Wednesday, September 27, 2017

Kelley Lynch's Brady Motion Filed w/ LA Superior Court 09.27.17

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant has been falsely accused and charged with alleged violations of a protection order (or conflicting orders in two states that are at issue in this case) obtained by deceased singer-songwriter Leonard Cohen and additional charges related to her allegedly illegitimate communications to Robert Kory, Michelle Rice, IRS, FBI, DOJ, Treasury, ICE, CIA, Senate Judiciary, FTB, and others.  Two Amended Information Complaints have been filed to date.
ARGUMENT

This motion requests disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment information pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 and its progeny and Penal Code section 1054.1(e).
A California prosecutor’s obligation to provide exculpatory and impeachment information arises from the federal Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (constitutionally-mandated discovery) and California’s Criminal Discovery Statute as codified in Penal Code section 1054.1(e) (statutorily-based discovery).  Both the federal and state rules require that the prosecution provide evidence favorable to the defendant on the issue of guilt or punishment.  Favorable evidence may consist of exculpatory information factually specific to a case (exculpatory evidence) or impeachment information undermining the credibility of a prosecution witness (impeachment evidence) and members of the prosecution team.
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87.  A failure to disclose material favorable evidence to an accused (a Brady violation) can result in a dismissal or reversal or modification of a judgment. The rule established in Brady (Brady rule) is independent of the Criminal Discovery Statute.  Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 378.
In Penal Code section 1054.1, the California legislature set forth a list of discovery materials and information which the prosecution is required to disclose to the defense before trial, including 1054.1(e) (“The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant . . . any exculpatory evidence.”).  The term “exculpatory evidence” as used in Penal Code section 1054.1(e) is a symbolic term used to describe Brady evidence and includes impeachment evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676 (“This Court has rejected any [constitutional] distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.”); Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 281 (“Thus the term ‘Brady violation’ is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence . . . .”); People v. Kasim (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1381 (“Law enforcement agencies (1) possessed significant exculpatory evidence bearing on the credibility of the key prosecution witnesses.”); Snow v. Sirmons (2007) 474 F.3d 693, 711 (“Exculpatory evidence includes impeachment evidence.”).
In enacting Penal Code section 1054.1(e), the legislature codified and expanded the Brady rule. In providing for the disclosure to the defense of “any exculpatory evidence,” the legislature broadened the Brady rule to mandate California prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense without regard to materiality.  Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890, 901; see also People v. Bowles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 318, 326. 
A failure to disclose any exculpatory evidence (a PC 1054.1(e) violation) can result in various discovery sanctions pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.5(b), but generally not in dismissal.  Pen. Code, § 1054.5, subd. (c).
            The prosecution in this case should be admonished to strictly adhere to the constitutional (Brady) and statutory (PC 1054.1(e)) disclosure obligations. A failure to reveal or produce exculpatory and impeachment information pursuant to the Brady rule and Penal Code section 1054.1(e) may also violate Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5-220 (“A member shall not suppress any evidence that the member . . . has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.”) and Penal Code section 141 (A prosecutor who intentionally withholds relevant, exculpatory information is guilty of a felony.).
A prosecutor has an affirmative due process duty to disclose to the defendant all favorable material evidence possessed by the prosecution team.  In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879. This Brady rule applies even though there has been no request.  United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107.
Evidence is “favorable” to a defendant if it either helps the defendant or hurts the prosecution.  In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-544.  Evidence is favorable to a defendant when it is exculpatory or can be used to impeach the testimony of a material prosecution witness.  United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676.  “Exculpatory” evidence pursuant to Brady is information which, if true, could show that a defendant is innocent or less culpable for the crime charged and which must be disclosed to the defendant without request.
Examples of exculpatory evidence include evidence that: Mitigates punishment [In re Miranda (2008) 43 Cal.4th 541, 567-577]; Directly opposes guilt [Castleberry v. Brigano (6th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 286, 293]; Negates an element of a charged offense [Youngblood v. West Virginia (2006) 547 U.S. 867 (Suppressed note written by alleged sexual assault victims could have supported consensual-sex defense.)]; Supports defense testimony [People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 54; Hobbs v. Municipal Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 670, 688]; Supports an affirmative defense [United States v. Ross (9th Cir. 2004) 372 F.3d 1097, 1108-1109 (Evidence supporting entrapment defense is favorable to defendant.)]; and Supports a defense motion [United States v. Gamez-Orduno (9th Cir. 2000) 235 F.3d 453, 461; United States v. Barton (9th Cir. 1993) 995 F.2d 931, 935].
“Impeachment” evidence pursuant to Brady is information about a witness that a fact finder may consider in determining whether that witness is telling the truth.  Evidence impeaching the credibility of a material prosecution witness is different conceptually from other kinds of evidence favorable to a criminal defendant, in that impeachment evidence generally does not concern itself with the question whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the charges against him or her. Yet impeachment evidence is subject to the same Brady rules of disclosure as any other kind of evidence favorable to the defendant.  Pipes & Gagen, California Criminal Discovery (4th Edition), sec. 1:23:1.
Examples of impeachment evidence include: Felony convictions involving moral turpitude [People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 314];  Misdemeanor or other conduct that reflects on believability [People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295-297; California Criminal Jury Instructions No. 105]; Misconduct involving moral turpitude [People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 297, fn. 7]; False reports by a prosecution witness [People v. Hayes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1244]; Pending criminal charges against a prosecution witness [People v. Coyer (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 839, 842]; Parole or probation status of a prosecution witness [Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 319; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 486];
Evidence contradicting a prosecution witness’s statements or reports [People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 568-569]; Evidence undermining a prosecution witness’s expertise (e.g., inaccurate statements or expert opinions)  [People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1179]; A finding of misconduct by a Board of Rights or Civil Service Commission that reflects on a prosecution witness’s truthfulness, bias or moral turpitude [Cf. People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 293]; Evidence that a prosecution witness has a reputation for untruthfulness [Evid. Code, § 780; see Carriger v. Stewart (9th Cir. 1997) 132 F.3d 463, 479 (Evidence that a prosecution witness has a reputation for manipulation and dishonesty is evidence tending to exculpate the defendant and must be disclosed to the defendant.)]; Evidence that a prosecution witness has a racial, religious or personal bias against the defendant individually or as a member of a group [Evid. Code, § 780; In re Anthony P. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 502, 507-510]; and Promises, offers or inducements to a prosecution witness, including a grant of immunity [United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676-677; Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 153-155].
Impeachment evidence is favorable to a defendant when it undermines the credibility of a prosecution witness.  United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676; People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 30; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 46. 
Evidence impeaching the testimony of a material prosecution witness becomes favorable evidence pursuant to the Brady rule only when the witness testifies as a prosecution witness.  See United States v. Haskell (8th Cir. 2006) 468 F.3d 1064, 1075; People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 589.
Evidence is “material” if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed.  Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 289.
A prosecution witness is a “material witness” when that witness's testimony is so important that there is a reasonable probability that its absence would affect the outcome of the prosecution’s case.  E.g., Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 291-296; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 653; People v. Ruthford (1975) 14 Cal.3d 399, 406; Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 154-155; In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 535.  Specifically, a “material witness” provides testimony at trial on an important issue which is not cumulative, i.e., testimony which no one else can give on a disputed issue.  E.g., People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1049-1051; Banks v. Dretke (2004) 540 U.S. 668, 700-701; United States v. Fallon (7th Cir. 2003) 348 F.3d 248, 252; Bailey v. Rae (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1107, 1116-1119.
Penal Code section 1054.1 provides: The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and information, if it is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies:
(a) The names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses at trial. (b) Statements of all defendants. (c) All relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the offenses charged. (d) The existence of a felony conviction of any material witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial. (e) Any exculpatory evidence. (f) Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case, including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial.

