From: Kelley Lynch <kelley.lynch.2010@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 2:16 PM
Subject: Re: Michelle Rice
To: IRS, FBI & DOJ cc: California State Bar
Hi IRS, FBI, and DOJ,
Rice's testimony is transparent. She has lied to me. She lied about a material fact. She has lied on the stand. And, the State Bar should investigate. It doesn't matter how she lies or fabricates information. She lied about a material fact; feels completely comfortable violating a restraining order and writing me; being copied on in criminally harassing emails; conjuring up fantasies about what a judge may have said privately; and has made partner. She's also quite proud of that fact. I believe that goes to motive. Providing me with tax information is evidently, according to these liars, a violation of a restraining order. She's a lawyer? Did she research that issue? I did. She's a bald faced liar and so is Kory and he put that in writing to IRS. I believe these people should be prosecuted and disbarred. And now, Michelle Rice serves as a paid lawyer. Do you see any problems with that? Cohen confessed to perjury on the stand. Rice admitted lying to me about a material fact in her email (even if she has a lame excuse since it takes 1 minute to google), etc. Why didn't the judge refer Cohen for a perjury prosecution and Rice to the State Bar? I don't think it could be more blatant.
All the best,
Kelley
PD: Now I’d like you to review what has been previously marked as Defense B, which is the four-page document, the California registration of the Colorado order. Can you please review that document and let me know where it shows that Mr. Kory is a named person, a named – Rice: Well, he’s not named, but our office is actually on the exclusion order, 5300 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, California, which is a law office, is on the stay away order. PD: And isn’t is also true that your law office’s address is only included under places of exclusion; isn’t that correct? Rice: That is correct. RT 359
PD: Now, that email that you sent to Ms. Lynch on February 14th, you said that you replied to all, to everybody that she had also included in that order; is that correct? I mean on the email. Rice: Well, she had been emailing Mr. Cohen in January of 2011, and I just used her distribution list. I just copied and just sent it to her distribution list. I don’t know all of the people that are copied in. PD: That’s understandable. But why did you cc all those other people in the emails that you sent to Ms. Lynch? Rice: I basically – I also had verbiage in the letter that said, you know, harassment through third parties was also prohibited contact under the restraining order. RT 360-361 PD: So are you saying that in seven years that you’ve been employed as Mr. Cohen’s counsel, you’ve never contacted Ms. Lynch and provided her any documentation that she’s requested. Rice: Well, I’m not Ms. Lynch’s attorney, so it would be improper for me to provide her with any information. I’m Mr. Cohen’s attorney. And to the extent that she’s asking for tax information, we don’t have that information. PD: Okay. So you have never sent her any of the information she’s asked for? Rice: I’m not under any obligation to. PD: I understand you’re not under any obligation. Have you or have you not sent that? Rice: I have not sent Ms. Lynch anything … PD: To your knowledge, has Mr. Cohen ever directly sent Ms. Lynch any documentation? Rice: It would be a violation of the restraining order. PD: Is that your understanding, that if he sent her documents, he would be violating the restraining order? Rice: It is my understanding. RT 361-362
Review January 2011 emails. There does not appear to be any evidence submitted to court regarding January 2011 emails allegedly sent to Leonard Cohen so nothing supports this testimony.
PD: And did you bill your time for that? [collecting emails; binders; etc.] Rice: Yes, we do time slips and I do bill time. PD: Are you billing your time for appearing in court today? Rice: Of course. PD: Okay. And you’ve been here throughout every stage of the proceedings, voir dire, opening statement? You’ve been outside in the hallway,; is that correct? Rice: Pretty much, yeah. PD: Are you billing your time for that as well? Rice: Yes … PD: Do yu know if he’s [Kory] billing his time for that as well? Rice: I would assume so. RT 365
MICHELLE RICE REDIRECT
Streeter: Ms. Rice, did we have a discussion about whether or not you were going to be necessary to testify in this case, the People thought it was necessary for you to testify in this case? Rice: Yes. Streeter: Okay. And did I, the People’s representative, make it clear to you that you must come to this courtroom and testify? Rice: Yes. Streeter: Thank you. Nothing further.
