady itself was a sentencing case. The Ninth Circuit recognized the
applicability of Brady to sentencing
in both United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998)
and United States v. Mikaelian, 168 F.3d 280 (9th Cir.
1999). In Plunk, the defendant sought undisclosed impeachment information,
and the court acknowledged that “pursuant to Brady, the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutions.” United States v. Plunk. In Mikaelian, the court quoted the same
language from Brady that it had
quoted in Plunk and cited Plunk as applying Brady at sentencing.” United
States v. Mikaelian.
Lynch
has alleged that the government withheld information and/or evidence favorable
to her defense. That would include, but
is not limited to, the fact that the District Attorney elected not to prosecute
Leonard Cohen and Lynch has no information regarding a potential quid pro
quo. In fact, Cohen’s elicited testimony
with respect to Phil Spector would lead one to conclude otherwise – that Cohen
received favorable treatment from the DA’s office in exchange for his testimony
against Lynch. The District Attorney’s
responses to Lynch’s FOIA requests failed to uncover any information.
There
are cases from other circuits in which sentences have actually been vacated
because of Brady violations. Examples
are United States v. Weintraub, 871 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1989)
and United States v. Severson 3 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir.
1993). In Weintraub, the court vacated a sentence where the government
withheld evidence impeaching trial testimony the lower court had relied on in
determining drug quality at sentencing.
In Severson, the court vacated
a sentence and remanded for reconsideration of rulings on the Sentencing
Guidelines obstruction of justice and acceptance of responsibility adjustments
based on Brady material disclosed by a prosecutor just prior to oral
argument. The Government’s ethical and
due process obligations do not end with a verdict simply because it obtained a
conviction. Its Brady obligation
continues. The government is obligated
to disclose any “evidence favorable to the accused,” which means any evidence
“which relates to guilt or punishment, and which tends to help the defense by
either bolstering the defense’s case or impeaching prosecution witnesses.” United
States v. Sudikoff, 36 F.Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1999). This case has been cited with approval by the
Ninth Circuit. During oral arguments, in
Juan Smith v. Burl Cain, No. 10-8145, 2012 WL (January 10, 2012),,
Justice Kennedy confirmed that the test re. Brady violation is whether or not
there is a reasonable probability that the result would be different: “With all respect, I think you misspoke when
you – when you were asked what is – what the test for when Brady material must
be turned over. And you said whether or
not there is a reasonable probability – reasonable likelihood; pardon me – a
reasonable probability that the result would have been different. That’s the test for when there has been a
Brady violation. You don’t determine
your Brady obligation by the test of a Brady violation. You’re transposing two very different things. And so that’s incorrect.”
Two
points the jury raised in debriefing address the reasonable probability
standard: they wanted to hear from the
IRS and relied on Streeter’s false statements that there was $100-150,000.00 in
assets left in an unidentified Traditional Holdings, LLC account. Leonard Cohen’s loans and/or advances from Traditional
Holdings, LLC are, in fact, corporate assets that were to be repaid (with
interest) within 3 years per the Annuity Agreement that Cohen signed and which
was notarized. Those loans and/or
advances total millions of dollars.
Leonard Cohen personally testified that he had access to the assets and
bought homes or his son and girlfriend.
Streeter
further misled the jurors when she insinuated that these assets belonged to
Leonard Cohen personally. At that point,
Lynch’s trial lawyers should have raised the alter ego doctrine. Lynch’s trial lawyers further misled the jury
when they falsely stated that Leonard Cohen panicked over his financial
situation. Leonard Cohen panicked over
the fact that he heard Lynch was reporting his tax fraud to the IRS. Lynch and Cohen had no discussions –
whatsoever – about his financial circumstances because there were no
problems. Cohen testified: “I was running low” in response to a question
about a Traditional Holdings, LLC account.
The public defender should have questioned him over his position that he
is the alter ego of this corporate fiction.
Cohen confirmed that he took money from Traditional Holdings, LLC to
purchase homes and for other reasons.
This did not prevent Sandra Jo Streeter from asserting the false
accusation that an anonymous account held only $100-150,000.00 in assets. There was no objection to her line of
questioning. Streeter continued to
aggressively pursue this line of questioning, repeatedly asking Lynch if there
was only $150,000 left in an unidentified account after Lynch testified that
there were millions in assets. Lynch’s
trial lawyers failed to apprise the jury that Traditional Holdings, LLC sold
the intellectual property; Sony paid Traditional Holdings, LLC – not Leonard
Cohen – for the intellectual property; Leonard Cohen personally made the
warranties and representations; Lynch had an Indemnity Agreement; and, Leonard
Cohen’s loans and/or advances were (according to the Annuity Agreement he
personally signed) to be repaid within 3 years at 6% interest. Cohen’s loans were never repaid. The only thing Leonard Cohen learned in the
fall of 2004 was that Lynch intended to report his tax fraud to the Internal
Revenue Service.
Public
Defender: Now, you learned in 2004 that
your – that the account, that Traditional Holdings account, the money – that you
were running low, correct? Cohen: I was running low – Q:
That funds in that account, that Traditional Holdings account, they were
running low; yes or no? Do you remember
that? Cohen: I – I discovered that they were being
dissipated. Q: Okay.
Now, you panicked, correct?
A: I was concerned, yes. Q:
And, in fact, you had actually taken money from that account to buy homes,
correct? A: Yes, I had.
Q: You took money from that
account to buy a house for your son, correct?
RT 287 A. That’s correct. Q: To
buy a house for your girlfriend, correct?
A: Yes. Q: Okay. So you – it’s fair to say that you did take
money from that account? A: That’s correct, yes. Q: You
were aware enough about that account to know that you could take money from
that account? A: That’s correct.
Streeter: -- He had recently sold his songbook a few
years before, right? Or a year or so
before, correct? Kelley Lynch: Traditional Holdings sold some assets that it
apparently did not own, yes, to Sony. RT
493 Q:
And it was Mr. Cohen’s songbook, right?
A: Not just Mr. Cohen’s. I own 15 percent f the intellectual
property. So both Mr. Cohen and myself,
yes. Q:
Part of that was his songbook?
A: Absolutely. Eighty-five percent. Most definitely. You would call it his publishing catalogue,
not his songbook. Q: It was sold or several million dollars,
correct? A: Yes, it was sold for a number of million
dollars. Q: At the point that you quit Mr. Cohen’s
employ, there was only a hundred thousand dollars left in that account. A: I
don’t know about that. There were loans
from Mr. Cohen that were not repaid. So
there would need to be an accounting to determine what was left. Q:
Okay. There wasn’t millions in
there? A: There were assets, okay. Q: In
the bank account? A: There were assets. Q;
Okay. A: That was one asset, the bank account,
150,000. There were other assets. Q: But
that bank account had only 150,000?
A: Right, and there were other
assets. RT 494 There were millions in other assets. A: And
you had access to that bank account?
A: No, I did not have access. Neal Greenberg was his financial
advisor. I had no access. RT 495
Leonard
Cohen was neither broke nor concerned about his finances. In fact, in the fall of 2004, he offered
Lynch whatever she wanted in exchange for her assistance with his corporate,
tax, and financial planning matters. He
had recently received $1 million advance against his studio album; planned to
and was contractually obligated to tour; ultimately pursued a multi-million
dollar lithograph deal Lynch was negotiating; was finishing work on “Book of
Longing;” and put a halt to an intellectual deal he demanded (after he and Lynch
parted ways) because, as Lynch believes, a multi-million intellectual property
deal wouldn’t jive with his sophomoric offensive story for the news media and
other gullible individuals.
Brady relies upon
prosecutors and law enforcement to locate and identify information that could
cast doubt on a defendant’s guilt. The
problem is that those are the people with the least motivation to do so. They are viewing all evidence through a prism
of confirmation bias. Streeter’s own
comments confirm this. It is of
importance to note that the defense asked for advance notice with respect to
the documents the prosecution would present.
Streeter met with Cohen’s legal representative, Robert Kory,
approximately two weeks prior to trial and then blind-sided Lynch’s legal team
with an “IRS binder” on April 9, 2012.
That binder contained new evidence that Lynch had never seen, heard of,
and was unable to review until after her release from jail. She still does not have a complete copy of
her file and all documents contained in the “IRS binder.” Streeter advised the court that she reviewed
virtually all of the comments made by Defendant as “nothing more than
unsubstantiated allegations” that were incredibly troubling to Leonard
Cohen. The bias on the part of the City
Attorney and LAPD, particularly as a wealthy celebrity was involved, was
obviously powerful. Perhaps the City
Attorney and LAPD simply believed that Cohen had supplied Lynch with the tax
documentation she requires and still is not in receipt of. Or, perhaps the City Attorney and LAPD have
witnesses who can prove that Lynch and Cohen were in an “intimate sexual dating
relationship” or “sexual relationship.”
Since they were not this will be impossible to prove. The arrogance and misconduct in high-profile
matters is also another very serious issue.
Based on the prosecutor’s words and conduct, which are now part of the
permanent record, Lynch believes it is extraordinarily obvious that Streeter’s
misconduct was not merely due to negligence or oversight. Another serious issue in Lynch’s case is the
fact that prosecution was apparently able to determine what evidence to present
and/or withhold from the jury. The City
Attorney has repeatedly quoted Cohen about requests for tax information being
hidden in volumes of emails – however, Cohen himself testified that (in the
alleged evidence that was presented to the jury) that Lynch requested tax
information approximately 50% of the time.
Lynch has no idea who selected the alleged evidence used against her but
she is well aware of what has been concealed and has asked the IRS, FBI, DOJ,
Treasury, FTB, and others, who were copied in on all emails (documenting the
destruction of her life since reporting Cohen’s tax fraud to the IRS on April
15, 2005) to address that and other issues.
Those would include, but are not limited to, all statements and
testimony relating to federal and state tax matters.
In Juan
Smith v. Burl Cain, No. 10-8145, 2012 WL (January 10, 2012), the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that even the hand written notes inside the police file of
the investigation officer must be handed over to the defense. Lynch does not have even the most basic
component of her file – an entire copy of LAPD’s report. She has contacted LAPD’s TMU, the City
Attorney’s Office, and the Public Defender’s Office in an attempt to obtain the
entire LAPD file – including any and all matters related to Leonard Cohen, DA
Steve Cooley, DDA Alan Jackson, LAPD’s investigation into these and other Lynch
related matters (including the 911 call and all reports related to the May 25,
2005 SWAT incident), the arrest warrant and probable cause affidavit with
respect to the instant matter, Berkeley PD’s entire file, and any all
information with respect to Lynch’s extradition from Northern California to Los
Angeles, California during a period of time when she was not represented by an
attorney. Lynch’s and her defense team
were not provided with copies of all notes, reports, and documents relating to
the City Attorney’s interviews with prosecution witnesses Leonard Cohen, Robert
Kory, Michelle Rice, and others – including the private investigator Streeter
agreed to remove from the courtroom.
Streeter, in her Sentencing Memorandum, raises the fact that the DA’s
office contacted the City Attorney with respect to Lynch but the defense was
provided no notes, reports, or documentation related to those
communications. Streeter herself advised
the jury that the evidence would prove that Lynch fought with the DA to bring
charges against Cohen but no evidence was presented supporting that
statement. On or about April 5, 2012,
Streeter emailed Cohen that she hated to keep “peppering him with questions”
but failed to turn over to the defense anything related to the earlier
questions. This particular email
contained a version of Cohen’s highly embellished Phil Spector gun story that
impeached his testimony about an alleged incident with Phil Spector and a gun.