Subdivision (e) codifies the Brady rule. As used in that subdivision, the phrase “exculpatory evidence” includes both exculpatory and impeachment evidence.  The United States Supreme Court has rejected any constitutional distinction between exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence and has specifically stated that “impeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule” (United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676). Similarly, the California Supreme Court has rejected any distinction between the phrase “exculpatory evidence” as utilized in Penal Code section 1054.1(e) and the prosecutor’s Brady disclosure duty under the Due Process Clause (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 372).  Subdivision (e) also expands the Brady rule. Its language requires a prosecutor to disclose to the defendant any exculpatory evidence, not just material exculpatory evidence.  Barnett v. Superior Court (People) (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890, 901.  A failure to disclose any exculpatory evidence (PC 1054.1(e) violation) can result in various discovery sanctions pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.5(b), but generally not in dismissal.  Pen. Code, § 1054.5, subd. (c).
The fulfillment of the prosecution’s obligation under the Brady rule and Penal Code section 1054.1(e) to provide exculpatory and impeachment evidence is the sole responsibility of the prosecution and should be done without a defense request.  To ensure compliance with the Brady rule, the United States Supreme Court on more than one occasion has urged the “careful prosecutor” to err on the side of disclosure.  Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 440.  “The prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.”  United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 108; see also Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 439 (Warning prosecutors against “tacking too close to the wind” in withholding evidence.).
A prosecutor must continue to comply with the Brady rule and Penal Code section 1054.1(e) during the trial, so any exculpatory and/or impeachment evidence discovered after the trial begins must be provided to the defense.  See United States v. Jordan (11th Cir. 2003) 316 F.3d 1215; In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1246.
The Brady rule is based on due process and exists to ensure a defendant a fair trial.  Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 559; Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87.  However, if, after the trial ends, a prosecutor acquires information which casts doubt upon the correctness of a conviction, the ethical code of the legal profession requires the prosecutor to disclose the information.  Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 427, n. 25; In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1246; Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 5-220 (“A member shall not suppress any evidence that the member . . . has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.”).
CONCLUSION
It is the obligation of the prosecution, in preparing for trial, to seek all exculpatory and impeachment information from all members of the prosecution team. Members of the prosecution team include federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and other government officials participating in the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the defendant.  In this case that would include, but is not limited to, the District Attorney of Los Angeles, LAPD’s TMU (including with respect to Steve Cooley), Berkeley Police Department.  Defendant attaches hereto, and makes a part hereof, a schedule of information and/or evidence she is requesting from the prosecution team, and asks the Court to grant this motion.
Dated:  25 September 2017                             Respectfully Submitted,

                             
                                                                        By:_______________________________
                                                                              Kelley Lynch, in Propria Persona 




EXHIBIT A

SCHEDULE OF BRADY
INFORMATION/EVIDENCE REQUESTED

            The prosecution is obligated to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence that is material to either guilt or punishment.  Exculpatory evidence means favorable to the accused.  This obligation includes “substantial material evidence bearing on the credibility of a key prosecution witness.”  People v. Ballard (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 752, 758.  Such impeachment evidence must disclose more than “minor inaccuracies.”  People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 929.  Impeachment evidence is defined in Evidence Code Section 780 and CALJIC 2.20.  Examples of impeachment evidence are set forth as follows:
The character of the witness for honesty or veracity or their opposites.  (Evidence Code Section 780(e).) 

A bias, interest, or other motive.  (Evidence Code Section 780(f).)

A statement by the witness that is inconsistent with the witness’ testimony.  (Evidence Code Section 780(h).)

Felony convictions involving moral turpitude.  (Evidence Code Section 788.)

Facts establishing criminal conduct involving moral turpitude, including misdemeanor convictions.  (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295-297.)

False reports by a prosecution witness.  (People v. Hayes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1244.)

Pending criminal charges against a prosecution witness.  (People v. Coyer (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 839, 842.)

Parole or probation status of a witness.  (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 319; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 486.)

Evidence undermining an expert witness’s expertise.  (People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1179.)

Evidence that a witness has a racial, religious, or personal bias against the defendant individually or as a member of a group.  (In re. Anthony P(1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 502, 507-510.) 

The duty of disclosure applies even to completed case.  (People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1179.)  However, it does not apply to cases in which the defendant pled guilty or no contest.  (U.S. v. Ruiz (2002) 536 U.S. 622.)  Kelley Lynch pled not guilty in 2012.  She has raised the fact that the entire 2012 trial record is evidence of fraud with this Court. 