Another Sidebar, without Court Reporter was held. RT 366
MICHELLE RICE RECROSS EXAMINATION
PD: Ms. Rice, were you present when there was an incident that occurred at Ms. Lynch’s home where the SWAT team went to her house, were you present there on that day? Rice: No. PD: You weren’t present in 2005 on that day? Rice: No. If you are referring to the incident in May of 2005. PD: Were you? Rice: No. I was not present. PD: Okay. But you know about that incident? Rice: Through Ms. Lynch’s emails, yes. RT 367 PD: Now in that February 14th, 2011 email that you wrote to Ms. Lynch where you told her that the order had been filed when it had not, did you know she was represented by counsel? Rice: No, I did not. PD: Did you make any attempt to find out if she was represented by counsel at that time? Streeter: Objection; relevance. Court: Overruled. Rice: I believe – I believe I actually did follow up with an email to Ms. Lynch, and I may have asked her if she’s represented by counsel, please let us know. I’m not sure. Again, this was last year. PD: So you followed up after you sent the initial email, that you may have done that? Rice: I believe so. PD: Okay. Now – Rice: If I may, if I may. In her voice mail she says, you know, I’m not represented by counsel, she’s – you know, she’s always saying – sometimes I may have read it in her emails. PD: But you believe she wasn’t represented by counsel? Rice: That’s correct. I would not have contacted someone who I knew to be represented. That’s correct. RT 367-368 Rice: She seems to say in her voice mails that she’s representing herself and, you know, who else is she going to go to get tax information from and that sort of thing, whatnot. RT 368-369 PD: But even though you felt you were a protected person, you directly contacted Ms. Lynch and you gave her misinformation that you had filed an order on February 14th; is that correct? … Let me rephrase it for your clarification. Even though you believed you were a protected person on that restraining order from Colorado, you still contacted Ms. Lynch; is that correct? Rice: I did so in the capacity of Mr. Cohen’s attorney … RT 370 PD: You still contacted Ms. Lynch; is that correct? And you provided false information to her, that you had registered an order out of state in the State of California? Rice: It is not false information. I was writing that because we had intended to file it, but we were still researching. It’s quite – let me. RT 370-371 Rice: There is a complicated procedure when you get an out-of-state order from another state. This is a Colorado order. We had to go to the Court to actually get that. This portion right here, this attestation, the California Court would not accept it without the order being verified by the Court Clerk in Colorado. So I had a copy that was not attested to. RT 371 PD: You write to Ms. Lynch that you had already filed the order in the State of California. RT 371
MICHELLE RICE
FURTHER REDIRECT
Streeter: Do you remember everything that the court [Boulder] said to Ms. Lynch in reference to contacting Mr. Cohen’s Colorado attorney? Rice: No, because there’s stuff—things that could have been said off the record that didn’t get – you know, he could have chatted with the judge. I don’t know. RT 373-374
Exhibit 26 – Transcript – Colorado hearing RT 375
Another sidebar is held without court reporter. RT 375
The Supremacy Clause, found in Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, establishes the Constitution, Federal Statutes, and U.S. treaties as "the supreme law of the land." Therefore, if a state law conflicts with a federal law, the federal law must be followed.
The Supremacy Clause states:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be Supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
According to U.S. law treaties are those international agreements that receive the advice and consent of the Senate. (Article II, section 2,clause 2 of the Constitution). A treaty to which United States is a party is given status equal to that of a federal legislation and therefore forms a part of the Supreme law of the land.
This concept of federal supremacy was first developed by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 406 (U.S. 1819), where the court held that the State of Maryland could not tax the Second Bank of United States, a branch of the National Bank. It was concluded that "the government of the Union, though limited in its power, is supreme and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, "any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
In Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (U.S. 1982) it was held that “a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute” and that a conflict will be found either where compliance with both federal and state law is impossible or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Similarly in Stone v. San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 862 (9th Cir. Cal. 1992) the court held on the issue of injunction and remediation, that "otherwise valid state laws or court orders cannot stand in the way of a federal court's remedial scheme if the action is essential to enforce the scheme. State policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees."
In effect, this means that a State law will be found to violate the Supremacy Clause when either of the following two conditions (or both) exist:[2]
1. Compliance with both the Federal and State laws is impossible
2. "State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"
The Supremacy Clause is the provision in Article Six, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution that establishes the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties as "the supreme law of the land." It provides that these are the highest form of law in the United States legal system, and mandates that all state judges must follow federal law when a conflict arises between federal law and either a state constitution or state law of any state.
The supremacy of federal law over state law only applies if Congress is acting in pursuance of its constitutionally authorized powers.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
Similarities exist between the Supremacy Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
The difference between the two is that while the Supremacy Clause deals with the relationship between the Federal Government and the states, the Fourteenth Amendment deals with the relationships among the Federal Government, the States, and the citizens of the United States.
In the case of California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989), the Supreme Court held that if Congress expressly intended to act in an area, this would trigger the enforcement of the Supremacy Clause, and hence nullify the state action. The Supreme Court further found in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363(2000), that even when a state law is not in direct conflict with a federal law, the state law could still be found unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause if the "state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress's full purposes and objectives".[4] Congress need not expressly assert any preemption over state laws either, because Congress may implicitly assume this preemption under the Constitution.
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC), formally the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, is the domestic portion of federal statutory tax law in the United States, published in various volumes of the United States Statutes at Large, and separately as Title 26 of theUnited States Code (USC).[1] It is organized topically, into subtitles and sections, covering income tax (see Income tax in the United States), payroll taxes, estate taxes, gift taxes, and excise taxes; as well as procedure and administration. Its implementing agency is the Internal Revenue Service.
The Internal Revenue Code includes most but not all federal tax statutes. Some tax statutes are found in other provisions of the United States Code including title 11 (related to bankruptcy) and title 28 (related to the judiciary). Further, some tax statutes are not codified at all (for example, the provisions of tax statutes that list the effective dates of Internal Revenue Code amendments).
In its role in administering the tax laws enacted by the Congress, the IRS must take the specifics of these laws and translate them into detailed regulations, rules and procedures.
So where was the State Bar Court during the ten-year period examined by the Van de Kamp commission? In a follow-up hearing on the commission's research, State Bar Chief Trial Counsel Scott J. Drexel testified that after reviewing half of the 53 misconduct cases that led to reversals of conviction, he had yet to find a single instance where a judge reported the misconduct to the bar—despite a mandate to do so (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6086.7(a)(2)). Drexel told the commission that the State Bar sends out a letter each year reminding judges of the statutory requirements.
See more at: http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=NaN&eid=903325&evid=1#sthash.4lcIscTw.dpuf