The
prosecutor clearly had a duty to disclose both exculpatory and impeachment
evidence. The California courts have
held: “The duty of disclosure is a
continuing duty for both parties. Izazaga
v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 356, 365; Hobbs v. Municipal Court (1991,
3th Dist.) 233 Cal.App.3d 670, 688. The
continuing duty to provide disclosure under the Criminal Discovery Statute is
not simply a pretrial duty. “The duty to
provide discovery is not limited to the time before trial; discovery is an
ongoing responsibility, which extends throughout the duration of the trial and
even after conviction.” People v. Kasim (1997, 4th Dist.) 56
Cal.App.4th 1360, 1383, 66 Cal.Rptr 2d 49; accord People v.
Garcia (1993, 4th Dist.) 17 Cal.App. 4th 1169,
1179. In greater detail, the court in People v. Garcia said: “In Brady
v. Maryland … the United States Supreme Court held “the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violated due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” In re.
Ferguson (1971), 5 Cal.3d 525, 532-533, the California Supreme Court
imposed a stricter duty upon prosecutors by requiring them to disclose
substantial material evidence favorable to the accused without request.
Material evidence in this context is evidence ‘which
tends to influence the trier of fact because of its logical connection with the
issue.” People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 30, fn 14. The Duty to disclose evidence favorable to
the accused extends to evidence which may reflect on the credibility of a
material witness. People v.
Rutherford (1975), 14 Cal.3d 399; see also Giglio v. United States (1972)
405 U.S. 150, 153. The above cited cases
hold this duty on the part of the prosecution to disclose all substantial
material evidence favorable to an accused at trial stems from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The duty of disclosure does not end when the
trial is over. “After a conviction the
prosecutor also is bound by the ethics of his office to inform the appropriate
authority of after-acquired or other information that casts doubt upon the
correctness of the conviction.” Imbler v. Pactman (1976) 424 U.S. 409,
427, fn. 25; see also People v. Gonazalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1261;
rule 5220, Rules Prof. Conduct of State Bar; ABA Model Code Prof.
Responsibility DR 7-103(b) EC 7-13; ABA Model Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.8(d).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the prosecution had a duty to turn
over exculpatory evidence relevant to a habeas corpus proceeding. Thomas v. Goldsmith (9th
Cir. 1992) 979 F.2d 746, 749-750.
Lynch
has filed an appeal and initial writ of habeas corpus – without the benefit of
her trial file, transcripts of the bail hearing (which are highly material) and
April 4, 2012 hearing, most documents, all alleged evidence used against her,
motions, jury instructions, Brady material, and other information. This has caused grave and irreparable harm to
defendant. Both the appeal and writ of
habeas corpus were served upon the City Attorney of Los Angeles. She has, since her release from jail,
continually requested this information. There
is overwhelming evidence in this case that the prosecutor knew or should have
known that his witnesses testified falsely in certain respects and exculpatory
and impeachment evidence relating to witness’ credibility has been suppressed. Materials in the hands of law enforcement
authorities, to which defendant is entitled, have been withheld from the
defense. Since evidence is material “if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Stickler v. Green (1999) 527, U.S.
263, 260, quoting United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682.
Streeter: Yes,
so as – just to reiterate, the people view virtually all of the comments made
by Ms. Lynch as nothing more than unsubstantiated allegations, but,
nevertheless, some of the things that Ms. Lynch has said have been incredibly
troubling to Mr. Cohen.
Through Brady
and its progeny, the Supreme Court has made clear that “Brady material” must be
turned over to the defense in a timely manner, whether the defense requests it
or not, and that a prosecutor’s good faith efforts to comply do not shield the
state from a “Brady violation.” The Supreme Court also held that “Brady
material” includes not only affirmatively exculpatory evidence but also
impeachment evidence and any consideration a witness may receive; it also
includes evidence in the possession of law enforcement, even if prosecutors
themselves do not possess it or even know about it. Prosecutors are arguably the most powerful
figures in the American justice system.
They decide which charges to bring, what plea bargains to offer, and
what sentences to request. Given their
role in the system and the broad powers they exercise, it is critical that they
discharge those duties responsibly and ethically.
The most common forms of prosecutorial
misconduct are evidently hiding exculpatory evidence and engaging in improper
examination and argumentation, another form of misconduct is the knowing use of
false testimony to win convictions.
Perjury can and does undermine a defendant’s right to a fair trial. When the government obtains conviction
through the knowing use of false testimony, it violates a defendant’s due
process rights. And when a prosecutor
knowingly allows perjured testimony to be heard, that’s prosecutorial
misconduct. The system is either
unwilling or unable to police itself.
Prosecutorial misconduct can have serious financial consequences and the
taxpayers take the hit. The government
has an obligation to correct false testimony and the record. The facts of the case cannot possibly remain
true because the facts themselves are tainted.
Napue v. Illinois
(1959). The principal state witness in a
murder trial was asked by an Assistant District Attorney whether he had
received consideration in exchange for his testimony. The witness said that he had not. The ADA knew this to be false but did not
reveal it. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars prosecutors from
presenting false testimony and requires them to correct false testimony when it
occurs.
Brady v. Maryland
(1963). Petitioner and a companion were
both convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The companion made a series of statements,
one of which indicated that it was he, and not the petitioner, who actually
committed the murder. Prosecutors turned
over all of the companion’s statements except the one that exculpated the
petitioner. In Brady v. Maryland, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that suppression of evidence favorable to the accused
by the prosecution violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.
Giglio v. United States
(1972). A key witness against Petitioner
testified at trial that he had not received a promise for leniency from the
state in return for his testimony. Unbeknownst
to the trial prosecutor, the witness had in fact received a promise of leniency
from another prosecutor in the office.
Petitioner discovered this and filed a motion for a new trial. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
prosecution was obligated to disclose to the defense any promise or expectation
of leniency it offered to a witness. It
clarified that the state’s Brady obligation extends to all prosecutors in the
office, and that it is up to such offices to create systems to ensure that such
information is disclosed. Further, the
Court clarified that impeachment evidence – evidence affecting the credibility
of a witness – is Brady material and must be disclosed. The following cases highlight U.S. Supreme
Court holdings with respect to Brady materials and violations:
United States v. Agurs
(1976). Petitioner was convicted of murder after a trial in which he argued he
had acted in self-defense. Subsequently
petitioner sought a new trial because the state had failed to disclose the
victim’s criminal record. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that there was little difference between a general request
by defense counsel for Brady material and the absence of a request altogether,
and it found that prosecutors are obligated to turn over exculpatory evidence whether
or not defense counsel asks for it.
United States v.
Bagley (1985). Respondent was indicted
on firearms and narcotics charges. Prior
to trial, he requested that the prosecution disclose any “deals, promises, or
inducements” made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony. The prosecution did not disclose that its two
principal witnesses worked with the ATF in an undercover investigation of
respondent. Respondent sought a new
trial under Brady v. Maryland. The U.S.
Supreme Court again held that Brady requires disclosure of impeachment
evidence. It also clarified the
“materiality” prong of Brady. It said
that a Brady violation occurs if the withheld evidence was “material” in the
sense that there was a “reasonable probability” that its disclosure would have
led to a different result in trial or sentencing. It explained that “reasonable probability”
meant “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Kyles v. Whitley
(1995). Petitioner was convicted of
first degree murder and sentenced to death.
Prior to trial, police had collected eyewitness statements containing
physical descriptions of the attacker which were inconsistent with
characteristic of the petitioner. These
statements were not disclosed to the defense.
Post-trial petitioner argued that this evidence had been suppressed in
violation of Brady v. Maryland. The U.S.
Supreme Court agreed. It imposed an
affirmative duty on prosecutors to become aware of and disclose any favorable
evidence held by others acting on the government’s behalf, including the
police. The Court also clarified the
materiality standard. It said that a
defendant is not required to show that had the withheld evidence been disclosed,
more likely than not he would have been acquitted. It reiterated that instead, a defendant need
only show that the undisclosed evidence “undermines confidence” in the trial
outcome.
Banks v. Dretke
(2004). Petitioner was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death. The state
represented that it had disclosed all Brady material, but it nevertheless
failed to disclose the fact that a key witness was a paid government informant
and that another witness’s testimony had been coached. Furthermore, prosecutors failed to correct
the record when these witnesses testified falsely. Petitioner sought relief because of the
apparent Brady violation but lost in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th
Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the lower court had erred in dismissing Petitioner’s Brady claim. It placed the onus for Brady compliance
clearly on prosecutors. It said
defendants need not “scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material” and “a
rule … declaring ‘prosecutor may hide defendant must seek’ is not tenable.” The
Court also reiterated the holding in Kyles
v. Whitley: “the materiality
standard for Brady claims is met when ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably
be taken to … undermine confidence in the verdict.” When police or prosecutors
conceal exculpatory material in the state’s possession, it is incumbent on the
state to set the record straight.
TRUE THREAT
“It
is not the policy of the law to punish those unsuccessful threats
which
it is not presumed would terrify ordinary persons excessively;
an
there is so much opportunity for magnifying or misunderstanding
undefined
menaces that probably as much mischief would be caused
by
letting them be prosecuted as by refraining from it.
The
People v. B.F. Jones,
62 Mich. 304 (1886)
Black’s
Law Dictionary defines a threat as a “communicated threat to inflict physical
or other harm on any person or on property” – the emphasis usually being
physical in nature.
California
passed the first cyberstalking law in 1999.
The key element of the California Cyber-stalking statute [Penal Code
649.9 PC] is that it requires a “credible threat.” From this objective standard, the statute
defines a credible threat as “a verbal or written threat or implied by a
pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal or written statements and conduct
made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to
cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or
her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family.”
Alleged
threats, according to the Ninth Circuit, are judged by an objective standard
that focuses on the speaker. The test if
whether a reasonable person uttering a communication would foresee that the
listener would interpret the statement as a serious expression of intent to
harm. In addition to the “objective
speaker” test, the Ninth Circuit also requires that statements appearing to be
threats “should be considered in light of their entire factual context.” If the
words uttered and the surrounding circumstances are so “unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific” that they convey a seriousness of
purpose and the prospect of being carried out in the near future, then the statement
is a true threat.
The California statute criminalizing true
threats, Penal Code Section 422, requires that the prosecution establish that
the accused willfully threatened to commit a crime that would result in death
or great bodily injury to another person.
The California statute tracks the language of several Supreme Court
decisions and requires that the threat, either standing alone or considering
the surrounding circumstances, be so “unequivocal, unconditional, immediate,
and specific” that it conveys to the allegedly threatened person a gravity of
purpose and immediate prospect of it being carried out. The threat must also have reasonably caused
the threatened person to be in sustained fear of harm.
In United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148
(1997, the U.S. Supreme Court established the standard with respect to
distinguishing a threat from constitutionally protected speech. The standard that was developed is known as the
“true threat” doctrine. The Watts case centered on a speech
following a political rally in opposition to the Vietnam draft. Watts allegedly said: “I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.
They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.” He was arrested for threatening the
President. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that Watts’ remarks were crude political hyberbole which, in light of its
context and conditional nature, did not constitution a knowing and willful threat
against the President. The “threat” was
too tenuous in nature and hence not a “true threat.” Subsequently, the Baker court concluded that a threat needs to be “imminent” under
the true threat doctrine. The Watts
court examined a number of factors that would distinguish constitutionally
protected speech from unprotected speech.