In accordance with the requirements detailed hereinabove, Kelley Lynch requests the following information.  She intends to pursue an affirmative entrapment defense as well as issues related to the prosecution manufacturing criminal conduct.  That will include, but is not limited to, the prosecution’s novel theory that her requests (as addressed extensively during her 2012 trial which led to a conviction) for federal tax information and communications with federal agencies (such as IRS, FBI, DOJ, Treasury, and so forth) were her “intent to annoy” Leonard Cohen. 
It is the obligation of prosecutors, in preparing for trial, to seek all exculpatory and impeachment information from all members of the prosecution team. Members of the prosecution team include federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and other government officials participating in the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the defendant.  In this case that would include, but is not limited to, the Los Angeles City Attorney, Los Angeles District Attorney, LAPD’s Threat Management Unit, Berkeley Police Department, and possibly other government and/or law enforcement agencies and/or agents.  The information and/or evidence being requested is as follows:
1.          Any agreement, expressed or implied, not to prosecute a witness, such as Leonard Cohen or his representatives, for any crime or crimes, or to otherwise recommend leniency or favorable treatment.  During the 2012 proceedings, DCA Sandra Jo Streeter confirmed that the District Attorney’s Office elected not to prosecute Leonard Cohen in connection with Lynch’s complaint to the DA’s Major Fraud Unit.  That complaint involved the theft of millions of dollars from Lynch, corporations, and raised other serious issues related to fraud, corporate malfeasance, money laundering, tax fraud, legal conspiracy, etc.  During those proceedings, former DA Steve Cooley publicly aligned himself with Leonard Cohen, had at least one investigator in the courtroom to intimidate Lynch, and the prosecution elicited extensive testimony about Phil Spector, Cohen’s so-called gun stories about Mr. Spector, former DA Steve Cooley, former DDA Alan Jackson, and Phil Spector’s appellate attorney, Dennis Riordan.  Lynch maintains that there was some form of quid pro quo between the prosecution, which would include the District Attorney’s Office in this case, Leonard Cohen, and/or Cohen’s legal representatives, Robert Kory and Michelle Rice, et al. that resulted, in part, in the DA’s decision not to prosecute Cohen and Leonard Cohen’s testimony during the 2012 proceedings about Phil Spector.  In fact, Lynch contends that her trial was design as a response to her September 2009 letter to former DDA Alan Jackson. 
2.         The role of Leonard Cohen, Robert Kory, Michelle Rice, former DA Ira Reiner, or any other representative or agent of Leonard Cohen’s, as a confidential informant, witness, and/or human source with respect to the Phil Spector case, Kelley Lynch, and/or any matters related to the IRS and tax fraud at issue throughout the 2012 proceedings.  The credibility of cooperating witnesses or informants is an issue should they testify during trial.  Leonard Cohen previously testified.  However, this information was not disclosed to Kelley Lynch.  The information requested should include all proffer, immunity and other agreements, validation assessments, payment information, and other potential witness impeachment information.  Lynch intends to pursue an affirmative entrapment defense, involving members of the prosecution team (including the District Attorney’s Office) and prosecution witnesses, so this information and/or evidence is both relevant, material, and probative. 
3.         Any agreement, expressed or implied, not to prosecute a third party of concern to the witness for any crime or crimes, or to otherwise recommend leniency or favorable treatment. Such third parties include Leonard Cohen, Leonard Cohen’s legal representatives, Robert Kory and Michelle Rice, and/or related parties.  This issue would also extend to any assistance the prosecution team offered Leonard Cohen with respect to tax fraud, theft of corporate property, and/or attempts to sabotage Internal Revenue Service and discredit Kelley Lynch.
4.         The substance of any written communications between the government and Leonard Cohen and/or any agents, representatives, or attorneys of Leonard Cohen relating to any deals or understandings entered into between them and the government whereby Cohen and/or his representatives may expect immunity or other favorable treatment in return for its cooperation or testimony in this or any other prosecution.  That would include, but is not limited to, the Phil Spector case, any IRS or federal tax prosecution, and with respect to Kelley Lynch.  It is Lynch’s understanding that Leonard Cohen’s statements related to Phil Spector and a gun were transmitted to the Spector Grand Jury and she is aware that the Spector prosecution used a version of Cohen’s gun story in at least one motion in limine as a prior bad act.  That version was contradicted by Leonard Cohen’s testimony during Lynch’s 2012 trial.  It was further contradicted by an email Leonard Cohen transmitted to DCA Sandra Jo Streeter during those proceedings.    
5.         Any agreement, expressed or implied, to provide favorable treatment or consideration such as money, a job, a new start, or any concession to the witness himself or to a third party of concern to the witness.
6.         Any agreement, expressed or implied, to contact any state or federal agency, bureau, department, or other unit to put in a good word for the witness or to suggest that the witness receive any sort of favor, benefit, compensation, or consideration.  That would include, but is not limited to, Internal Revenue Service, FBI, DOJ, Treasury, FTB, and/or ICE.  It is Lynch’s understanding that the District Attorney of Los Angeles contacted ICE with respect to Phil Spector’s driver, Adriano DeSouza, and concessions were made to him in exchange for his testimony.  Leonard Cohen was a resident alien in this country who, due to the issues related to the federal tax matters raised during Lynch’s 2012 proceedings, may have been concerned about his residence status.