The
broader concern behind the rulings in Watts
and Baker is to protect “highly
charged political rhetoric lying at the core of the First Amendment.” NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 866, 926-27 (1982)(protecting public
speech during political boycott). Thus
advocacy of force to upset the existing political order is protected unless it
threatens imminent violence. Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Angry
citizens may violently castigate police performing their duties. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451
(1978). See also Gooding v. Wilson
, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Court of Appeals have implemented Watts to
permit prosecution of authentic threats with an eye to preventing misuse of the
law of threat to silence political debate.
When a putative threat might be core political speech – when directed at
public officers or Government agencies – First Amendment concerns are
heightened. Examples are U.S. v.
Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d.Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976)(threat
against Arafat by JDL); U.S. v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 554 (3d Cir.
1991)(threat to President); Melufin v. Hames, 38 F.3d 1478 (9th
Cir. 1994)(threat included judge); and U.S. v. Lincoln, 462 F.2d 1368 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 952 (1972).
When threatening words are employed more to convey a political position
than to portend violence, prosecutions are dismissed. See, e.g. People v. Rubin, 96
Cal.App.3d 968 (Ct.App. 1979)(JDL soliciting murder of Nazis found political
hyperbole).
The
statute requires the Government to prove a true “threat.” Lynch’s comment was absolutely made in the
context of political hyperbole. The Government
was involved. Her emails to the IRS,
FBI, DOJ, and Treasury have documented everything that has occurred since she
reported Leonard Cohen’s tax fraud to the IRS on April 15, 2005. Prior to sending her drone Valentine Card
email, she privately emailed the FBI and DOJ.
One can safely assume that the FBI and DOJ understand a true “threat”
when they see one. She was speaking to
the FBI and DOJ about prosecutor Sandra Jo Streeter and her conduct with
respect to her. She was addressing very
serious public issues – including with respect to the City Attorney’s Domestic
Violence Unit and the fact that she was not in the required statutory “dating
relationship” with Leonard Cohen. She
included a legal case in the email thread.
ORIOLA . And, she has the freedom to speak in the manner in which she
speaks to her family, friends, neighbors, teachers, government, and
others. “Suppression of speech as an
effective police measure is an old, old device, outlawed by our
Constitution.” Watts v. United States.
Watts held
that the government has to prove a true “threat;” political hyperbole does not
fit within the statutory definition of “threat;” public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open; they may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials (
see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); the
language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputes (see Linn-v.
United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966) is often
vituperative, abusive, and inexact.
Lynch does not believe the Government can prove
that Lynch actually has a drone or disposition matrix. Her speech was political hyperbole and does
not fit within any definition of “threat” that could be viewed as credible –
let alone imminent. She believes these
public issues (including her personal political views contained on
riverdeepbook.blogpost.com) are vehement, caustic, and honest but unpleasant
sharp attacks on what appears to be an out of control government and public
officials in Los Angeles City and County; and happens to believe her positions
are exact and accurate
A Defendant must have intended to carry out his
“threat,” Some early cases found the
willfulness requirement met if the speaker voluntarily uttered the charged
words with “an apparent determination to carry them into execution.” Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643,
645 (C.A. 7th Cir. 1918); cf. Pierce v. United States, 365 F.2d 292
[394 U.S. 705, 708]. Lynch does not see
a threat. Detective Jose Viramontes
appeared to conclude that Lynch’s alleged email thread was a “joke.” Lynch
maintains that her email thread was relevant, material, addressed legal and
official misconduct issues; highlighted the type of speech she believes
prosecutors in Los Angeles wrongfully use to prosecute people; and had no
determination to carry anything in “execution.” She absolutely believes the CIA
should assess the alleged credible threat because the image and words cannot be
separated and, beyond that, Lynch did not create or post the image online. The CIA clearly has the expertise to address
all drone and disposition matrix questions.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a State
cannot, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a public
official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves “actual malice” – that the statement was made with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. Lynch hasn’t said anything that could
remotely be viewed as false or uttered with reckless disregard. Lynch’s communications communicated
information, expressed opinions, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses,
and continually requested an investigation by the IRS, FBI, DOJ, Treasury, FTB,
and Phil Spector and his legal team.
In re. CC, No. 061230, is a Court of Appeal (Third
District) case that addresses alleged threatening or obscene criminal
communications. C. C. sent his former
girlfriend text messages expressing strong negative feelings about their
breakup. A delinquency petition charged him with criminal threats and making a
threatening or obscene telephone communication. (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 653m, subd.
(a).)1 The People dismissed the criminal threat count and the juvenile
court sustained the petition, finding C. C. sent threatening or obscene texts. The Court concluded that C. C.’s text
messages were neither threatening nor obscene as those terms are used in
section 653m: “They did not threaten any physical harm, as required by
statute. Nor, read in context, did the vulgar language he used qualify as
obscene. Accordingly, we reverse for lack of substantial evidence.” C. C.’s text messages included the following
language: “no [S.] im gonna come to school
with one of [P’s] gun and kill half the school ill load everyone with bullets
and then shoot myself in the head right in front of u. just to show u how much
u pushed me “fuck u u stupid fuckin girl! fuck u!! “god u stupid little fuckin
cunt! god i waited to kiss u for a
fuckin month its been two weeks ur kissing ppl [Sh.’s] friends try to cuddle
with me and I push them off ur all i think about i do drugs now because of u
because u r constantly hurting me i told u i cheating on u cause i didnt want
to hide things from u i could have and i could have been happy but no . . . . u
pushed me to cheat on u u would constantly tease me and fuck with me and put me
thru things those were all bitch moves and i took them i cheated on u because
of that u find a fuckin guy that will stay with u when u tease but dont put out
and I waited all that time u will probably fuck [B.] right after he wins the
[football game] i fuckin hate u i wanna kill myself cause u put me thru all
this but only ppl c my bad side not ur shitty side cause ur a cheerleader and
ill i did was b nice and i get picked on so fuck u [S.]
god ur a lyer and a jerk. “fuck.”
The juvenile court found that the texts were sent with
the intent to annoy, and that the first text constituted a threat and that both
texts were obscene. The Court applied
the standard evidence rule: “We review
the whole record in a light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it contains substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that is credible and of solid
value, from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused committed the offense.” (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 859 (Ryan D.);
see People v. Raley (1992)
2 Cal.4th 870, 886, 891.)
Section 653m, subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who, with intent to annoy,
telephones or makes contact by means of an electronic communication device with
another and addresses to or about the other person any obscene language or
addresses to the other person any threat to inflict injury to the person or
property of the person addressed or any member of his or her family, is guilty
of a misdemeanor. Nothing in this
subdivision shall apply to telephone calls or electronic contacts made in good
faith.” The Court stated that: “For purposes of this appeal we will assume
substantial evidence shows ‘intent to annoy,’ although the point is debatable
and C. C.’s claim that the intent to communicate painful feelings does not
equate to an ‘intent to annoy’ within the meaning of section 653m carries some
force. We will separately consider the claims that the texts were threatening
or were obscene under section 653m.” It
was determined that a physical threat is required by Section 653m: “The statute requires a threat “to inflict
injury to the person or property of the person addressed or any member of his
or her family.” (§ 653m.) In our view the phrase “injury to the person” imports
the notion of physical harm. The
Attorney General contends that if the Legislature meant to limit the statute to
physical injury, it would have used the term “bodily injury,” a term used in
some statutes to convey that limitation. (See, e.g., §§ 245, subd. (a)(1)
[application of “force likely to produce great bodily injury”], 422 [threat “to
commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another
person”].) The Attorney General contends that by not using the term “bodily
injury” and instead using “injury to the person,” the Legislature intended the
statute to cover threats that make the recipient upset. Putting aside the
breadth of the proposed statutory scope, we are not persuaded. One does not
“inflict” bad feelings, one inflicts damage to another. If the
Legislature intended to protect the addressee’s psyche, assuming it was
permissible to do so, it would not have phrased the statute as a bar to
criminalize the infliction of injury to the person or property of the
victim. More to the point, if the Legislature had intended to criminalize
damage to the psyche (by this statute), it would have expressly stated as
such. In fact, the Attorney General has
provided an example that, examined more closely, points against his position.
Section 245, cited as an example of the Legislature’s use of “bodily injury,”
provides in relevant part: “Any person who commits an assault upon the
person of another with a deadly weapon . . . or by any means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury shall be punished [as described].” (§
245, subd. (a)(1), emphasis added.) The Legislature in this example uses the
phrase ‘assault upon the person of another’ to mean a bodily assault,
not a psychic assault. Section 240 defines an assault as “an unlawful
attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the
person of another.” (Emphasis added.) This has long referred to physical
force. (See People v. Wright (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th
703, 714-715.) We see no semantic
difference between ‘injury on the person’ as used in section 240 and long
construed to mean physical injury, and ‘injury to the person’ as used in
section 653m. Both refer to a physical injury to the person, not a psychic
injury. Because C. C.’s first text did not threaten physical harm to S.,
the delinquency petition cannot be sustained based on the threat prong of
section 653m.”
The Court then held that neither text was “obscene”
under Section 653m: “The juvenile court
found both texts were “obscene” as proscribed by the second prong of
section 653m. We disagree, because it is
inappropriate to extract isolated words from a private message and impose criminal
liability based on their abstract offensiveness. Viewing C. C.’s texts
in context, as we must, we find no basis for criminal liability. In People v. Hernandez (1991) 231
Cal.App.3d 1376, at pages 1384-1386 (Hernandez), the term “obscene” as
used in section 653m was interpreted to mean something different than the term
is used in the context of erotic expression, such as in defining “‘obscene
matter’” or “‘obscene live conduct.’” (§ 311, subds.(a) & (g); 2 Witkin
& Epstein, Cal. Crim. Law (3d ed. 2000) Sex Offenses and Crimes against
Decency, § 83; CALJIC No. 16.182; CALCRIM No. 1142.) In such contexts, referred
to in Hernandez, supra, at pages 1385-1386 as “the Miller standard”
(see Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15 [37 L.Ed.2d 419]),
“‘obscene matter’” generally refers to something “that to the average person,
applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest,
that, taken as a whole, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way, and that, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.” (§ 311, subd. (a)(1).)
Hernandez involved a traditional type of annoying telephone call,
where Hernandez repeatedly called a woman over a two-week period, hurling abuse
at her by using vile terms, such as calling her a “‘fat bitch,’ a ‘whore,’ and
a ‘c---.’”(Hernandez, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1380 & fn.
4.) In that factual context, Hernandez approved an instruction defining
“‘obscene’” as used in section 653m as “‘offensive to one’s feelings, or to
prevailing notions of modesty or decency; lewd.’” (Hernandez, supra,
231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1384.) Hernandez explained that because the purpose
of the statute “was to protect an individual’s right to privacy from annoying
intrusions[,]” section 653m was not limited to “‘obscene’ language dealing with
sex and appealing to the prurient interest under the Miller standard,
while exempting equally annoying
telephone calls
containing language that would be considered ‘obscene’ under a common or
dictionary definition.” (Hernandez, supra, at p. 1384.) Hernandez
in part noted that sister-state statutes had been construed to include a
similarly broad definition of “obscene” in order to deter harassing telephone
calls and thereby
protect the peace and solitude of telephone owners. (Id. at p. 1386; see
generally Annot., Use of Telephone to Annoy or Harass (1979 & 2008 supp.)