7.         Any agreement, expressed or implied, to recommend to any state or federal agency, bureau, or department, or other unit, that the witness, any friend, relative, agent, associate, or employer of the prosecution witness receive any sort of favor, benefit, compensation, or consideration.
8.         The terms of any agreement whereby the witness would become an agent of, or cooperate with, any governmental entity to provide information or evidence relevant to the detection or prosecution of a crime – or did in fact provide information and/or evidence.  That would include, but is not limited to, the Phil Spector case, any matter related to IRS and/or tax fraud, and with respect to Kelley Lynch.  It is Lynch’s understanding that Leonard Cohen was represented by former DA Ira Reiner. 
9.         Information in the possession of the government or available to the government as to the criminal history of the prosecution witness including all arrests whether convicted or not.
10.        Any consideration or promise of consideration made by any government representative to any prosecution witness.
11.        Disclosure of all crimes, misconduct, or bad acts which the government has reason to believe have been committed by any prosecution witnesses or by their representatives and/or operatives.
12.        Substantive case related communications.  During the 2012 proceedings, DCA Streeter informed the Court that the District Attorney’s Office contacted the City Attorney with respect to Kelley Lynch.  In the current proceedings, DCA Henry informed this Court that members of the City Attorney’s Office and District Attorney’s Office had discussed Lynch and mentioned an email Lynch allegedly sent former DA Steve Cooley.  Streeter also informed the Court that Lynch “fought” with the District Attorney’s Office.  Lynch has received no information and/or reports about these communications. 
13.        All substantive case-related communications would include communications among prosecutors and/or agents of these offices, between prosecutors and/or agents and witnesses and/or victims, and between victim witness coordinators and witnesses and/or victims.  Such communications may have been memorialized in emails, memoranda, or notes.  “Substantive” communications include factual reports about investigative activity, factual discussions of the relative merits of evidence, factual information obtained during interviews or interactions with witnesses/victims, and factual issues relating to credibility.  The format of the information does not determine whether it is discoverable. For example, material exculpatory information that the prosecutor receives during a conversation with an agent or a witness is no less discoverable than if that same information were contained in an email. When the discoverable information contained in an email or other communication is fully memorialized elsewhere, such as in a report of interview or other document(s), then the disclosure of the report of interview or other document(s) should be provided to the defense.  For example, DCA Streeter communicated directly with Leonard Cohen prior to and/or during the 2012 proceedings.  In one such communication, provided to Lynch’s lawyers, Streeter noted that she “hated to keep peppering” Cohen with questions but failed to provide the prior communications to the defense. 
14.       Potential Giglio Information Relating to both Law Enforcement and Non Law Enforcement Prosecution Witnesses:
  • Prior inconsistent statements
  • Statements or reports reflecting witness statement variations (see below)
  • Benefits provided to witnesses including:
    • Dropped or reduced charges
    • Immunity
    • Expectations of downward departures or motions for reduction of sentence
    • Assistance in a federal, state or local criminal proceeding
    • Considerations regarding forfeiture of assets
    • Stays of deportation or other immigration status considerations
    • Green card and/or alien resident status
    • Monetary benefits
    • Non-prosecution agreements
    • Letters and/or communications to and/or with other law enforcement officials (e.g. federal government authorities) setting forth the extent of a witness’s assistance or making substantive recommendations on the witness’s behalf
    • Consideration or benefits to culpable or at risk third-parties
  • Other known conditions that could affect the witness’s bias such as:
    • Animosity toward defendant
    • Animosity toward a group of which the defendant is a member or with which the defendant is affiliated
    • Relationship with victim
    • Known but uncharged criminal conduct (that may provide an incentive to curry favor with a prosecutor)
  • Prior acts
  • Prior convictions
  • Known substance abuse or mental health issues or other issues that could affect the witness’s ability to perceive and recall events
15.       Information Obtained in Witness Interviews: Although not required by law, generally speaking, witness interviews should have been memorialized by the agent. Agent and prosecutor notes and original recordings should be preserved, and prosecutors should confirm with agents that substantive interviews should be memorialized. When a prosecutor participates in an interview with an investigative agent, the prosecutor and agent should discuss note-taking responsibilities and memorialization before the interview begins (unless the prosecutor and the agent have established an understanding through prior course of dealing). Whenever possible, prosecutors should not conduct an interview without an agent present to avoid the risk of making themselves a witness to a statement and being disqualified from handling the case if the statement becomes an issue. If exigent circumstances make it impossible to secure the presence of an agent during an interview, prosecutors should try to have another office employee present. Interview memoranda of witnesses expected to testify, and of individuals who provided relevant information but are not expected to testify, should be reviewed.  Lynch was not provided this information during her 2012 proceedings although she was advised that Leonard Cohen and his lawyers, Robert Kory and Michelle Rice, met with members of LAPD’s Threat Management Unit and the prosecution.  In fact, it is Lynch’s understanding that prior to Robert Kory’s testimony during the 2012 proceedings, DCA Streeter met with him and this resulted in the introduction of an “IRS Binder” as potential evidence. 
·         a. Witness Statement Variations and the Duty to Disclose.
·         b. Trial Preparation Meetings with Witnesses.
·         c. Prosecution Memorandum, Reports, Interview Notes, Accounts of Interviews
16.       With respect to the involvement of the District Attorney’s Office in the 2012 proceedings and/or the current proceedings:

Many cases arise out of investigations conducted by multi-agency task forces or otherwise involving state law enforcement, prosecutorial and/or other government agencies.  Lynch maintains that, with respect to her 2012 prosecution and the current proceedings, the District Attorney of Los Angeles, LAPD’s TMU, and other members of the prosecution team were under the prosecutor’s control, participated in joint investigations, and/or shared resources.  The prosecution should have read access to that evidence and/or information.  Lynch is requesting the following information to the roles played by the District Attorney of Los Angeles, LAPD’s TMU, and/or other government agencies who worked with and/or were under the control of the prosecution during Lynch’s 2012 trial and/or the current proceedings:
  • Whether the prosecutor and the agency conducted a joint investigation or shared resources related to investigating the case;
  • Whether the agency played an active role in the prosecution, including conducting arrests or searches, interviewing witnesses, developing prosecutorial strategy, participating in targeting discussions, or otherwise acting as part of the prosecution team;
  • Whether the prosecutor knows of and has access to discoverable information held by the agency;
  • Whether the prosecutor has obtained other information and/or evidence from the agency;
  • The degree to which information gathered by the prosecutor has been shared with the agency;
  • The degree to which decisions have been made jointly regarding civil, criminal, or administrative charges; and
  • The interests of the parties in parallel or generally related proceedings.
Favorable Information

17.       Any information that might held the defense attack the government’s case or mount an affirmative defense such as entrapment or the manufacturing of a crime.  In determining what must be disclosed under Brady the [prosecution’s] guiding principle must be that the critical task of evaluating the usefulness and exculpatory value of the information is a matter primarily for defense counsel, who has a different perspective and interest from that of the police or prosecutor.

18.       Any information relevant to evidentiary questions or important pretrial constitutional motions.  As serious issues related to First Amendment rights and the use of the restraining orders at issue as prior restraints upon Lynch’s speech, she is requesting any and all information related to the basis for any and all determinations that any communications at issue are not legitimate, made in good faith, and/or were sent solely with the “intent to annoy” Robert Kory and/or Michelle Rice. 

19.       As Lynch intends to raise an affirmative entrapment defense, and will address manufactured crimes, she is requesting any and all information related to LAPD’s 2011 report that contains information related to Detective Albanese, Beverly Hills Police Department, and her contacts with the District Attorney of Los Angeles.  In particular, LAPD’s report confirmed that Albanese communicated with William Hodgman and Wendy Segal and was advised that the elements of stalking were not present.  Albanese was also evidently advised that Cohen and his representatives, Kory & Rice, should pursue “intent to annoy” charges. 

20.       Any favorable information in the possession of the prosecution team.  That would include, but is not limited to, any information previously recorded and/or which was merely conveyed orally to a member of the prosecution team.  The format of the information does not determine whether it is discoverable.  The government must search for favorable information in reports, emails, text messages, discussions, or information obtained during interviews and information the prosecutor received during conversations with members of the prosecution team and/or witnesses.  As prior closed cases are covered by Brady materials, and Lynch did not receive any such information during the 2012 proceedings, this request is for any and all such information from the 2012 proceedings as well as the current proceedings. 

21.       Any and all information that tends to cast doubt on defendant’s guilt with respect to any essential element in any charged count.  That would include, but is not limited to, disclosure of any information that is inconsistent with any element of any crime charged.

22.       Any physical evidence, testing, or reports tending to make guilt less likely.  Specifically, Lynch is requesting access to physical copies of all original alleged Voice Mail messages from her 2012 trial, and those referred to throughout these proceedings, together with the names of any expert witness who reviewed same.  For example, the individual who informed Cohen and/or his representatives how to handle evidence that was not date/time stamped.  Lynch is requesting access to the actual recordings and not copied.  She would also like a written chain of evidence list which she was not provided during the 2012 proceedings.  Lynch has no indication as to how or what evidence came into the possession of LAPD’s Wilshire Division, LAPD’s Threat Management Unit, and/or the City Attorney of Los Angeles. 

23.       Any information that tends to support an affirmative defense. As stated herein, Lynch intends to pursue an entrapment defense that involves a manufactured crime.  Part of the manufactured crime will relate to federal tax matters, compliance with federal tax laws, and so forth. 

24.       Any information that tends to cast doubt on the admissibility of the government’s evidence.  Lynch is requesting any information that might have a significant bearing on the admissibility of prosecution evidence and/or cast doubt on the admissibility of evidence that the government anticipates offering in its case-in-chief.  For example, Lynch would like information as to precisely who in LAPD’s TMU and/or the City Attorney’s Office made any determinations whatsoever that she transmitted the fabricated email evidence at issue herein. 

25.       Any information that tends to support the defendant’s pretrial constitutional motions or tends to show that defendant’s constitutional rights were violated.  Lynch is requesting copies of training requirements on the part of LAPD’s TMU and members of the City Attorney’s Office with respect to First Amendment rights, federal tax laws and compliance with same, civil and/or criminal tax fraud, corporate malfeasance, corporate tax laws, and so forth. 

26.       Any information that tends to diminish culpability and/or support lesser punishment.

27.       Inconsistent statements by government witnesses regarding the facts of the alleged crimes or the alleged conduct of the defendant. Lynch is requesting this information for the 2012 proceedings as well as the current proceedings.  For example, any evidence that a prosecution witness has lied to the government about material matters during the course of the investigation.  Any information related to inconsistent statements made by key witnesses.  The witness interviews, including with respect to the 2012 proceedings that Lynch was not provided, should have been memorialized at the time.  That would include Leonard Cohen, Robert Kory, and Michelle Rice.  That information is Brady information. 

28.       Statements by others, including any and all witnesses not called previously at trial or who will not be called at trial in these proceedings, that are inconsistent with statements of government witnesses regarding the facts of the crime or the alleged conduct of the defendant. Lynch maintains that this request would include any statements of Leonard Cohen’s transmitted to the Phil Spector Grand Jury or used by the Spector prosecutors in the Spector case. 

29.       Any information that relates to the potential mental, psychiatric, and/or physical impairment of any witness.  That would include, but is not limited to, Leonard Cohen, Michelle Rice, and Robert Kory.  Lynch is requesting disclosure of any known substance abuse or mental health issues (such as depression, the use of psychiatric medications, and so forth) or other issues that could affect the witness’s ability to perceive or recall events, including psychiatric and/or medical issues.

30.       Any information relating to potential witness bias, including: benefits received by any witness (including possible informant status in the Spector case), disclosure of any benefits provided to testifying witnesses (including reduced charges, immunity, expectations that they would not be prosecuted, assistance with other criminal proceedings, assistance with immigration status considerations, monetary benefits, agreements, letters to other law enforcement or government agencies, and/or any other favorable treatment, promise, reward, or inducement provided to any witness by the prosecution team.  That team would, of course, include the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office and the Phil Spector case. 

31.       Other known conditions that could affect the witness’s bias such as: animosity toward defendant, animosity toward a group of which the defendant is a member of with which defendant is affiliated, relationship with the victim, known but uncharged criminal conduct. 

32.       Information that calls into question efforts to present the witness as neutral and disinterested. For example, any incentive on the witnesses’s part that would shed light on his or her incentive to cooperate with the government and/or law enforcement. 

33.       Impeachment information that officers or others had “fed” parts of a witness’s story to the witness during questioning.  For example, any information related to Threat Management Unit’s assisting with the creation of tools, techniques, and/or restraining orders to build a case against Lynch. 

 Any information related to a witness’ dishonesty and/or criminality and/or probative of untruthfulness

34.       Disclosure of any facts of prosecution witnesses’s perjury in any proceedings or that any witness has lied to the government in the course of an investigation. 

Additional disclosures

35.       Any relevant oral statement made by the defendant in response to questioning by a person the defendant knew was a government agent, if the government intends to use the statement at trial.

36.       Any relevant written or recorded statement by the defendant in the government’s control or that the government can obtain by due diligence, including in the possession of LAPD’s TMU and/or the District Attorney of Los Angeles.

37.       The defendant’s prior criminal record.  That would include, but is not limited to, any FBI record.

38.       All documents and/or objects, including Voice Mail messages and any other physical forms of evidence, that are are material to preparing the defense, may be used by the government in its case-in-chief, or have been obtained from the defendant.

39.       Reports of any physical or mental examination or tests if the item is material to preparing the defense and the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief.  That would include, but is not limited to, all materials the government provided domestic violence counselor Sandra Baca during the 2012 proceedings and her findings as well as other oral/written communications the government had with this expert.

40.       A written summary of any expert testimony that the government intends to introduce at trial.

41.       Any and all information, material to guilt and/or innocence, used during the 2012 proceedings whether or not that information is considered relevant in the current proceedings. 

Affirmative Entrapment Defense Information/Evidence

42.       Any and all findings on the part of Investigator William Frayeh, Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office related to his confirmation to Lynch that he would review communications between former DDA Alan Jackson and Stephen Gianelli [who most certainly functions as an operative desperately attempting to elicit information about Leonard Cohen, IRS and tax fraud, federal tax matters, and the Phil Spector case while discrediting Lynch, her witnesses, and targeting witnesses].  Investigator Frayeh informed Lynch that Gianelli may have found a “sympathetic ear” with Spector prosecutor Alan Jackson about Lynch. 