95 A.L.R.3d 411; Comment, Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment: An
Exercise in Statutory Precision (1989) 56 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1403.)”
Lynch challenges the Hernandez definition of “obscene” as the
word is used in section 653m for the purposes of this probation violation
matter (and with respect to the post-conviction issues she is presently pursuing)
because she does not believe that “obscene” can possibly mean “offensive to
one’s feelings, or to prevailing notions of modesty or decency; lewd.’” (Hernandez,
supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1384.)
In any event, Lynch’s communications do not fit within any of those
parts. Lynch’s communications have, as
was true throughout her trial, been taken out of context.
The Court, in C.C. reasoned: “The texts were not “lewd.” The first text
has nothing arguably lewd in it. Although the second text used vulgarities
derived from sexually-related terms such as “fuck” and “cunt,” those words were
not used lewdly. They were expletives used as verbs and adjectives to emphasize
the depth of his feelings, and in a couple of places as insults to describe how
he felt about S. as a result of her conduct. For example, calling her a “cunt”
did not import any lewd thoughts about her; it conveyed anger and insult
towards her. There was one explicit sexual usage, when C. C. posited that S.
would “fuck” another boy after a football game, but the term “fuck” was merely
a synonym for sexual congress, it conveyed no more salacious meaning than a
more refined term for that activity.”
There is a difference between an obscenity and an entirely acceptable
expletive uttered out of frustration.
The Court continued: “”Neither
text was offensive to prevailing notions of modesty or decency. As for the
second text, the words “fuck” and “bitch” and “cunt” are generally eschewed in
polite settings, which is why in court the parties and witnesses generally
referred to the “F word” or “B word” or “C word.” But each has acquired
secondary meanings through modern usage. In particular, the evidence was
uncontradicted that these words are in common use at the high school, the venue
in which the relationship existed, and in which C. C.’s pointed communications
about his feelings were sent. For this reason we reject the Attorney General’s
view that the use of “C word” and the like at trial proves the words are
necessarily indecent.”
Lynch’s communications were not offensive to
prevailing notions of modesty or decency.
This issue should have been argued, during Lynch’s 2012 trial, given the
fact that both Lynch and Cohen worked in the music industry; Cohen personally
wanted a rap tribute album dedicated to him (featuring Dr. Dre and Eminem);
Cohen uses expletives; and, Cohen is viewed as someone who has published one of
the most “obscene” literary works in Canada.
The Court explained that: “The meaning of words is always contextual.
As provided in the erotic obscenity arena, matter must be judged in its
entirety, including the context in which it is presented. (§ 311, subd. (a)
[matter must be “taken as a whole”]; see People v. Goulet (1971) 21
Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3-4.) The importance
of context is highlighted by In re Price (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 941 (Price).
Price upheld a charge of using obscene language in public (former
§ 311.6; Stats. 1961, ch. 2147, § 5, p. 4428), when a minor called
police officers, inter alia, “‘mother fuckers,’” because the majority
interpreted it to mean “a vulgar description of sexual intercourse with one’s
mother.” (Price, supra, at pp. 944, 946.) A dissenting opinion pointed
out that the majority’s reading of the words was wrong: “The term ‘f g pigs’ in the context in which
it was used referred not to copulation of porcine animals but was rather a
highly insulting epithet directed to the police officers. The term ‘f g law’
referred not to the law of sexual intercourse but a derogatory reference to the
law in general. The average person would not have construed the phrase ‘f k
them’ uttered by appellant in reference to the police officers as an invitation
to engage in sexual activities with them.
Appellant’s use of the vulgarism describing the filial partner in an
oedipal relationship is fairly to be viewed as an epithet rather than as a
phrase appealing to a shameful or morbid interest in intra-family sex.” (Price,
supra, 4 Cal.App.3d at p. 948 (dis. opn. of Thompson, J.).) Although we are not applying the same
definition of obscenity at issue in Price, the point is that the
dictionary definitions of words such as “fuck” or “cunt” may not reflect the
meaning conveyed by those words as used in contemporary society. Meaning
generally hinges on the circumstances in which words are used. As we explained in a case involving an
alleged criminal threat (§ 422), “The circumstances surrounding a communication
include such things as the prior relationship of the parties and the manner in
which the communication was made.” (Ryan D., supra, 100
Cal.App.4th at p. 860.) In this case, the words were used by an agitated,
frustrated high school boy to his former high school girlfriend, and both
parties to the communication attended a high school where such language is in
common parlance. The messages concern intimate matters between the parties, and
were not spoken aloud in a group, but texted privately inter sese. To extract isolated words like “fuck” and
“cunt” from such a communication and predicate criminal liability on
them because they are “offensive” in the abstract is to stretch the Hernandez
definition far beyond its utility, which was to broaden the meaning of obscene
beyond its usage in reference to erotic material, in order to deter unwanted, harassing,
communications that intrude on a person’s peace and solitude. (Hernandez,
supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1384, 1386.) Similarly, while the violence described in
the first text is arguably upsetting, it is not obscene—that is,
offensive to prevailing notions of modesty or decency—particularly when read in
the context in which the text was sent.
In short, whatever may be said about the manner in which C. C. expressed
himself, it was not criminal. The
judgment is reversed for lack of evidence.”
California Penal
Code 422 PC defines the crime of "criminal threats" (formerly known
as terrorist threats). A
"criminal threat" is when you threaten to kill or physically harm
someone and that person is thereby placed in a state of reasonably
sustained fear for his/her safety or for the safety of his/her immediate
family, the threat is specific and unequivocal and, you communicate the threat verbally, in writing, or
via an electronically transmitted device.
Lynch did not issue a threat, credible or otherwise. She sent a series of emails to the FBI, DOJ
(and others
In order to be
convicted of this offense, the prosecutor must prove the following four
elements: that you willfully threatened
to kill or seriously injure another person; that you intended your verbal,
written or electronically communicated statement to be received as a threat;
that the threat on its face and under the circumstances was so
"unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific" that it conveyed
an immediate possibility of execution; and, that the threatened individual
reasonably feared for his/her safety or for the safety of his/her immediate
family.
The victim must in
reasonable fear. "Fear" as it applies to criminal threats actually
encompasses three different concepts:
that the victim was actually fearful; that the fear was reasonable;
and the fear was sustained (as opposed to momentary or fleeting).
Penal Code 422 PC
calls for a threat that is "so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and
specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an
immediate prospect of execution..."
Because there is no requirement that the victim suffer any physical
injury, criminal threats is a crime which is ripe for false accusations. Anyone
who is angry, jealous, vengeful, spiteful or trying to escape his/her own
criminal liability could easily falsely accuse another person of this serious
crime.
DUTY
OF CANDOR
A lawyer’s duty of candor, is succinctly addressed
in Wendy L. Patrick’s article “Don’t Lie To Me”: “An attorney’s duty of candor pervades every
aspect of practicing law in and outside the courtroom. One of the most crucial points is that the
duty of candor about statements of fact and law applies to statements an
attorney makes to a jury as well as to a judicial officer.” Clearly, misleading a jury, judge, or
judicial officer by an artifice of false statement of fact or law is a serious
matter that taints and perverts any decent notion of justice and can be used to
falsely obtain convictions, judgments, and orders. The prosecutors for the City Attorney of Los
Angeles and the lawyers Los Angeles Superior Court appointed to represent
individuals are attorneys who have a duty of candor.
An attorney’s duty of candor pervades every
aspect of practicing law, in and outside of the courtroom. This duty is codified by statute, reaffirmed
in case law and mandated by the California Rules of Professional Conduct and
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The duty of candor covers everything from perjury, false evidence,
representations of procedural issues and citation of authority in court.
California
Rule of Professional Conduct 5-200, Trial Conduct, states that in presenting a
matter to a tribunal, a member: (a)
shall employ, for the purposes of maintaining the causes confided to the
member, such means only as are consistent with truth; (b) shall not mislead the
judge, judicial officer or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law; (c) shall not intentionally misquote to a tribunal the language or a book,
statute or decision; (d) shall not, knowing its invalidity, cite as authority a
decision that has been overruled or a statute that has been repealed or
declared unconstitutional; (e) shall not assert personal knowledge of the facts
at issue, except when testifying as a witness.
The
California Business and Professional Code addresses a lawyer’s duty of
candor. California’s Business and
Professions Code Section 6068(d) states that it is the duty of an attorney to
“employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him or her,
those means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the
causes confided to him or her, those means only as are consistent with truth,
and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law.” The
California Business and Professions Code contains a section that spells out the
potential punishment. California
Business and Professions Code Section 6103 states that “a willful disobedience
or violation of an order of the court requiring him to do or forbear an act
connected with or in the course of his profession, which he ought in good faith
to do or forbear, and any violation of the oath taken by him, or of his duties
as such attorney, constitutes causes for disbarment or suspension.”
California
Business and Professions Code Section 6106 discusses actions unfit for an
attorney, that may result in discipline.
The sections states that “the commission of any act involving moral
turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, whether the act is committed in the
course of his relations as an attorney or otherwise, and whether the act is a
felony or misdemeanor or not, constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension.” California Business and Professions Code
Section 6128 actually imposes misdemeanor criminal liability on a lawyer who
engages in or consents to any deceit or collusion “with intent to deceive the
court or any party.” (BP 6128(a)).
Punishment for violating this section is up to a six-month jail sentence
or a fine of up to $2,500 or both.
California
has not yet adopted a version of the ABA Model Rules, but when the state does
not have an ethical rule governing a specific issue, courts may look to the ABA
for guidance, although they may not consider ABA Rules and Opinions as binding
authority. Regarding ABA formal
opinions, case law holds that while an ABA formal opinion “does not establish
an obligatory standard of conduct imposed on California lawyers,” the ABA Model
Rule may be considered as a “collateral source” where there is no direct
ethical authority in California. State
Compensation Insurance Fund v. WPS Inc. (State Fund) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
644, 656. Model Rule 3.3 – Candor Toward
the Tribunal states in subsection (a): A
lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) Make a
false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement
of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; (2) fail
to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and
not disclosed by opposing course; (3) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to
be false. If a lawyer the lawyer’s
client or a witness called by the lawyer has offered material evidence and the
lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence other
than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer
reasonably believes is false. Rule 3.3
states in paragraph (b) that a lawyer representing a client “who knows that a
person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent
conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures
including if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.” Paragraph (c) qualifies
the duties in paragraphs (a) and (b), stating in pertinent part that they apply
“even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6 [Confidentiality].” It is
important to note that the provisions of Rule 3.3 apply in a broader sense than
simply in the courtroom. Comment [1]
states that the duty of candor applies not only in front of a “tribunal,” but
also while representing a client in “an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant
to the tribunal’s adjudicative authority, such as a deposition” Therefore,
subdivision (1)(3) would require a lawyer who realizes his or her client
testified falsely even in a deposition to take remedial measures.
In
addition to Rule 3.3, which specifically covers candor in the courtroom,
several other Model Rules discuss a lawyer’s duty of candor generally. Model Rule 4.1 – Truthfulness in Statements
to Others also covers the duty of candor.
The rules states: In the course
of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of a material fact
or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose material fact to a third
person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6 (emphasis
added). Note the difference between the
references to Rule 1.6 in Rule 3.3 versus Rule 4.1, Rule 3.3 requires that candor to the court
take precedence over the duty of confidentiality, while Rule 4.1,l truthfulness
in statements to others, recognizes the higher importance of the duty of
confidentiality.