43.       Any and all information related to former DDA Pat Dixon’s communications with Spector trial attorney Bruce Cutler about Kelley Lynch.  In his entirely hearsay letter to the Sentencing Judge during Lynch’s 2012 trial, Bruce Cutler raised communications he had with Dixon about Lynch in 2008. 

44.       Any and all findings on the part of Investigator John Thompson who, together with Detective Silva, of the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office was investigating matters evidently related to a complaint Lynch filed with the DA’s Internal Affairs Unit.  That complaint addressed threats involved threats made against Lynch by former DA Steve Cooley’s personal investigator, Marko, and further threats to arrest Lynch for requesting the return of her evidence in the form of a letter Phil Spector sent her which she permitted Investigator Brian Bennett to take with him and copy.  She did not provide that to the District Attorney’s Office as a gift. 

45.       Any and all information and/or reports related to Investigator Brian Bennett’s statements to Kelley Lynch that the District Attorney’s Office received an “anonymous” telephonic tip about her friendship with Phil Spector.  Brian Bennett, an investigator on the Phil Spector case, personally advised Lynch that the anonymous tip was placed to the DA’s office by a woman. 

46.       Any and all information as to when LAPD’s Threat Management Unit became involved with any investigation related to Lynch.  That would include, but is not limited to, any and all matters related to Leonard Cohen and/or Phil Spector. 

47.       The most significant responsibility of the TMU is the process of threat assessment, and implementing that threat assessment into a case management strategy. However, before any threat assessment of value may be done, detectives must obtain as much applicable information on the suspect and victim as available.  Lynch is requesting any and all information related to any such  game plan and/or case management strategy formulated with respect to her – as that would relate to her 2012 prosecution and the current proceedings.  For example, Leonard Cohen informed the Boulder Combined Court that California law enforcement instructed him to obtain the restraining order. 

48.       Any and all emails, voice mails, text messages, and/or other electronic communications the government, including all members of the prosecution team (such as LAPD’s TMU and/or the District Attorney’s Office) exchanged with a witness or potential witness and/or which mentions a witness or potential witness. 

49.       Trial preparing meetings with witnesses.  That would include with respect to the 2012 and current proceedings and should extend to the District Attorney’s Office, LAPD’s TMU, and the City Attorney’s Office. 

50.       Outcome of any prosecution investigation related to witness credibility and allegations.  For example, Lorca Cohen’s public allegation that her father molested her.   

51.       The names of the employees at the City Attorney’s Office who transcribed the alleged Voice Mail messages during the 2012 proceedings.  This resulted in wholly incoherent, fraudulent, and false representations of the alleged messages being transmitted to the jurors.  It also appeared intentional that criminal conduct on the part of witnesses was intentional deleted and/or distorted. 

52.       Name of Leonard Cohen’s private investigator who was present for a portion of the 2012 proceedings and reports related to any statements and/or information provided by him to the prosecution.

53.       The name of the female and male investigators, from the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office, who were present in the courtroom throughout the 2012 proceedings. 

54.       Information and/or reports related to any prosecution/witness discussions following the March 23, 2012 proceedings where Leonard Cohen testified that he and Lynch were in a purely business relationship and she never “stole” from him – just his “peace” of mind. 

55.       As Lynch is pursuing an entrapment defense, that will involve a manufactured crime and fictitious course of conduct, she is requesting all information, witness statements, and/or reports in the possession of the prosecution that resulted in the summary of so-called evidence presented to jurors in the 2012 proceedings as follows:

Streeter:  So the people believe that the evidence will show in the case of People of the State of California vs. Kelley Lynch that during the 80s, Mr. Leonard Cohen, who was a singer ... struck up a relationship with Ms. Lynch.  They had a brief intimate relationship, and then at some point after that the relationship ended in the late 80s when Mr. Cohen’s business manager died, Mr. Cohen hired Ms. Lynch, first as his personal assistant, and then ultimately as his business manager.  But unfortunately around 2004 or so, things started to go not very well between Mr. Cohen and Ms. Lynch.  And Mr. Cohen ended the business relationship that he had with Ms. Lynch.  Unfortunately, that was not the end of it for Ms. Lynch, the evidence will show.  The evidence will show that shortly after the termination of the business relationship by Mr. Cohen that Ms. Lynch began an onslaught, a campaign of harassment on Mr. Cohen, and that harassment -- that harassment has continued or did continue up until February 29, 2012.  But during this campaign, the evidence will show, that Ms. Lynch started against Mr. Cohen, she did not just limit her contact toward Mr. Cohen.  Ms. Lynch contacted other people that were close to Mr. Cohen.  RT 37-39

There is – the evidence will show that Ms. Lynch was upset and Mr. Cohen and fought with the District Attorney’s office, the LA County District Attorney’s office didn’t file charges against Mr. Cohen.  RT 40  The evidence will show the evidence stopped, virtually stopped.  None from Ms. Lynch.  When did they start back up?  About the time Mr. Cohen’s world tour was over in 2011.  RT 40

56.       Any and all tax forms that DCA Streeter informed the jurors during Lynch’s 2012 trial that she was in possession of.  That would include, but is not limited to, 1099, K-1s, corporate balance sheets, and corporate tax returns for the years 2004 and 2005.  Streeter has, during the current proceedings, raised the tax statements and/or information. 

57.       Any and all information related to Streeter’s statements during the 2012 proceedings that the “tax statement” and/or Cohen’s “tax fraud” was a “ruse.” 

Now, in some of the emails there are mention by Ms. Lynch of failed business agreements and failure by Mr. Cohen to live up to his agreement of what she believed their business relationship was.  And indeed one of the things, the evidence will show, that she talks a lot about is tax fraud and the need to have the tax return.  But the People will submit to you or show to you that this so-called business relationship, or not honoring their business relationship, indeed the most important thing that she mentions every so often the tax statement is merely a ruse.  For example ... the evidence you will see ... that Ms. Lynch specifically asked for her K-1 form ... Let’s talk a little bit about Ms. Lynch’s need for the tax form or tax returns -- the evidence will show that Ms. Lynch was Mr. Cohen’s business manager.  The evidence will show that Mr. [sic] Lynch -- Mr. Cohen has no clue as to what a W-2 form is, a 1099 is, a K-1 form.  The evidence will show that Ms. Lynch is the one that had all of that information, knew all that information.  Mr. Cohen did not have it, does not have it and does not understand what it means.  Okay.  (RT 42-43)

58.       Any and all injunctions related to any corporation at issue herein.  Specifically, corporate injunctions extending to any corporate officer and/or federal Tax Matters Partner obtained by Blue Mist Touring Company, Inc. (Delaware corporation), Old Ideas, LLC (Delaware corporation), and/or Traditional Holdings, LLC (Kentucky corporation). 