Regarding
the issue of affirmative misrepresentation versus passive failure to correct
misinformation, Rule 4.1 Comment [1] states that while an attorney must be
truthful in his or her dealings with others in representing a client he or she
“generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant
facts.” The Comment goes on, however, to state that “[a] misrepresentation can
occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that
the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations
can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that
are equivalent of affirmative false statements.”
Model
Rule 8.4, Misconduct, also includes several provisions relating to a lawyer’s
duty of candor. Relevant provisions state
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to (b) commit a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects, or (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
In
conclusion, the duty of candor pervades every aspect of practicing law, in and
out of the courtroom. In conclusion, the
duty of candor refers to duty of a public authority to disclose material
facts. The general duty of candor requires
attorneys to be honest and forthright with courts. The attorneys should also refrain from
deceiving or misleading courts either through direct representation or through
silence. This duty is owed to courts
during all aspects of litigation. The
duty of candor towards the tribunal is a widely recognized one within the legal
profession.
THE GOVERNMENT
UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT
“I
am whatever you say I am.”
Eminem
“The
first human who hurled an insult instead of a stone was the founder of
civilization.”
Sigmund
Freud
“If
they stop telling lies about the Democrats, we will stop telling the truth
about them.”
Adlai
Stevenson on the Republican party
“A
crafty and lecherous old hypocrite whose very statue seems to gloat on the
wenches
as
they walk on the State House yard.”
William
Cobett on Benjamin Franklin
Speech
might be unprotected if it intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly inflicts
severe emotional distress. Such a rule,
however, is applied specifically to private figures. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Hustler v.
Falwell (1988) that satire which could be seen as offensive to a “public
figure” is fully protected. Such speech
is rooted in historical protection of political satire. A notable example of a case involving
offensive speech was the Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson (1989),
which struck down a law criminalizing flag burning in Texas. While threats of “violence” directed at a
person or group of persons, with the intent of committing bodily harm or death,
are generally unprotected, there are exceptions. As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that “threats may not be punished if a reasonable person would understand
them as obvious hyperbole.”
Lynch was able to locate legal precedence for
criminalizing speech that insults government.
That precedence was established by the Libyan government. Law 37, which disregards international law
and interim constitutional provisions, criminalized the spreading of “false
news or information” or “propaganda.” The
Libyan Supreme Court struck the law down ruling that Law 37 is unconstitutional
giving Libyans the right to freedom of speech and information that is an
essential accompaniment and tool to help shape Libya’s transition to
democracy. Reporters Without Borders
confirmed the importance of reaffirming freedom of opinion and expression. The law would have criminalized any insult to
the Libyan government and other institutions.
It would be very convenient for a government to ban any form of
opposition or criticism to it.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992), held that the government cannot impose viewpoint-based
restrictions even on bigoted fighting words, specifically distinguished (in
dictum) from workplace harassment laws. The
government may punish fighting words because of their tendency to cause a fight,
though not because of the ‘hostility – or favoritism – towards the underlying
message expressed. As Hustler v. Falwell, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, and the antidraft speech show,
protected speech may not be punished because of its communicative impact, even
if the punishment is accomplished through a general law. Even FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438U.S. 726, 748-49], which upheld a content-based ban
(albeit one that touched only speech that the plurality saw as “low-value”),
emphasized that:
the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing
it … For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment
that the government must remain
neutral in the marketplace of ideas. If there were any reason to believe that the
Commission’s characterization of the Carlin monologue as
offensive could be traced
To its political content … First Amendment protection
might be required.
In summary, the Court held that “the best
restatement of current captive audience doctrine” is this: The government has some power to restrict
offensive speech that reaches into the home, though even there the restriction
cannot be justified by the offensiveness of its ideas (as opposed to its form),
see Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978)]; Rowan v. United
States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736, 738 (1970)], and Pacifica. But outside the home, the government acting
as sovereign can’t shield people from offensive speech even if the speech is
hard to avoid … We are as captive to offensive picketing, offensive
demonstrations, “Fuck the Draft” jackets worn in public [Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)], and the like, as we are to most offensive workplace
speech … Some commentators have argued that harassment law is justified by
“congressional power under the Commerce Clause to impose content based speech
restrictions in the workplace to effectuate values embodied in the greater
constitution,” or even by Congressional power under the Thirteenth
Amendment. This argument, however is
entirely unsound … Would a law banning economically themed picketing be
justified by the Commerce Clause? … Certainly not. The positive grants of power to Congress in
no way diminish the restraints imposed by the Bill of Rights.”
In
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded: So too with speech in the
workplace: there is no way of
distinguishing “true political speech” from, say, an ethnic joke, which might
convey a political opinion much more effectively than any explicit political
slogan. See also Abood v. Destroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (“expression about philosophical,
social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters’ is entitled to full
First Amendment protection.”).
In
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that parodies
of public figures, which could not reasonably be taken as true, are protected
against civil liability by the First Amendment even if intended to cause
emotional distress. This case applies to
Lynch’s trial (and the parody email related to DA Steve Cooley) and the issue
at hand. Hustler Magazine’s parody of
Jerry Falwell was deemed to be within the law because the Court found that
reasonably people would not have interpreted the parody to contain factual
claims. Unfortunately, Lynch’s public
defenders did not address this issue during her trial. Lynch sent the FBI, DOJ, and others an email
with a P.S. which is the only written aspect of the alleged email that
specifically mentions “Sandra Jo Streeter.”
It was, for all intents and purposes, a parody of what Lynch felt
unfolded during her trial with respect to statements such as “take you down”
that was qualified frequently with the word “legally.” The ad, Jerry
Falwell Talks About His First Time, contained the following dialogue within
an advertisement for Campari Liquer that also contained Falwell’s photograph: “Falwell:
My first time was in an outhouse outside Lynchburg, Virginia. Interviewer:
Wasn’t it a little cramped?
Falwell: Not after I kicked the
goat out. Interviewer: I see.
You must tell me all about it.
Falwell: I never really expected
to make it with Mom, but then after she showed all the other guys in town such
a good time, I figured, “What the hell?”
The ads played off a double entendre which addressed Falwell’s first
sexual experience. The Falwell ad was a
parody of Campari ads where celebrities were interviewed about their “first
times.” Falwell goes onto explain to the
interviewer that his first sexual experience occurred “with Mom in an outhouse
while both were ‘drunk off our God-fearing asses n Campari.’” Falwell goes onto say that “Mom looked better
than a Baptist whore with a $100 donation” and claims that he and his Mom had
intercourse regularly afterwards. This
ad contained a disclaimer. Lynch’s P.S.
serves as a disclaimer which explains precisely why she sent the email to the
FBI and DOJ. “At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern. The freedom to speak one’s mind is not only
an aspect of individual liberty … and thus a good unto itself – but also is
essential the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a
whole.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc. 466 U.S. 485, 466 U.S. 503-504 (1984). The First Amendment envisions robust political
debate that extends to criticism of public figures who are “intimately involved
in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame,
shape events in areas of concern to society at large.” In New
York Times v. Sullivan, the Court held that the First Amendment gives
speakers immunity from sanction with respect to their speech concerning public
figures unless their speech is both false and made with “actual malice” lest
there be an intolerably chilling effect on speech that has constitutional
value. Clearly, Sandra Jo Streeter,
Vivienne Swanigan, Steve Cooley, Alan Jackson, and other members of the Los
Angeles City Attorney and District Attorney offices, are public figures for
purposes of First Amendment protections.
INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The right to effective assistance of counsel is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See McCann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n. 14 (1970). This
constitutional guarantee attaches to both retained and appointed counsel. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
344-45 (1980). In 1984, the U.S. Supreme
Court established a two-prong test to be used by lower courts in evaluating
ineffective assistance of claims: a
criminal defendant must prove that counsel performance was “deficient” because
it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and that this deficient performance
so prejudiced the defendant that the resulting conviction or death sentence is
unreliable or fundamentally unfair. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal handed down an ineffective assistance
of counsel ruling involving an attorney’s failure to investigate, interview and
subpoena a witness. See Harrison v.
Quarterman, __ F.3d ___ 2007 WL 2306918, C.A. 5 (Tex.), August 14, 2007,
No. 04-11188.
Against
the backdrop of case law that ineffectiveness may be found when an attorney
does not contact and/or subpoena a potentially critical witness, the First
Circuit addressed the fact that if the potential testimony was accurate and the
witness willing to testify, then there was a strong argument that trial
counsel’s failure to interview the witness and call him as a witness at trial
fell below the standard of a reasonably competent attorney. It is obvious that an attorney must engage in
a reasonable amount of pretrial investigation and at a minimum interview
potential witnesses and make an independent investigation of the facts and
circumstances in the case. Failure to do
so is constitutionally deficient representation under Strickland Deficiency
Test. LA Superior Court appointed trial
lawyers who did not attempt to properly investigate or subpoena witnesses; they
did not have the facts straight or an understanding of the alleged evidence;
they failed to properly impeach testimony; they failed to contact witnesses who
could corroborate Lynch’s testimony; etc.
One meeting with Lynch, that reviewed the facts, background, witnesses,
and evidence could conceivably have resolved many of these issues. Instead, Lynch’s trial lawyers could not even
be bothered to phone her sister back. Lynch’s
trial counsel deficient performance fell below the standard of a reasonably
competent attorney required by Strickland.
Deficient performance is not enough to warrant reversal
under Strickland. A defendant must
demonstrate that the deficient performance prejudiced his/her defense. Inherent in the prejudice component is a
prerequisite showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Given the fact that Lynch’s trial lawyers
argued that she and Cohen had a sexual relationship; he panicked about his
finances; didn’t attempt to impeach Cohen’s testimony with respect to the IRS
refund (that has now been challenged as fraud); and so forth and so on; it is
impossible to believe that their deficient performance didn’t wholly prejudice
her defense. Given the role credibility
and witness testimony played in this case, there exists a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors and prosecutorial misconduct, false
testimony, perjury, and concealment, the jury might have reached a different
verdict.
The
cumulative impact of the ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial
misconduct, false statements, and perjured testimony clearly impacted the
jurors. The failure to call witnesses
permitted Streeter to argue, in closing, that Lynch’s testimony was
uncorroborated.
RESTRAINING
ORDER TERRORISM
The
domestic violence industry is now an enormous, and highly abused, financial
industry. Cities, counties, and states
receive millions of federal dollars in grant money by adopting provisions of
federal law.
The basic issues in Lynch’s trial were allegedly
whether or not she violated a lawful restraining order and intended to annoy
Leonard Cohen. She did not. The Court permitted countless mini-trials to
take place while refusing to afford Lynch the opportunity to call compulsory
witnesses and properly defend herself. The
Boulder Court advised Lynch that the “permanent” restraining order expired in
2010. Lynch had no intent to annoy
Cohen; nothing related to the tax issues is a ruse and the City Attorney is in
no position to say otherwise; and Lynch has outstanding legitimate business and
legal issues with Leonard Cohen.
Lynch maintains that this is a violation of the
Violence Against Women’s Act (VAWA) that requires jurisdictions to give full
faith and credit to protection orders issued by other jurisdictions. 18 U.S.C. Section 2265 which states: “Any protection order issued that is
consistent with subsection (b) of this section by the court of the State …
shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court of another State … and
enforcer as if it were the order of the enforcing State or tribe.” 18 U.S.C. Section 2263(a). The May 25, 2005 new California domestic
violence order is not the order of the Boulder, Colorado court. That order was a civil harassment order. This has now created both state and federal
legal issues.
A domestic violence charge (California Penal
Code Section 273.5) requires the infliction of corporal injury to a spouse,
boyfriend, girlfriend, family member or an individual who formerly fit into one
of these categories. There is a
requirement that the individuals have been in an “intimate relationship.”
Frequently, an accuser will make a false allegation of abuse out of anger,
jealousy, or to gain an upper hand in litigation, divorce, or custody
proceedings. Penal Code 273.5 makes it
illegal to inflict a “corporal injury” resulting in a “traumatic
condition.” The Boulder, Colorado order
was a civil harassment restraining order that can be used for neighbors,
roommates, coworkers, and so forth. This
fact is material, relevant, and was concealed from the jury. Lynch herself did not realize that the 2011
California order was a domestic violence order until months after her release
from custody when she phoned Los Angeles Superior Court and was asked: “Is this your boyfriend?” She was shocked by this question.
At sentencing for conviction of a domestic
violence crime, a court may issue an order prohibiting a defendant from having
any contact with the victim. In addition
to assessing a fine, a court may require a person convicted of a domestic
violence offense to pay a fee that funds domestic violence programs. A California domestic violence conviction
goes on one’s permanent criminal record and will surface anytime someone does a
routine background check. This can make
it difficult to gain employment, state licensing, and other benefits. Once the court issues a restraining order,
the order is entered into a statewide computer system (called CLETS) that all
law enforcement officers have access to.
A central issue with respect to a domestic
violence order is the statutory requirement of a “dating relationship.” Lynch and Cohen were in no such relationship
and never had a brief intimate sexual relationship. Given the fact that allegations of “domestic
violence” were raised when the new California order was created, modifying the
original Boulder order, Lynch had to right to receive notice and to be
heard. Service would also have provided
LA Superior Court with personal jurisdiction over her. Lynch was not served and/or notified of the
2011 California order. On or about
February 14, 2011, Cohen’s lawyer, Michelle Rice, wrote and lied to Lynch when
she informed her that Boulder, Colorado had been registered in California. It had not.
VAWA requires that “The respondent must have
had notice and an opportunity to be heard sufficient to protect that person’s
right to due process.” 18 U.S.C. Section 2265(b)(2). Defendant was not given notice or the
opportunity to be heard with respect to the new allegations raised in the May
25, 2011 domestic violence order. The
jurisdiction that issues the order determines:
1) who is protected; 2) the terms
and conditions of the order; and, 3) how long the order is in effect; 4) how
the order is enforced; and, 5)the arrest authority of responding law
enforcement.
Prosecutors, such as Sandra Jo Streeter of the
City Attorney’s Domestic Violence Department, have a duty to review the order
to ensure that it reflects, on its face, compliance with VAWA’s full faith and
credit provision (18 U.S.C. Section 2265) and states that the issuing court had
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and that the respondent
had notice and an opportunity to be heard; cites the state statute upon which
the court’s decision and order are based; provides the name, location, and
telephone number of the issuing court; states the duration of the order and its
expiration date, if any; includes National Crime Information Center Protection
Order File identifiers on the form and any other identifying information
required by state registries; provides notice of the federal domestic violence
and stalking crimes and the federal prohibitions regarding firearms; and,
ensures that the protection orders are legible and use clear, concise
language.
In Colorado, there are domestic violence
protection orders and orders for stalking, sexual assault, physical
harm/threats and abuse of elderly/at-risk adult. In August 2008, Leonard Cohen obtained a
temporary restraining order against Lynch.
Lynch, who was not properly served and addressed this issue in her
motion to quash (as it involved extrinsic fraud upon the court), attended the
hearing, felt the situation was out of control, and asked the judge to make it
“permanent.” After hearing that Leonard
Cohen personally flew in for a secret hearing, Lynch returned to the court,
reviewed the file, and was shocked by the extensive perjury, fraud,
concealment, and lies. That is precisely
why she filed a Motion to Quash and properly served Leonard Cohen. When Lynch asked the court to make the order
permanent she was unaware of any allegation against her. She did not waive an evidentiary
hearing. She found the proceedings
unconscionable and put an end to what she referred to as insanity. Lynch made no agreement with the court to
accept false accusations and was very clear that she intended to attack any
fraud and perjury. The judge advised her
that she could not give her legal advice.
Lynch did not engage in violent, threatening, harassing, stalking or
sexually abusive behavior.
VAWA states that all valid orders granted in
the United States receive “full faith and credit” in all states. There is nothing valid about the Colorado
order regardless of the fact that Judge Carolyn Enichen elected not to hold
Cohen responsible for his fraud and perjury.
It is addressed in Lynch’s Motion to Quash which serves as a legal
objection. Defendant filed her Motion to Quash the
Boulder order on the grounds that Cohen committed perjury in his fraudulent and
falsified Declaration. Defendant
believes that prosecutor Sandra Jo Streeter should have been aware of this
document and the issues Defendant raised.
Instead, Streeter asked Lynch if she had a copy, knowing that she had
deprived her of bail and had no access to her evidence in storage in the Bay
Area. Lynch addresses the fact that she
was not properly served and there is fraud with respect to the proof of
service. Leonard Cohen was properly
served this document. Lynch maintained
that due to the extrinsic fraud upon the court in that matter that the court
did not have jurisdiction over her.
Perjury, with respect to a proof of service, is perjury and fraud. Lynch advised Cohen’s lawyers that they could
properly serve Yongzin Rinpoche on her behalf.
She heard nothing back. Leonard
Cohen has a pattern and history of committing perjury, filing fraudulent
documents, and concealing and withholding evidence. Lynch addressed the fact that Cohen has
relentlessly targeted her since she reported his tax fraud to the Internal
Revenue Service. Leonard Cohen’s
business manager, Rich Feldstein, is raised as an issue. Cohen’s pattern of blaming his advisers is an
issue. For instance, Marty Machat. Lynch’s refusal to meet with Cohen and his
tax lawyer is addressed as the key issue with respect to the falling out – as
was her refusal to hand over the corporate books and records. The issue, from Lynch’s point of view, that
led to Cohen’s extraordinary flight from Europe to obtain yet another
fraudulent restraining order is Ann Diamond’s draft article for Rolling Stone,
Lynch’s online posts, and communications with journalists. She attached evidence to the Motion to
Quash. Her public defenders assured her
that they would obtain a copy of the entire Boulder, Colorado restraining order
file. Lynch testified to that fact. Lynch’s accountant, Dale Burgess, faxed Lynch
and her lawyers after meeting with Cohen’s accountant, Kevin Prins. This fax, dated February 3, 2003, addresses
the fact that Kevin Prins did not have the back-up documentation necessary to
prepare an actual accounting. Leonard
Cohen’s loans/advances from Traditional Holdings, LLC are addressed. The fact that his level of borrowing was
dangerous to the corporate structure itself was confirmed. Cohen’s failure to report the 2001 Sony sale
to the IRS and other steps on the tax returns was addressed. The K-1s Leonard Cohen, sole owner of LC
Investments, LLC transmitted to the State of Kentucky and IRS indicating that
Lynch was a partner on that entity was raised as an issue. Attached as evidence are the Kentucky K-1s
issued by LC Investments, LLC to Cohen and Lynch and Richard Westin’s October
6, 2004 letter transmitting them to the state of Kentucky. Lynch has no idea why these tax documents
assign her a 99.5% share of LC Investments, LLC. Cohen’s use of fraudulent restraining orders
against Lynch is addressed. Cohen’s
illegal use of Lynch’s social security number is also addressed. The custody matter, SWAT, Killer King, and
Phil Spector were also addressed – as was the fraud in the Killer King
report. Lynch attached the Los Angeles
District Attorney’s Internal Memorandum on King Drew dated April 8, 2005. Lynch discusses the fact that her emails are
documenting the destruction of her life since reporting Leonard Cohen’s tax
fraud to the Internal Revenue Service on or about April 15, 2005. Cohen’s former use of prescription meth is
addressed. It is fascinating to Lynch
that Cohen, in court documents and on the witness stand, feels that this
assails his reputation but is entirely comfortable talking to Sylvie Simmons,
his biographer, about his past use of meth, LSD, and so forth and so on. His nickname was Captain Mandrax. Issues with respect to the FBI and the Aryan
Nation were addressed. She confirms that
she believes the FBI knows that the Aryan Nation exists and have connections to
meth labs and addresses the fact that she brought information, related to an
FBI investigation, to the attention of the IRS Commissioner’s Staff, Department
of Justice and others, because she felt this information endangered her
life. Lynch also raises the fact that
she and a Denver FBI Duty Agent do not necessarily see eye to eye on why
Officer Storbeck of the Boulder Police Department rolled into Deneuve
Construction with the Police Chief’s secretary.
The Duty Agent did not seem to feel that LAPD was behind this activity. Lynch maintains that Officer Storbeck advised
her that LAPD contacted him. In any
event, he was armed. Lynch immediately
phoned Phil Spector about the incident.
Monies owed Lynch by Cohen and Lindsey are addressed. Lynch does find it interesting that Santa
Monica Police Department were monitoring her particularly now that she has been
advised, by Betsy Superfon, that Cohen and Kory contacted Santa Monica Police
Department about Lynch. She was also
followed in Santa Monica by Superfon’s boyfriend and filed a complaint about
this individual with Santa Monica Police Department. He had previously stopped by Lynch’s house
and represented himself as an FBI agent who was working on a matter that
involved the Salvation Army. Lynch later
heard from Douglas Penick that Steve Lindsey advised him that this individual
went to Lynch’s house to obtain information with respect to the IRS, Phil
Spector, and Bruce Cutler. Cohen advised
the court that Lynch moved to Boulder, Colorado to avoid California law enforcement. Yongzin Rinpoche and his wife, Clea Surkhang,
invited Lynch to visit. Cohen’s contacts
with Phil Shull, owner of Deneuve Construction, are addressed. The firing squad comment, also raised at
Lynch’s 2012 trial, was explained. After
being interviewed by Mikal Gilmore, whose brother was executed by a firing
squad, Cohen spent months and months advising Lynch that he wanted to die by
firing squad and even told her about his fantasies with respect to his last
meal and cigarette. Lynch is convinced
that her public defenders and the prosecutor should have reviewed this
document, attached evidence, and addressed these matters with her jurors. Defendant has noticed that certain
individuals feel comfortable changing information and testimony as they move
from one court to another, or one courtroom to another, and feel comfortable
lying or distorting what judges in other matters have said, ruled upon, or
ordered. She believes that is a very
serious legal issue.
Lynch continues to be gravely harmed by the
Colorado order. Lynch had no opportunity
to have her side heard, with respect to the May 25, 2011 California order, and
it violates the most fundamental concepts of due process. Lynch intends to pursue this matter legally
and through the federal court system particularly now that it is being used, by
the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Domestic Violence Unit, to persecute
Lynch. That is her personal
opinion. The original Colorado order was
modified and Lynch maintains that this violates numerous state and federal
statutes.