59.       Any and all information related to LAPD’s 2011 determination that Lynch and Cohen were in a “sexual relationship” and explanation of how that related to a statutory required “dating relationship.” 

60.       Phil Spector Grand Jury transcripts if they indicate that Leonard Cohen’s statements were in fact transmitted to the Spector Grand Jury. 

Streeter:  Did Ms. Lynch ever mention People that both you and she knew?  … Cohen:  She talked about some well-known singers that both of us know.  Streeter:  I’m sorry … well-known – Cohen:  She talked about some well-known singers that both of us knew.  Streeter:  Such as who, Mr. Cohen?  Cohen:  Such as Bob Dylan.  Streeter:  What about – did she ever mention Phil Spector or Phillip in any of those?  Cohen:  Yes, she accused me of – she accused me of testifying before a Secret Grand Jury which resulted in the conviction of Mr. Spector.  Streeter:  Do you know Mr. Spector?  Cohen:  I knew him.  He produced a record of songs that we wrote together.  It was in 1977.  Streeter:  But you had no dealings with him since then; is that right?  Cohen:  No, I don’t believe – I haven’t seen him.  I don’t remember if it was ’77 or ’78 that the record came out.  But since then, no, I have had no contact with him.  RT 56-57

She accused me of testifying before a secret grand jury which resulted in the conviction of Phil Spector.  RT Streeter:  Okay, in any of her emails, did she ever mention Phil Spector?  Cohen:  She often mentioned Phil Spector, repeating over and over that I had testified before a Grand Jury and I was involved in the conviction of Phil Spector.  RT 60-61

61.       Any and all witness statements related to the Whole Foods accident involving Lynch’s son, John Rutger Penick, and/or the coordinated custody matter related to Lynch’s son, Ray Charles Lindsey.  This request would go to witness honesty and/or deceit. 

Streeter:  All right.  Did does Ms. Cohen [Lynch] have any children?  The Court:  Ms. Kelley – Ms. Lynch.  Streeter;  I’m sorry.  Does Ms. Lynch have any children?  Cohen:  Yes, Ma’am.  She has two sons.  Streeter:  Did she ever mention any of her children in any of the voicemail messages?  Cohen:  Yes, many times.  She – she accused me of being indirectly responsible for her losing custody of one child.  Streeter:  What was that child’s name?  Cohen:  That child’s name was Ray Lindsey – Streeter:  Does she have another child?  Cohen:  Yes, she has another child.  Streeter:  What’s that child’s name?  Cohen:  His name is Rutger Bennett [Penick].  Streeter:  Does she ever mention Rutger – Cohen:  Yes, many times she suggested I was responsible for an accident that befell him.  RT 57-58

Streeter:  Okay, and any of the emails did she ever mention her son Ray Lindsey?  Cohen:  Yes she did.  Streeter:  Did she mention her son Rutger in the emails?  Cohen:  Yes, Ma’am.  RT 62

62.       As Lynch is pursuing the possibility that all alleged (and unauthenticated evidence) electronic and/or email evidence transmitted to the Court during her 2012 proceedings may have been altered, she is requesting the actual copies that Leonard Cohen testified he personally transmitted to the Law Offices of Robert Kory and/or Kory & Rice, LLP together with the names of all individuals who had access to same.  In response to a 2011 request for tax information, Kelley Lynch received the following email from Leonard Cohen.  She believes it goes to bias and motive on the part of Cohen and his representatives as well as an unconscionable focus on her son, John Rutger Penick whenever tax matters are raised.  She also believes it proves that information, potentially relevant to criminal conduct or dishonesty on the part of the prosecution’s witnesses, may have been removed from any and all allegedly forwarded email evidence.

baldymonk@aol.com
<baldymonk@aol.com> Sat, Sep 24, 2011 at 12:35 AM

To: kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com

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correction:
i see Rutger is copied in

63.       A copy of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department report related to their interview of Leonard Cohen with respect to the Phil Spector case.  This report was at issue during the 2012 proceedings but, at that time, was addressed in self-serving hearsay statements.  This report should be available to the prosecution team and/or in their possession. 

Streeter:  Do you recall if also in that voice mail message there was any mention of Phil Spector?  Cohen:  Yes, Phil Spector’s name was mentioned.  Cohen:  And his attorneys; is that right?  Cohen:  I believe so.  Streeter:  Now, is the discussion of Phil Spector something that is common in the voice mail messages that Ms. Lynch has left you?  Cohen:  It’s almost routine.  RT 157-158  Streeter:  What about the email messages that Ms. Lynch has sent you, particularly in the time period of February 2011 to February 2012?  Is the topic of Mr. Spector a common topic? Is the topic of Mr. Spector a common topic?  Cohen:  Yes, it is.  Streeter:  Would you say that that is almost routine as well?  Cohen:  Yes, it is.  Streeter:  Did you have any involvement in the Phil Spector trial?  Cohen:  None, whatsoever.  RT 158 Cohen:  May I qualify that?  Streeter:  Yes.  Cohen:  At the very beginning of the trial, after the – the death of Lana Clarkson was made public, I was visited by two Sheriffs from the LA County.  And they interviewed me as to my relationship with Phil Spector.  My attorney, Mr. Cron, was present at the time.  I told the detectives that Phil Spector had produced an album of mine in 1977, and they asked me about some stories that were circulating in the newspaper about his use of guns in the studio. I told them of my experience.  Then they asked me when I’d last seen Phil Spector.  I said the last I’d seen him was shortly after the record was released, which I think was 1977 or 1978, and I hadn’t seen him since.  When they discovered that I hadn’t seen him since, they were no longer interested in interviewing me and left.  So that has some connection I did have with the trial.  Subsequent to that, I’ve had nothing to do with the trial whatsoever.  Streeter:  Now, when you spoke to the detectives do you know where Ms. Lynch was?  Cohen:  My attorney, Mr. Cron, asked Ms. Lynch to leave the room, so that I think the attorney/client privilege would not be challenged.  Streeter:  But she was somewhere around?  Cohen:  She was in my house.  RT 159

64.       Any and all information that IRS or federal tax laws require taxpayers to request tax information more than one time in any given email or oral request and/or for what particular period of time that alleged rule and/or law would apply.  Lynch is also requesting the relevant IRS or federal tax rule and/or law that states that the request for IRS required tax and/or corporate information appear on the “first page” of any such request.   

Streeter:  The subject says, Kelley Lynch 2004 and 2005 federal tax returns.  Streeter:  Now, previously you testified that that was one of the issues that she had with you.  In looking at that – the first page of that email, do you see any mention at all about requests for tax returns?  Cohen:  No, Ma’am, there isn’t any.  RT 164

This is the other thing the people found a little interesting.  She knows what a 1099 is a K-1 -- a K-1.  Whoever heard of a K-1 before this case?  The FTB and the IRS.  Did anyone know there was a difference between the FTB and the IRS?  Or what the FTB is?  … This is a woman who knows what a K-1 is … RT 566

So this isn’t about Ms. Lynch being angry that she didn’t get her tax documents.  RT 577  So what you have here, what this is proof of is not a woman who legitimately wants her IRS records or documents.  It’s the unraveling of a con.  RT 578

Streeter:  Do you see any mention of a request for a K-1 form?  … Is there any request for a 1099?  RT 165 

Streeter:  Do you recall whether or not there was any mention of a request for tax returns?  RT 167

65.       Evidence, pursuant to DCA Streeter’s and Leonard Cohen’s statements to the Court during the 2012 proceedings, that an IRS holding re. the default judgment, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC338322, exists.  Evidence that IRS determined that Leonard Cohen and/or the corporations he controlled were not required to provide Lynch with IRS required tax forms (1099, K-1s, corporate balance sheets, corporate tax returns) for the years 2004 and/or 2005 and that IRS determined that the 2006 default judgment altered their prior reporting and/or filing requirements.  Evidence that IRS accepts a fraudulent expense ledger as a substitute for IRS required forms 1099, K-1s, balance sheets, and/or corporate tax returns. 

Cohen:  Two courts had given me a default – or one court had given me a default judgment, the other court affirmed that default judgment.  But, more significantly, the IRS accepted the results of the default judgment and awarded me a tax refund, so Ms. Lynch had no cause to ask me for any taxation information.  The forensic report on which the default judgments were made were very specific and Ms. Lynch has read them.  That is the forensic report that Ms. Lynch has been asking for.  The only problem is she doesn’t like the results.  PD:  Okay.  Do you remember what my question was?  Streeter:  Objection; argumentative, Your Honor.  Court;  Sustained.  PD:  I’m asking you if – Court;  Why don’t you re-ask the question if you don’t think it’s been answered.  PD:  Did you talk to your manager who handles your tax to request those documents from 2001 to 2004?  Cohen:  No, Sir.  PD:  Okay.  Did you go about seeing about the K-1 that was being requested; yes or no?  Cohen:  No, Sir.  PD:  Did you go and give them Ms. Lynch’s information for you to send that information to?  Cohen:  No, Sir.  PD:  And we’ll get back to that judgment at a later time.  RT 279-283

66.       Evidence obtained from FBI related to their investigation into a murder, meth labs, meth distributions, and the Aryan Nation – including any information Lynch provided based on statements third parties made to her - together with their conclusion that this was an “implied threat” or Lynch’s intent to annoy Leonard Cohen. 

PD:  Okay.  You also mentioned that you were threatened with an email that referenced the Aryan Nation.  Do you remember that?  Cohen:  Correct.  PD:  I’m going to go ahead and show you that email, which has been marked as People’s 14.  Now, you just read that part that said Aryan Nation when you were asked about it, correct?  Cohen:  Right.  PD:  Now, the actual sentence says, P.S. more than one member of the Aryan Nation, so to speak, ended up protecting me on the streets of Santa Monica.”  That’s what the whole sentences says, correct?  And you’re aware that Ms. Lynch was actually homeless in Santa Monica?  Cohen:  Correct.  PD:  Nowhere does that sentence say anything about you, correct?  Cohen:  There are other emails.  PD:  I’m asking about this sentence.  Cohen:  This particular sentence has no reference to me, no – PD:  Okay.  And – Cohen:  -- Although there was an implied menace there.  PD:  Objection; speculation.  Court:  Overruled.  PD:  So that was an implied menace to you?  Cohen:  Yes, Sir.  When an enemy tells you that the Aryan Nation is protecting her, you would be concerned.  PD:  So you consider Ms. Lynch an enemy?  Cohen:  She considers me an enemy.  She mentions the fact that she’s my enemy forever in email after email.  RT 309-310

67.       Any and all prosecution information and/or reports of all witness statements related to the “IRS Binder.”  The prosecution presented the “IRS Binder” to the defense during Lynch’s 2012 trial.  Lynch was advised by her lawyers that this related to Robert Kory’s testimony although she was provided no information as to how that might be the case. 

Public Defender:  We received a binder from Ms. Streeter that was provided to her by one of the witnesses that includes, you know, we believe a highly relevant witness that goes to Mr. Kory’s anticipated testimony based on what she provided us.  He’s an agent of the IRS and we have subpoenaed him.  We received that information on Monday.  We subpoenaed him, he’s received that subpoena, but pursuant to federal regulations he has to clear that before he can testify with the appropriate authorities.  I spoke with the agent this morning.  That request is being considered and evaluated by their attorneys.  And as I said, they’ll give me an answer by this afternoon regarding whether or not he will be able to testify and as to what he will testify to.  Based on the fact that we received the binder on Monday, I think me and Mr. Kelly -- Court:  What does his testimony go to?

PD:  We believe it goes directly to the level of specific intent elements, Your Honor, that Ms. Lynch’s communications were not made with any intent to harass or annoy, and they were made in good faith, based on the actions taken by this agent, they fully corroborate Ms. Lynch’s intent.  We also think that on the secondary corollary matter, they go the vice motivation of the People’s witnesses.  Court:  Okay.  Well, I will consider that after I hear your information this afternoon.  RT 384-385.

68.       Evidence of Streeter’s expertise and/or education in the field of mental health diagnoses.  This is relevant and material as she requested, during the 2012 proceedings, that the Court commit Lynch to a domestic violence facility and potentially drug her against her will. 

69.       Copies of prosecution information and/or reports of all communications with Bruce Cutler and/or anyone representing his interests during the 2012 proceedings. 


DECLARATION REMOVED