A civil harassment order is used for the
purpose of preventing harassment by co-workers, neighbors, strangers, and
acquaintances. The Colorado Statute
civil harassment order is issued pursuant to Section 13-14-106. The statute requires a judge to find, by
examination of the record and the evidence, by a preponderance of the evidence
that the respondent has committed acts constituting grounds for issuance of a
civil protective order. Respondent does
not believe that her request to make an order “permanent” due to the insanity
she witnessed at the hearing proves that the Boulder court had grounds to issue
an order that addressed the underlying allegations, particularly given the fact
that Lynch was completely unaware of them at the time of the hearing. Lynch Pursuant to Colorado statute
13-14-106(1)(a): if the court modifies
the protection order on the motion of the protected party, the modified
protection order must be served upon the respondent.
Colorado Statute 13-14-108. Modification and termination of civil protection
orders states: (4) The issuing court retains jurisdiction to
enforce, modify, or dismiss a temporary or permanent protection order. (5) The court shall hear any motion filed … The
party moving for a modification … shall affect personal service on the other
party with a copy of the motion and notice of the hearing on the motion, as
provided by rule 4(e) of the Colorado rules of civil procedure. The moving party shall bear the burden of
proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the modification is
appropriate or that a dismissal is appropriate … (6) In considering whether to modify … the court
shall consider … c) whether the restraining party has been ordered to
participate in and has completed a domestic violence offender treatment program
provided by an entity approved pursuant to section 16-11-8-103, C.R.S. …
According
to Section 3(b) of the statute, there are additional requirements with respect
to the modification of the court’s order:
A court shall not consider a motion to modify a protection order filed
by a restrained party pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) unless
the court receives the results of a fingerprint-based criminal history record
check of the restrained party that is conducted within ninety days prior to the
filing of the motion. The
fingerprint-based criminal history record check must include a review of the
state and federal criminal history records maintained by the Colorado Bureau of
Investigation and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The restraining party shall be responsible
for supplying fingerprints to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation and to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and paying the costs of the record checks.
The order was modified when it was unlawfully
filed in LA Superior Court as a domestic violence order. There are also very serious issues with
respect to fraudulent information being transferred into the central registry
of protection orders: The court shall
electronically transfer into the central registry of protection orders
established pursuant to section 18-6-803.7, C.R.S., a copy of any order issued
pursuant to this section and shall deliver a copy of such order to the
protected party. Defendant does not
believe, and intends to challenge this in federal court, that Leonard Cohen met
his burden of proof with respect to the Boulder court order. Defendant Lynch did not reside in Boulder,
Colorado at the time of the hearing. She
was clear about that on the record. One
party must be a resident. At the time
the order was modified, neither party had been anywhere in the vicinity of
Boulder, Colorado for a number of years.
Lynch left Boulder, Colorado shortly after the hearing and moved to
Northern, New Jersey.
The DVPA is intended to
prevent the recurrence of acts of domestic violence and to provide for a
separation between parties involved for a period of time sufficient to enable
them to seek a restitution of the causes of the violence [Ca Fam Section
6220]. An alleged domestic violence
victim is a “protected person” under the DVPA and thus entitled to the benefit
of DVPA order only if he or she fits one of the descriptions contained in Ca
Fam Section 6211 (providing that domestic violence “abuse” perpetrated against
specified classifications of persons).
The person seeking a DVPA remedy as a “protected person” must fall into
one of the categories described in Ca Fam Section 6211: Spouse, Co-habitant or former co-habitant,
dating or engagement relationship, Co-parent, Child, and/or Blood
Relative. A showing of abuse is
required.
According
to the Domestic Violence Prevent Act (Family Code Section 6200-6219), a dating
relationship means “frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by
the expectation of affection or sexual involvement independent of financial
considerations.” Lynch had no
expectation of affection or sexual involvement with Leonard Cohen and nothing
between the two was independent of financial considerations. Kelley Lynch and Leonard Cohen did not have
an intimate sexual dating relationship, brief or otherwise. Defendant was Cohen’s personal manager,
worked in other capacities (although never as business manager), and financial
considerations were a serious part of their business relationship which was
inseparable from their alleged friendship.
The business relationship and alleged friendship did involve sexual
harassment and indecent exposure on the part of Cohen with respect to
Lynch. For some reason, the City
Attorney of Los Angeles (who appears fixated on Cohen’s “penis”) views sexual
harassment and indecent exposure as both an intimate dating relationship and
something that should annoy Leonard Cohen.
There is an absolute lack of clarity and/or definition with respect to
California’s concept of a “dating relationship.” Lynch finds it absolutely
unconscionable that the Government believes it can simply assign her a
relationship. The Court of Appeal, First
District, in Oriola v. Thaler, 84 Cal.App. 4th 397, defined a
dating relationship as a “serious courtship … No dating relationship existed between Lynch
and Cohen that would support the domestic violence order and Lynch is appealing
the lack of jurisdiction under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA)
which has also exposed her to prosecutor Sandra Jo Streeter and the Domestic
Violence Unit of the City Attorney’s Office.
The Act extends protection to individuals who are or have been in
certain relationships with the alleged perpetrator of defined types of abuse,
including “a dating or engagement relationship.”(Family Code Section 6211
(c).) There was no “dating relationship”
between Lynch and Cohen.
The
DVPA provides for issuance of orders “to restrain any person for the purpose of
preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of
separation of the persons involved. If
an affidavit shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a
past act or acts of abuse.” (Family Code Section 6300.) According to Oriola v. Thaler, “the DVPA was originally enacted in 1979. At that time, the Legislature had been
advised that legal remedies then available to battered persons … were
ineffective in dealing with domestic violence … Originally, the DVPA did not
protect persons in a ‘dating relationship.’ As first enacted, the DVPA applied
only to family members and persons who regularly resided in the household and
had sexual relations with another family or household member, or had so resided
within the last six months (Former Code Civ Proc. Section 542, subd.(b)(c)) ,,,
The DVPA does not define the phrase ‘dating or engagement relationship’ and the
meaning of a ‘dating relationship’ is not clear enough to delineate the
particular meaning the Legislature had in mind when it used these words.” The Court then goes onto review the practice
of “dating” and addresses the fact that “While the DVPA ‘clearly has a broad
protective purpose, both in its stated intent and the breadth of the persons
protected … it reflects no legislative intent to extend is protection to all
categories of people who have social relationships with one another … or even
all the informal socializing relationships that could conceivably be described
as ‘dating.’” The Court had no “quarrel
with the proposition that a ‘dating relationship’ ordinarily refers to a
‘romantic,’ as opposed to ‘platonic’ relationship between two people as those
words are today commonly understood.”
Public Defender: Now, being that she was your business
manager, you wouldn’t say that was probably the best idea, to have a romantic
relationship with your business partner, correct? Leonard Cohen: I don’t think it goes to the description of
romantic ... Q: That part of the
relationship, what you called the intimate part of the relationship, why did
that end or when did that end? ... When did it end? (RT 275)
Leonard Cohen: I don’t remember
exactly when it ended. Like many relationships, it -- it just dissolved
... Okay. Q: And do you know why
it ended? Leonard Cohen: I would
say that part of the relationship exhausted itself and dissolved naturally.
(RT 276)
The Court, in Oriola v. Thaler,
concluded that “The failure of the Legislature to define the nature of the
‘dating relationship’ it had in mind creates a daunting judicial problem …
therefore, as no judicial attempt to compass the human mind can fully succeed,
we can devise no completely satisfactory definition of the ‘dating
relationship’ the Legislature contemplated.”
The Court then reviewed different state statutes and found that the
statutory definitions generally “limit the term ‘dating relationship’ not just
be requiring some showing of ‘affectional involvement’ but by excluding casual
social relationships and held that a ‘dating relationship’ refers to serious
courtship.”
Lynch maintains that Cohen and his lawyers have
used restraining orders, and in particular this alleged domestic violence
order, to silence and harass her. One of
the chief differences between the relief available to an individual under Code
of Civil Procedure Section 527.6 and tat potentially available under the DVPA
is that the DVPA authorizes the court to order restitution. Cohen obtained injunctive relief, in
Colorado, under an entirely different statutory scheme. There is no evidence, other than Leonard
Cohen’s testimony (which includes a perjury confession), to support a domestic
violence order.
Leonard Cohen sought protection, in California,
under DVPA, and could easily have availed himself of a California
harassment/stalking (as described in Ca Civ Pro Section 527.6) order but chose
not to. Lynch has never followed,
harassed, or issued what could be viewed as a “credible threat” with intent to
place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety or that his
immediate family. (See Ca Penal Section 646.9; 6274, and 646.91.)
The
procedure to obtain domestic violence restraining orders is two-fold. First, ex parte orders are obtained. At the ex parte hearing, temporary orders may
be issued by the court which last until the next “Order to Show Cause” hearing
which must be held no more than 21 days from the issuance of the first
order. Since due process requires
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard, ex parte orders are issued
with caution and only under extraordinary circumstances. Lynch has no details regarding the May 25,
2011 order; does not know if there was a hearing; and was not served or
notified of that new California order.
Absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, the ex parte applicant
must notify all parties no later than 10:00 am the court day before the ex
parte appearance. [Ca Rule s of Court
Rule 379(b).] Lynch has no idea if a
hearing was actually held or if LA Superior Court merely filed a foreign civil
harassment order as a domestic violence order with no proof that the issuing
court had agreed to modify it; it was served upon Lynch, ensuring personal
jurisdiction; etc.
Orders
must be personally served to be effective.
To ensure effective statewide enforcement, domestic violence protective
orders (including modifications, extensions, and terminations thereof) must be
registered with the State Department of Justice (DOJ) through the California
Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems (CLETS). The DOJ is required to maintain a “Domestic
Violence Restraining Order System” and to make all information concerning such
restraining orders (whether or not served upon the respondent) available to
court clerks and law enforcement personnel through computer access. Electronic transmission of the pertinent
information is the county’s responsibility.
[See Ca Fam Section 6380(a), (e) (f), 6382.]
Domestic
violence orders are deemed to be of three years’ duration if the expiration
date is not stated on the face of the order form. [Ca Fam Section 6345(c).] There does not appear to be a uniform definition
of the word “permanent,” from one jurisdiction to another, or even within a
jurisdiction, which causes tremendous vagueness and confusion to someone who is
not an expert in the complex area of restraining order law. This area of law should not have any
confusing or vague terms because civil orders have criminal repercussions.
VAWA supersedes the statutory provisions under
federal and state pre-emption. VAWA
requires evidence demonstrating that the defendant was afforded due process and
verification of the order if the terms or status of the order are not clear or
if jurisdiction requires clarification by the appropriate state registry. If the registries do not provide the
necessary information, prosecutors and law enforcement should contact the clerk
of the court in the issuing jurisdiction.
Steps such as these are necessary for corroboration of the allegations
sufficient to support a charging document in another jurisdiction.
It is Defendant’s belief that Cohen decided to
create the new May 25, 2011 domestic violence order due to the fact that
enhanced protection for alleged victims can be achieved by requesting things
like high bail; asking a court to conclude that an individual is an increased
flight risk; various conditions with respect to defendant’s release from
custody.
Prosecutors and victim witness specialists are
advised to access risk factors such as:
separation of the parties; threats of homicide or suicide; possession of
or access to weapons; prior use of weapons; stalking behavior; obsessive or
desperate attachment to victim; destruction of victim’s property; history of
domestic violence and violent criminal conduct; drug or alcohol involvement;
depression of other mental illness; abuse of children and animals. While these may be valid and viable tools for
a risk assessment, these categories also extend themselves to people who are
willing to create fraudulent and fictional narratives; have motive to target an
innocent person; hold revenge fantasies about another individual; or, who
simply need to come up with a defense.
Lynch and Cohen were never in an intimate dating relationship. They never had a “sexual relationship.” They
were never together and could not have separated. Leonard Cohen testified that the
relationship, an alleged brief intimate encounter in the mid-to-late 80s,
simply dissolved. Lynch has no access to
weapons and believes there are far too many weapons in this country but does
absolutely support one’s constitutional rights in accordance with the Second
Amendment. Lynch has never threatened anyone
with a weapon.
Lynch has never engaged in stalking behavior
although she is aware that Leonard Cohen, and others, have concocted a stalking
scenario whereby a woman who was Cohen’s alleged lover in the 80s; worked for
him until 2004; suddenly became disgruntled; stole with him and got away with
it; proceeded to harass him; and ultimately wants to contact him for no good
reason and evidently is interested in attending his concerts. The theory is absurd and preposterous. However, it mimics statements attributed to
Jeff Dunn of LAPD’s Threat Management Unit in various articles with respect to
celebrity stalkers who make an individual’s life a “living hell” and attend
celebrity concerts. Leonard Cohen may
also picked up some instructional tips from a film his former girlfriend,
Rebecca DeMornay, was in. That film is
entitled “The Hand That Rocked The Cradle” where DeMornay plays the
psychopathic nanny that stalks a family.
Cohen spent a tremendous amount of time with DeMornay during this
period.
Exhibit
__: LAPD TMU Articles
Prosecutor
Sandra Jo Streeter: This case is about
what Ms. Lynch did to Leonard Cohen over a one-year period; how she made his
life a complete and utter living hell;
how he feared for his safety … RT 600
Why
did you get the one in Colorado?
Cohen: One of the specific
reasons was that I was giving a concert in – in Colorado in Denver, and we knew
that Ms. Lynch was living there and we were uncertain as to what her actions
would be if I were performing in the vicinity.
We heightened security at the concert, and as part of those precautions
we took out a restraining order against her in Colorado, since she had moved to
Boulder, Colorado in the meantime. RT
73 Streeter: So when Ms. Lynch stopped contacting you when
you were on tour, did you think everything had really been resolved? Cohen:
No, not at all. Streeter: Why not?
Cohen: Because whenever there was
an article or review of my concert in any newspaper of the world Ms. Lynch
would … Kelly: Objection, your
Honor. Court: Sustained.
No
objection. Should have let him finish
the question. Concert 9 months
later. It was about Ann Diamond’s
article, my online posts defending myself and refuting the slander, and my
communications with journalists.
Prosecutor Sandra Jo Streeter and Leonard Cohen appear to
have fashioned their questions, statements, and testimony on LAPD’s TMU
information. Defendant does not believe,
for a moment, that Leonard Cohen flew into Boulder, Colorado from Europe (where
he was on tour) to obtain a civil harassment order against her because he felt
she would attend his concert approximately 9 months later in Denver,
Colorado. Cohen testified that Lynch did
not contact him from the time the September 2008 order became “permanent” until
approximately September 20 or 21, 2011.
During that time, however, Leonard Cohen appears – according to his
testimony – to have been monitoring Lynch’s comments with respect to articles
and reviews of his concerts. Lynch
understands, having been his personal manager for approximately 17 years, that
Leonard Cohen is obsessed with his press, reviews, and pays attention to every
detail of his business and artistic affairs.
Defendant maintains that Leonard Cohen actually flew into Boulder, Colorado
from Europe due to the fact that Ann Diamond wrote an article she intended to
submit to Rolling Stone and posted it on her blog. Leonard Cohen’s lawyer, Robert Kory,
threatened Ann Diamond with litigation over that article although it is, for
the most part, entirely factual.
Other
issues that can be distorted and used to one’s personal advantage, when
victimizing an innocent individual, are accusations of an obsessive or
desperate attachment to one’s alleged victim; drug or alcohol involvement;
mental illness; abuse of children and animals.
Defendant who has engaged in none of these types of activity; who does
not have alcohol, drug, or mental health issues, and who most certainly never abused
her sons, anyone else – including animal, has now been conveniently accused of
all of the above. Restraining order
terrorism affords individuals who are willing to lie, falsely accuse others,
and perjure themselves to retaliate for a variety of reasons. It also affords endless opportunities with
respect to business disputes, child custody matters, divorces, and so forth and
so on. In fact, when an individual is
willing to engage in positively deranged conduct, the sky is the limit.
The
DVPA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Lynch. Leonard Cohen’s testimony over the alleged “dating
relationship” includes perjury and allegations that their alleged brief
intimate relationship occurred in the mid-to-late 80s when Lynch resided in New
York City (approximately 25 years ago).
Defendant argues that, apart from the fact that there was no brief
intimate dating relationship, the definition is unconstitutionally vague
because it does not place any time limits on the former relationship of the
parties. When a court considers a
vagueness challenge, it must determine the validity of the law in light of the
particular facts at hand. The statute
offers no guidance to law enforcement officers or prosecutors as to how
recently the relationship must have ended.
Leonard Cohen could not describe when the relationship allegedly
ended. It apparently just dissolved.
Docket
No. 98111-Agenda 9-January 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
HOWARD W. WILSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed March 24, 2005.
All
statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of rebutting that
presumption is on the party challenging the validity of the statute to
demonstrate clearly a constitutional violation. People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 406 (2003).
If reasonably possible, a statute must be construed so as to affirm its
constitutionality and validity. Greco,
204 Ill. 2d at 406. When a statute is declared unconstitutional, our review is de novo. People v. Einoder, 209 Ill.
2d 443, 450 (2004).
Defendant
concedes that he may challenge the statute only as applied to the facts of this
case. Where, as here, a statute does not affect first amendment rights, it will
not be declared unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is capable of no
valid application. Izzo,
195 Ill. 2d at 112. Defendant does not dispute that the statute is capable of
some valid applications. In cases that do not involve first amendment freedoms,
due process is satisfied if: (1) the statute's prohibitions are sufficiently
definite, when measured by common understanding and practices, to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited, and (2)
the statute provides sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement
officers and triers of fact that its application does not depend merely on
their private conceptions. People
v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 639-40 (2000). A defendant cannot escape
a statute's reach by arguing that it might be vague as applied to someone else.
Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d
at 113. If the defendant's conduct clearly falls within the statute's
proscriptions, prosecuting him does not offend due process even though the
statute might be vague as to other conduct in other circumstances. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d at 113.
As
applied to defendant, the statute meets Falbe's
two-part test. First, the statute's
prohibitions are sufficiently definite, when measured by common understanding
and practices, to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning as to
what conduct is prohibited. As previously stated, domestic battery is
battery committed against a family or household member. Both the simple battery
statute and the domestic battery statute prohibit causing bodily harm to
someone or making physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with
someone. 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a), 12-3.2(a) (West 2002). Defendant conceded at oral
argument that he understood that he was not entitled to commit a battery
against the victim whether or not she was a family or household member. If
defendant's argument is that he was not given fair warning whether committing a
battery against Meeks would be a simple battery or a domestic battery, that
argument is also unavailing. Because defendant and Meeks formerly shared a
common dwelling and formerly had a dating relationship, defendant was clearly
informed that committing a battery against Meeks would be a domestic battery.
Defendant's argument before this court shows that he understood what was
prohibited. Defendant complains about the lack of a time limit in the statute
and notes that it applies to anyone who has ever had a dating relationship with
the victim or who has ever shared a common dwelling with the victim, no matter
how long ago. Defendant's interpretation is correct: the statute has no time
limit. But that does not make the statute vague. Defendant's own argument shows
that he understood what the statute meant.
Second,
as applied to the facts of this case, the statute provides sufficiently
definite standards for law enforcement officers and triers of fact that its
application does not depend merely on their private conceptions. At the time
defendant committed the alleged battery, he and Meeks had ended an intimate and
sexual 10-month relationship only 4 months previously. For 4 of those months,
they had shared a common dwelling. Thus, any law enforcement officer or trier
of fact would understand that this statute applied to defendant's situation,
and they would not have to rely on private conceptions as to what constituted
formerly sharing a dwelling or having a dating relationship.
Although
the trial court stated that it
understood that it could consider the statute only as it applied to defendant,
the court did not limit its inquiry accordingly. At the end of the evidentiary
hearing, the court expressed concern that defendant could still be charged with
domestic battery against Meeks if a similar incident occurred in 40 years. The
court then asked the State if that provided much guidance to law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, or triers of fact. The State responded that it did
because the question is always whether the parties have had a dating
relationship. Moreover, the lack of a time limit did not make the statute
vague. The court responded that it was concerned that if a man bumped into a
woman on the street, and he had dated that woman 45 years earlier in high
school, he could be charged with domestic battery. The State explained that
such a hypothetical was not relevant and again reiterated that a lack of a time
limit made the statute definite rather than vague. When the trial court issued
its written ruling, it stated that "if a person had had a dating relationship
with another individual 50 years ago, and then a battery occurred between those
two individuals, that person committing the battery could be charged with and
convicted of the offense of domestic battery." The trial court erred in
taking all of these hypotheticals into account. As we stated in Izzo, a defendant
"cannot escape the law's reach by arguing that the statute might be vague
as applied to someone else." Izzo,
195 Ill. 2d at 113. Moreover, even in these hypothetical situations, the
statute would not be vague. The statute is very clear that there is no time
limit, and both defendant and the trial court have demonstrated their
understanding of this.
From
the above quotations, it appears that the State is correct that the trial
court's true concern was not vagueness, but whether the statute was enacted
under a valid exercise of the legislature's police power. However, due process
principles prohibit only the arbitrary or unreasonable use of the police power.
Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d
at 640. "To constitute a legitimate exercise of the police power, a
legislative enactment must bear a reasonable relationship to the public
interest intended to be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable
method of accomplishing the desired result." Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d at 640. We are concerned not
with whether the legislature has chosen the best or most effective means of
resolving the problems addressed by the statute, but only with whether the
statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has
determined to be a threat to the public health, safety, and general welfare. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d at 640.
The trial court, however, could consider a police
power argument only on an as-applied basis. See Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d at 644-45. Thus, it was not relevant whether it was a
valid exercise of the police power to make the statute applicable to
relationships that ended 50 years before the alleged battery. The
legislature's obvious concern in enacting the domestic battery statute was in
curbing the serious problem of domestic violence. Defendant conceded at oral
argument that the threat of domestic violence does not end when a relationship
ends. Clearly, it was not unreasonable for the legislature to include within
the domestic battery statute relationships that had been over for only a few
months. Whether it was reasonable to include relationships that had ended 50
years ago is not before this court.
In sum,
section 112A-3, as applied to defendant, is neither vague nor an unreasonable
exercise of the police power. We therefore reverse the trial court's order
holding the statute unconstitutional and remand the cause for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CONCLUSION
The
People assert that she violated the terms of her probation in the following
manner: 1. Failure to present completion
of a psychological evaluation to the court for review and 2. Failure to obey all laws by her continuing
behavior that falls within the purview of California Penal Code Section 653(m)
(copies of the emails are attached hereto).
Defendant vehemently denies both accusations and reasserts her belief
that this matter is entirely retaliatory and an affirmative defense on the part
of the City Attorney of Los Angeles.
